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their fitness in the modern world. In my first case study I analyze how contemporary evangelical worship
spaces have become infused with technology and technological products. I take Life.Church in Edmond,
Oklahoma, which calls itself a “startup church” as the central example of how churches are adapting their
services and spaces to meet the needs of a suburban populace increasingly defined by digital habitus. My
second case study explores the world of faith tech. My interviews explore how these religious
entrepreneurs negotiate their place in the hierarchical culture of technology production centered in Silicon
Valley. I also discuss how many evangelicals see their work as having “redemptive” potential for both the
tech industry and American culture. In my third case study I analyze the motivations of a network of
Christian missionaries who are dedicated to incorporating new media technology into missions work. I
argue that these evangelicals are wary of corporate culture and instead identify with the early visionaries
of the internet especially with the Free and Open Source Software movement. Their experiments with
technology have run into problems in indigenous contexts and these issues have revealed the problems
inherent in the Western nature of technology production. Lastly, this study turns to users and takes a
network of female evangelicals on Twitter as examples of a new connective feminism in evangelical
culture brought about by the affordances of digital media.
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“WHAT GOD GAVE TO US”: DIGITAL HABITUS AND THE SHIFTING SOCIAL
IMAGINARY OF AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM
Corrina Laughlin
Dr. John L. Jackson Jr.

“What God Gave to Us”: Digital habits and the shifting social imaginary of American
evangelicalism examines how “digital habitus” (following Bourdieu, 1977; Sterne, 2000)
has shaped the social imaginary (Taylor, 2004) of the American evangelical subculture.
Using mixed qualitative methods including real-world ethnographic participant observation, interviews, and digital ethnography, the author presents four case studies that spring
from what the author conceives of as a “digital unconscious” (following from Walter
Benjamin’s (2010) notion of the “optical unconscious”) of evangelicalism. This study begins by situating evangelical digital habitus in the context of the long history of media
use in American evangelicalism, a history that has often seen this subculture using media
technologies means to prove their fitness in the modern world. In my first case study I
analyze how contemporary evangelical worship spaces have become infused with technology and technological products. I take Life.Church in Edmond, Oklahoma, which
calls itself a “startup church” as the central example of how churches are adapting their
services and spaces to meet the needs of a suburban populace increasingly defined by
digital habitus. My second case study explores the world of faith tech. My interviews ex-
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plore how these religious entrepreneurs negotiate their place in the hierarchical culture of
technology production centered in Silicon Valley. I also discuss how many evangelicals
see their work as having “redemptive” potential for both the tech industry and American
culture. In my third case study I analyze the motivations of a network of Christian missionaries who are dedicated to incorporating new media technology into missions work. I
argue that these evangelicals are wary of corporate culture and instead identify with the
early visionaries of the internet especially with the Free and Open Source Software
movement. Their experiments with technology have run into problems in indigenous contexts and these issues have revealed the problems inherent in the Western nature of technology production. Lastly, this study turns to users and takes a network of female evangelicals on Twitter as examples of a new connective feminism in evangelical culture
brought about by the affordances of digital media.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
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“Christians should be at the head of innovation and not the tail. We shouldn’t wait for
Google or for Apple to come out with Christian innovation it should be the Christians
trying to innovate for what is needed in the Kingdom.” (Jeyanti Yorke).

“The day that the iPhone came out I was in Las Vegas at the Consumer Electronics Show
in the Nokia tent. Heard the announcement... and I hit publish on a page that said how to
get your Bible onto an iPhone.” (Antoine Wright).

It is a hot, sunny day in Southern California and as I walk through the landscaped
campus of a large evangelical megachurch I see young children in water wings swimming
in the outdoor baptismal pools. I am talking with a pastor at this church and our conversation has turned from the interview he just gave me to idle chat. He tells me about a friend
of his who was involved in a Silicon Valley startup that is doing pretty well. The pastor
seems a bit envious, but he thinks trying something like that himself would just be too
risky, plus he does not have the skills he would need to succeed in the tech industry.
Nonetheless, he wants to start getting his kids into classes for coding so they will have
opportunities he has not had. His kids are three years old and eighteen months.
Lawrence Lessig (1999) has asserted that “code is law” and code is undeniably
powerful in a twenty-first century American culture where digital products, and what this
project conceives of as “digital habitus” has become ubiquitous. Thus the sense that this
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pastor wants his children to code connects to his desire for his children to have power and
influence in American culture. As this study will show, this idea is at the heart of the
American evangelical embrace of new media technologies. In what follows, I track those
evangelicals who fear that they are losing younger adherents and who posit that involvement in new media technologies is the way to remain “relevant” in American culture. Implicit in the young pastor’s hopes for his children is the sense that new media technologies are the future and if Christians want to be a part of that future, they have to prepare
themselves for it by learning how to code.
Beyond the need to stay relevant in the public sphere, many American evangelicals also believe that the goals and prophecies central to Christianity eschatology can
only be met when Christians use all of the tools of the modern world at their disposal. For
example, at Echo, an evangelical tech and media conference I attended in 2013, a social
media consultant, Tim Schraeder, gave a presentation in which he told the audience,
We’ve never been more equipped and more resourced to get the message of the
gospel out there…I really do believe that we could be part of that generation or
part of raising up the next generation that could see Christ return. And we have an
amazing opportunity but we’re going to be held accountable for how we
stewarded what God gave to us. (Schraeder, 2013 July 25).
In the cosmic play of Christian history, evangelicals see the contemporary moment as the
final or penultimate act before the return of the Christ, or the Rapture. Given this, the
Christians living on Earth during this time believe that they have a responsibility to do
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everything in their power to fulfill what they call “the Great Commission,” the biblical
imperative to bring the gospel, or the message of the Bible, to all people.1 As Schraeder
suggests, individual believers will be judged by God based on how effectively they used
God-given tools, like consumer media technologies, in their lifetimes.
These twin imperatives, cultural and theological, that animate how evangelicals
use technology have consequences for the shape and contour of evangelical culture. New
media technologies have transformed the primary spaces in which evangelical worship
takes place. It is now commonplace for evangelical churches to have an app or to employ
text-based giving. Similarly, it has become normal to imagine integrating technology into
missions work. Prominent evangelicals argue over Twitter, and they argue about Twitter.
And the technological products that evangelicals have developed and put into use have
been successful, wide-reaching, and influential. For example, the Bible App, created by
Life.Church, has been downloaded on over 300 million devices and translated into virtually every language. To create this app, Life.Church, based in Edmond, Oklahoma, hired
developers and computer engineers from Silicon Valley and tech hubs across the country
and assembled a group of programmers they called their “digerati team”—a feat that the
New York Times estimates cost the church over twenty million dollars (O’Leary, 2013)
and made it into a new hybrid institution, a “start-up church.” Successful forays into the
technology industry like this, have allowed this subset of evangelicals an influential voice
in mainstream evangelical publications, for example, The Christian Post named

1 A short

glossary of commonly-used evangelical terms is included in Appendix A.
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Life.Church “the most innovative church” in 2007 (Kwon). These evangelicals have also
circulated a Christian-based understanding of the religious affordances of technology
both through the influence of figures like Bobby Gruenewald, the leader of LifeChurch.tv’s “digerati team” who was voted one of the most innovative people in business
in 2011 by Fast Company, a magazine about Silicon Valley culture.
American evangelicalism has evolved over its history as I track in Chapter Two of
this project. Those who consider themselves evangelicals are Christian Protestants and
though there is much denominational, cultural, and doctrinal diversity among evangelicals, they can typically be characterized by the affective, emotional relationship that they
display in worship and activism, an understanding of Biblical literalism, and an emphasis
on being “born again” or conversion as a central theological tenet. 2 As Heidi Campbell’s
(2010) research has shown, American evangelicals have been early adopters of new media technologies relative to other religious traditions. At every iteration in the development of digital culture, from message boards to killer apps, evangelical Christians have
been producing technologies and creating networks alongside and sometimes within the
technology industry. Some of these have been passion projects, others have been for-profit businesses, some have been driven by the need to proselytize, or spread the “Good
News.” Others have been driven by the need to keep up with American cultural norms.
Yet in the narrative of the growth of internet culture, in journalism and popular media,
these projects and the people who have created them are typically considered with wry
2

This short definition of evangelicalism is adapted from David Bebbington’s (1989) definition which is
also used by the National Association of Evangelicals.
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curiosity, if they are considered at all. But, if we accept that software is culturally coded,
that technological products originate out of specific social milieus that carry with them
assumptions, biases, and value-propositions, then understanding the beliefs and motivations of religious technology producers and users adds to our understanding of digital culture. To this end, this study takes seriously the endeavors that American evangelical
Christians have made in digital culture and asks what the evangelical embrace of discourses and practices endemic to Silicon Valley culture has meant for evangelical culture
and for digital culture.
In light of this my study asks a series of related questions: What is revealed about
each of these cultures in the negotiations between them? What new publics take shape as
evangelicals shape technology? What is the meaning of technology to these Christians
and how do they understand their role in an evolving technological culture and in a presumed technological future? What is the relationship to capitalism inherent in the embrace of technology that these evangelicals perform? In what ways does the evangelical
embrace of technology discourses also mean that they replicate Silicon Valley and digital
culture’s failures, especially in regard to race and gender?
My study employs a qualitative approach that combines real-world and virtual
ethnography and interviews and focuses on four areas in which evangelicals are engaged
with digital culture. First, I look at how evangelical churches are transforming themselves
into tech-saturated spaces, and I visit and analyze an influential “startup church” that borrows strategies from Silicon Valley tech companies. Then, I explore those business peo-
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ple who create faith-based apps in Silicon Valley and around the country and who struggle to negotiate their place in Silicon Valley’s hierarchical culture. Third, I speak with
those working to tinker with technology to make it suitable for various missionary
projects around the globe, and whose efforts are reshaping the boundaries of the missionary project and the evangelical understanding of indigenous people. And finally, I turn
from considering technology producers to considering users and I explore how female
bloggers garnering charismatic authority through their performance of authentic Christian
womanhood on the internet are creating what the magazine Christianity Today has called
a “crisis” in evangelical culture by upending patriarchal authority structures. Throughout
these case studies, I argue that there is a widespread digital habitus in evangelical culture
that is creating new norms and ideas and that the digio-cultural assemblage of people,
businesses, and organizations that is emerging, which I characterize as a “digital unconscious,” is changing the evangelical social imaginary, the way that evangelicals understand themselves and their place in American culture.
Definitions: Technology, evangelicalism
This study is focused on how evangelicals use and conceive of digital media technologies and as such I use the terms “technology,” “digital media,” and “new media” interchangeably and in a way that I believe is emic to the community under study. When
my interlocutors spoke about “technology” they were referring to consumer technologies,
and especially those mass media technologies that have been successful in the consumer
marketplace. Things like the iPhone, social media platforms, and virtual reality (VR)
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hardware were included in the suite of technological products that concerned the people I
spoke with whereas things like the washing machine, or military innovations were not.
When they referenced the history of technology they nearly always referenced the printing press, understood to be the reason that the Bible was able to be read in vernacular
languages. So even in looking backward, their focus was always on media technologies,
technologies that can be used to disseminate messages.
I also use the terms “evangelical” and “Christian” interchangeably again, in a way
that I believe is emic to those who consider themselves evangelicals. The people that I
spoke with, the organizations that I visited, and the churches that I attended were part of
what is known as the evangelical tradition and identify themselves as such when asked,
however they typically call themselves “Christians” rather than “evangelicals.” This is in
large part due to the fact that the term “evangelical” is one that is under constant negotiation in evangelical culture especially because it is used to define a swath of people that is
typically read as politically conservative. In 2018, prominent Christian writer Tim Keller
published what became a controversial essay about the shifting meanings of the term
“evangelical” in the New Yorker magazine. In it, he writes of the problem of being associated with figures like disgraced Alabama politician Roy Moore and others who seem to
stand for evangelicals in the public sphere. Keller asserts that the term “evangelical” has
become loaded, even toxic in some circles and because of this even as evangelicalism
continues to be popular. He predicts that “The movement may abandon, or at least demote, the prominence of the name, yet be more committed to its theology and historic
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impulses than ever” (Keller, 2017). In my fieldwork I found a similar ambivalence for the
term “evangelical.” At least three evangelicals I interviewed told me––though I had not
asked–– that they believed in global warming. About the same number brought up how
they believe in equal rights for LGBTQ people, again unprompted. These Christians understood themselves to be part of a subculture that is often identified by its objection to
secularism, modernity, and science and they wanted to make sure that I knew that they
thought differently than their peers about these issues. All of this is background to explaining the historical weight of the term “evangelicalism,” a trajectory that I dive deeper
into in Chapter Two of this project.
Academic works on evangelicalism have often made the move of expressly focusing on white evangelicals. Chief among the justifications for this move is the idea that
white evangelicalism has been a distinct cultural and political force in the United States
with a history that is markedly different from what is known as “the black church.” For
Jonathan Walton (2009), however, this is a bias in the literature that is no longer relevant,
especially in relation to the study of media use in evangelicalism (p. 20). I take Walton’s
critique seriously and I did not set out to study only white Christians. I attended services
where popular black pastors preached, yet I found that the people that shared a zeal for
technology were overwhelmingly white evangelicals. My study unpacks the reasons why
there are a dearth of black voices in the movement that I trace, and I argue that in accepting the discourses of Silicon Valley digital culture, evangelicals have also accepted the
biases of this culture, specifically the historic erasure of racial and gender difference in
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technology production. Both evangelicalism and tech purport to be color blind spaces that
will accept anyone. Yet, as scholars have shown, this is not the case.
For example, Alice Marwick’s (2013) ethnography of Silicon Valley argues that
Silicon Valley culture has internalized the myth that it is a meritocratic industry and this
cultural understanding has excluded women and people of color because it is assumed
that if they do not already have a seat at the table, they must not have earned one, and
may not deserve one. And Sarah Wachter-Boettcher (2017) makes a similar point more
bluntly writing, “Scratch the surface at all kinds of companies––from Silicon Valley’s
‘unicorns’ (startups with valuations of more than a billion dollars) to tech firms in cities
around the world–– and you’ll find a culture that routinely excludes anyones who’s not
young, white, and male” (16). Similarly, evangelicalism has a fraught, contested history
of racial exclusion and separation. Though prominent evangelicals like Rick Warren and
Russell Moore have urged evangelicals to attempt to heal the racial schisms that have defined the movement in the past, there is little evidence that evangelicalism is becoming
more integrated (see Bracey & Moore, 2017). Women, too, face systemic challenges to
leadership roles of all types, and this is a history that I dive into in more depth in Chapter
Six of this project. It is perhaps because of their own history that evangelicals do not see
the faults in the technology industry that are clearly there. And it may be because of this
history that white evangelicals in particular are willing to accept the premises of the tech
industry more than those evangelicals of color.
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Religion and digital culture
Wade Clark Roof (1999) has asserted that religion in the United States is organized like “a spiritual marketplace.” Because the First Amendment has not allowed for a
single religion to be established in the state, religious entities have instead appealed to the
populace, and as many scholars have noted, there has been no more successful populist
religion in America than evangelicalism (see Balmer and Winner, 2002). That American
evangelicalism is a populist religion means that it has historically been invested in understanding, keeping up with, and often mimicking popular culture. At the same time, it is
counter cultural. Evangelicals talk about the imperative to be “in but not of the world”
and by this they mean that they must understand and participate in worldly things so as to
be able to connect to the “unchurched,” but as individuals and organizations, they must
not embrace what they see as the sinful nature of secular culture. Related somewhat orthogonally to what George Marsden calls the “establishment-outsider paradox” (2006, p.
7) in fundamentalism, then, is an understanding of evangelicalism as reflective of popular
culture. This aspect of evangelicalism has been explored by scholars working at the intersection of media studies and religious studies who have rightly pointed out that evangelicals have historically been early adopters of media technologies and in many cases have
advanced and helped to define media forms.3 This study follows in that tradition by exploring the evangelical understanding and embrace of new media technologies.

3

See especially Hangen (2002) on evangelicals radio shows and their audiences, Hendershot (2007) on the
material culture of evangelicalism, and Hoover (1988), Schultze (1991), and Walton (2009) on televangelism as a cultural form.
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Evangelicals are a counterculture, but they can be understood in terms of publics,
that is, collectives that cohere through shared participation in media forms such as magazines, television shows, and radio programs. I argue that since the early days of the fundamentalist movement, American evangelicals have formed counterpublics (following
Michael Warner 2002) as well as a counter-cultural spaces and by this I mean that they
have often expressed their activism vis a vis American culture as well as their understanding of themselves in and through media forms. I provide a more detailed analysis of the
historical development of evangelical counterpublics in Chapter Two of this project, and I
believe these social formations are central to the way that evangelicals have approached
and used new media technologies.
As it is concerned with media use, my study follows from and contributes to literature on media and religion, and on the social shaping of technology. Daniel Stout (2002)
has argued that religious groups redefine themselves in and through their media practices,
a process that is especially significant as they approach and use new media. And Birgit
Meyer concurs, noting in her study of religious mediation, “media by and large only become an issue when they are new and the possibility of using them is considered” (2009,
p. 12). Relatedly, these groups also define how large swaths of the public respond to media and mediated change. Heidi Campbell (2010) has observed that the rhetoric of religious leaders shapes the way that people adopt and use technologies, a process that she
calls the “religious social shaping of technology,” following MacKenzie and Wajcman’s
(1999) notion of the” social-shaping of technology.” There has been some work that de-
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tails how evangelicals use digital media, especially the practice of online churches (see
Hutchings, 2013; Laughlin, 2011), and there has been some analysis on how Christian
symbolism is used to characterize technological products, for example the labeling of the
iPhone as the “Jesus phone” (Campbell & La Pastina, 2010) and my work follows from
these studies but also diverges in that I focus on the imaginary of technology in evangelicalism and how digital habitus and a related circulating discourse, that I reveal through
interviews, textual analysis, and ethnographic experiences, is changing the shape and
forms of a long-established American subculture.
On the other side of the coin, works like Fred Turner’s From Counterculture to
Cyberculture (2006), Thomas Streeter’s The Net Effect (2011), Stephanie Ricker
Schulte’s Cached (2013) and others have focused on the cultural discourses that influenced the creation of internet, the tech industry, and new media technologies. And recent
studies have focused on how discursive communities have formed due to the affordances
of the internet, for example, Jessa Lingel has explored the “communities of alterity” that
have developed around body modification and punk counter-cultural networks (2017a),
and Zeynep Tufekci (2017) has looked at how activist networks have cohered with relatively degrees of success by employing digital media. My study takes a similar approach
to these explorations of digital culture but focuses on a specific religious subset of technology producers and users.
Digital habitus and the digital unconscious
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This study charts how the widespread adoption and integration of digital technologies is shaping evangelical culture and evangelical publics. To begin to think through
this I want to follow Johnathan Sterne’s urging that scholars of technology should employ
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus” in understanding technologies as both embodied
and social (Sterne, 2003). Habitus encompasses all of the socially and culturally conditioned practices that define a lifeworld, from the way a person unconsciously picks up a
fork to the frequency with with she checks the Twitter app on her iPhone. As Bourdieu
explains, “the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by that
history” (1977, p. 84). Habitus is the way that a culture or society replicates through individual and collective practices, but it is not fixed or externally imposed, and may change
over time. Technologies too are socially and historically shaped. They emerge from cultures, and live in social systems and as such they both guide habitus and are habitus; as
Sterne puts it, “understood socially, technologies are little crystallized parts of
habitus” (2003, p. 376) by which he means that they are “practical reason” made manifest. As digital, mobile media becomes more ubiquitous, what might be termed “digital
habitus” has infused American culture. Jose van Dijk notes that “In barely ten years, algorithms have come to punctuate everyday social acts.” (2013, 416). And as algorithms
have been folded into the social world, the habitus of Americans has shifted, and a new
set of digital practices have come to occupy space in the social world. All of the daily interactions and micro-interactions that are facilitated by digital media might be character-
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ized as digital habitus. Furthermore, this habitus is often guided by digital platforms such
as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram which encourage repetitive social behavior such as
scrolling, liking, posting, engaging.
Marshall McLuhan (1964) conceived of media technologies as extensions of
the human nervous system, and this now seems prescient in an era when it is common to
liken a smartphone to an appendage. Smartphones, wearables, laptops, internet-connected
cars, and televisions all provide people with mobile access to others, and to a repository
of images, inputs, discourses and all of this becomes part of what it means to move
through the world. Raymond Williams understanding of “mobile privatization” (1975),
the idea that in scattered living rooms in various places, people engaged with a global
culture (typically centrally controlled by large media conglomerates) through the medium
of television, has evolved to be more mobile, more privatized, and more individualized.
People perform various versions of themselves based on the platforms that they frequent
and switch between and in this way they hail others and form social bonds.4 And though
McLuhan’s prediction that the world would be united through electronic technology in a
“global village” has not borne out, what I term digital habitus has shaped new communities, publics, and imaginaries.
A focus on the imaginary particular fits a study of the interplay between technology and religion. Consumer technology in the neoliberal context is invested in the
4

The performative nature of social media platforms has been a robust site of study in the field of Communication. Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012) has framed this in regard to “self-branding.” Alice Marwick (2013)
has looked at the ways that social media platforms encourage and dictate particular performances of self
and status. And Marwick and boyd have studied how Twitter users perform themselves in and through that
platform.
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imaginary as it is preoccupied by future-casting; by an understanding of “innovation” as a
way to create products that tap into a consumer Zeitgeist. Religion is also a category that
traffics in imaginaries as it propagates a specific lens through which to view human history. In thinking of imaginaries, I want to focus on Charles Taylor’s (2004) definition of the
“social imaginary.” Taylor explains that the social imaginary encompasses “the ways
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (p. 23). Thus, the social
imaginary is the way that a culture or a public sees and represents their world, and, in
turn it defines normative expectations. Talal Asad (2003) argues that religious groups
have different social imaginaries than what might be considered the secular public as
posited by Habermas (1962/1989), that is a public governed by the norms of deliberation
and reasoned debate as in the 17th and 18th Century coffee houses in England and salons
in France that Habermas takes as his central examples. Religious voices, viewpoints and
imaginaries present a problem for the vitality of the public sphere, understood in a normative, Habermasian sense, because as Asad notes, “overlapping patterns of territory, authority, and time collide with the idea of the imagined national community” (Asad, 2003,
p. 179). As Benedict Anderson’s (1983/2006) work on “imagined communities” has argued, publics that took shape around nationally syndicated newspapers helped to define a
new understanding of the nation and of the significance of nationality and these “imagined communities,” “made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think
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about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profound new ways” (p. 36). For
Anderson, the imagined community of the nation in some ways replaced previous understandings of collective belonging including religious community, but in the contemporary
moment it is more precise to say that many modes of belonging and many social imaginaries may exist together and reinforce each other or in some ways butt against one another. On the whole, the evangelical social imaginary differs in important ways from the
social imaginary of the larger public sphere, though it is also more in concert with a secular imaginary than other religious traditions may be, for example, as Asad emphasizes,
the Muslim social imaginary in the context of a purportedly secular European society.
Through the case studies in this project, I argue that digital habitus is reshaping
the social imaginary of evangelicalism by building a “digital unconscious.” I reference
the “unconscious,” not to bring up a Freudian or Lacanian analysis, but to build on Walter
Benjamin’s understanding of the “optical unconscious,” a social unconscious that is on
display in and through media technologies. For Benjamin, the contrast between how auracular art like painting is experienced by a viewer in the here and now, versus how film
is experienced is significant. Benjamin emphasizes the fact that film is a temporal medium that relies on the cut, on montage, and on juxtaposition. In concert with the technology of the camera, a cinematographer can see beyond what is possible to apprehend by
human senses. Benjamin makes the case that film is thus able to penetrate reality, rather
than to simply represent it. These mechanistic affordances of film create for the medium
the ability to glimpse a collective “optical unconscious” (see Benjamin, 2010, p. 37).
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Like the optical unconscious, than, what I term the “digital unconscious” relies on technological affordances, such as software, and hardware. In the case of the digital, algorithmic technologies that guide users to see and engage with certain content, also define
publics by setting the terms and boundaries of the discourse. And with digital media, unlike with film, individuals, through their digital habitus, also leave traces–– comments,
likes, cookies–– that taken together chart paths through a discursive and visual realm,
even when those paths are not consciously taken by users, who may not even realize that
they left a mark, or that their paths intersect and diverge with others. Thus, though film
may also be considered a collaborative medium, as it is generally the creation of a group
of people, cinematographers, directors, editors, etc., the medium does not have the same
potential to incorporate feedback from viewers or users as the digital does. And this creates a digital unconscious that resembles Benjamin’s optical unconscious but also diverges from it in that it is collectively created by a socio-technical assemblage of people,
algorithms, and devices through digital habitus.
Central to Benjamin’s notion of the optical unconscious is its visuality. What
was created by the medium of film was a visual display of a collective unconscious. This
is significant given the fact that Benjamin imagines film, as a mass medium, to have
emancipatory political potential, though this potential, he asserts, will not be realized until the medium is no longer controlled by capitalist modes of production. The digital unconscious too, can be seen, and also experienced through a user’s movement through
platforms, images, and discourses, in other words it is the manifestation of a person and
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collective’s digital habitus. Though the offline world remains an anchor, the digital unconscious, as a collective display of information and digital flows, lives in the digital
realm and provides the unconscious register for a dispersed assemblage of people. Nonetheless, as I will argue through the case studies in this project, this digital unconscious
shapes cultural discourses and social imaginaries and becomes conscious in various
forms.
In the case studies that follow, the idea of a digital unconscious is meant to define the discourses, practices, and predilections of an assemblage of evangelicals who are
defined in and through their relationship with digital media, a relationship, I will argue
through my case studies below, that has stakes for the social imaginary of evangelicalism.
Though I think the heuristic of the digital unconscious works particularly well for a complicated assemblage of people like evangelicals, it is not a theory that stops at religious
communities. Indeed much of American life is now spent on devices and the notion of a
digital unconscious speaks to how many publics in the digital era are shaped. In Chapter
Two of this study I expand on my understanding of digital habitus and the digital unconscious particular to what might be considered the counterpublic or counterculture of
evangelicalism––a stance that has developed throughout the twentieth and twenty-first
century in the United States.
Investigating evangelicalism’s digital unconscious
The idea of an evangelical digital unconscious provides the entry point for my
methodological approach. My evidence comes from the digital unconscious that has
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formed in evangelical culture which I have gleaned using various digital and real-world
methods. Though the digital unconscious is a phenomenon that cannot exist without the
internet, and is a socio-technical assemblage, I did not chose to embark on a “virtual
ethnography” of it. Christine Hine (2000) writes that, “Online ethnographies despatialize
notions of community, and focus on cultural process rather than physical place” (2000, p.
57). Instead of focusing on places, Hine asserts that ethnographers of the internet should
focus on connections between and among people and users. While this approach holds
some appeal for an investigation into what I am calling a digital unconscious, I also found
in my research that there is much in the physical, social world that responds to this unconscious mode. By combining in-person and digital modes, I follow Daniel Miller and
Don Slater’s approach to qualitatively investigating digital publics, which values the
physical spaces in which online discourses and practices take shape as well as their virtual, and technological instantiations. As they put it “the Internet is not a monolithic or
placeless ‘cyberspace’; rather, it is numerous new technologies, used by diverse people,
in diverse real-world locations” (Miller & Slater, 2001, p. 1). Though I engaged in a
“hashtag ethnography” of Twitter users as one of my case studies, visited online churches, and generally tried to traffic in the digital unconscious of evangelical culture, I also
performed real-world fieldwork, travel, and interviews.
In my conception of the multiple virtual, real, and mediated sites that make up
the digital unconscious of evangelicalism, I have also followed an approach similar to the
multi-site ethnography outlined by George Marcus (1996). Marcus urged ethnographers
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to design their studies based on an understanding of the various flows of cultural contexts
that might make up a culture. For example, an anthropologist might “Follow the people”
in designing a multi-site project, or “Follow the discourse.” In investigating online countercultural communities, Jessa Lingel (2017b) has employed a comparative approach she
calls “networked field studies,” which draws from Marcus’s understanding of multi-site
ethnography but employs case studies. She writes that this approach is especially useful
in considering socio-technical communities because it is, “invested in looking across
communities to consider convergences and divergences in relationships to an uses of
digital technologies among groups of people” (Lingel, 2017b, p. 2). Though all of my
case studies come from a single countercultural source, that of the American evangelical
subculture, they focus on four different aspects of this culture and use the divergences
among these groups as a means to investigate the differences and commonalities among
them.
I conducted 36 interviews with people associated with this movement in evangelicalism, including those running faith-based startups, those in the missionary field, and
those working in churches. I identified my interviewees through a combination of “snowball sampling” and by following evangelical magazines like Christianity Today, evangelical blogs, and following Christians on social media platforms–– in other words, trying to
traffic in the flow of the digital unconscious shared by this community. One of my interviewees described his own entree into the world of digital Christians as “just building relationships with individuals who are in this world. That’s how I got started, I got into the
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ministry and then I started just going to conferences getting connected, building relationships and now five years later I feel like I know a lot of people in the world” (Pulos,
2017). Put simply, this also the approach that I took to identifying interviewees. I began
this study in 2010 and over the course of 8 years I spoke and connected with evangelicals
working on various facets of technology and media, who in turn referred me to other
people or referred me to Twitter accounts, smartphone applications, podcasts, and
churches. The decade during which I conducted my study saw the first billion dollar app
sale and the ballooning of the app market. It saw the growth of VR content and technology. And at every turn, evangelicals were watching and thinking through the possibilities
for missions, for community growth, for faith. Through cultural shifts in thinking about
technology, through subtle and not so subtle changes in how people used technology in
their everyday life, evangelicals shifted too. My study has tracked the people most invested in this; the people who have thought and continue to think about how technology
might change the practice and expression of faith for the better.
In addition to interviews, I employed short stints of participant observation that
provided me with experience from within the techno-social systems that comprise this
unconscious digital community. These included four months of real-world-ethnographic
fieldwork at a Los-Angeles-based tech startup, and immersion and participant observation in and through Twitter networks. I also attended two conferences, one in Dallas,
Texas and one online. Though my study primarily deals with producers of technology, I
consider users in the final substantive chapter of this study. In this chapter I take the ap-
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proach laid out by Bonila and Rosa (2015) of “hashtag ethnography” as a means to investigate an emerging feminist public whose use of social media has been dubbed a “crisis”
by the evangelical magazine Christianity Today. In their analysis of the hashtag #Ferguson and other activist campaigns that have gone viral on Twitter, Bonila and Rosa theorize that the hashtag function affords the medium a type of placeness and because of this
a hashtag can be understood as an ethnographic fieldsite. Despite the shortcomings that a
hashtag fieldsite has, they authors write, “we must approach them as what they are: entry
points into larger and more complex worlds. Hashtags offer a window to peep through,
but it is only by stepping through that window and ‘following’ (in both Twitter and nonTwitter terms) individual users that we can begin to place tweets within a broader context” (2015). “Hashtag ethnography,” then is a way to enter and participate in a mediatized social world, and furthermore, this is a world that has consequences beyond the virtual frame as contemporary social movements are multi-modal and the mediated context
of them cannot be ignored as it is inextricable from what is going on “on the ground.” By
employing multiple ethnographic and qualitative modes my study attempts to traffic in
and analyze the contours of the digital unconscious while also keeping in mind the real
world spaces that cannot be severed from their digital presences.
I should note that I am relatively sure that some of my informants have read my
degree of “nativeness” in evangelical culture differently than others. As John L. Jackson
Jr. notes in Thin Description (2013), ethnography no longer has a “backstage,” a place an
ethnographer can retreat to and keep hidden from his subjects. Thus, no longer can a re-
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searcher assume himself to be the observer, he is also observed by his informants. This
may be particularly true of researcher trying to understand digital contexts and immersing
themselves in digital worlds. I had the experience of introducing myself to an interviewee
only to have him allude to details of my life that I had not disclosed to him, but had disclosed on social media. This experience and others made me realize that I was being
watched, and certainly being judged on my nativeness.
In my first year of high school I became a Christian, or “was saved,” though this
experience, guided by a friend’s mother, was not entirely consensual on my part. I had
become friends with a group of girls who all went to the same evangelical church. I went
to church with them, and began to frequent the church’s youth group. We sometimes went
to other churches to see Christian bands play and for the most part, for me, this was a way
to meet boys. These girls remained my friends throughout high school and beyond –– one
of them was the Maid of Honor at my wedding. As an undergraduate I majored in Religious Studies and continued to explore my spirituality, though I had stopped going to
church on a regular basis several years before. When I embarked on this project, many
memories from my church days came back to me. Because of this history I understood
when people slipped shorthand versions of Bible verses into their language and I felt relatively fluent with evangelical jargon (in this study I have included a glossary of evangelical phrases in this that can be found in Appendix A). But beyond that, throughout this
project, I had genuine experiences in churches that I have considered personally important to my spiritual life: I have openly cried as I watched adults get baptized at a church
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service in Nashville; I have had deep conversations about faith and life with Christians
and pastors, that I have taken seriously; I have rethought many of the beliefs that I had
about religion and spirituality. This project opened me up to a world that I had only
known as a child and made me consider my faith and spiritual life in a new way–– though
of course that was not my intent when I began this investigation.
I tried to be as honest as possible when people asked whether I was religious, or
Christian. And I always took John Jackson approach of employing “ethnographic sincerity” (2010), which he has defined as both a way of being in the world and a way of doing
ethnography that treats “other subjects/ informants more robustly as fully embodied and
affective interlocutors” (p. S285). Affect is part of the experience of fieldwork, and we
should embrace it, Jackson argues, not just as observers, but as humans interacting with
other humans. Ethnographic sincerity recognizes and honors the fact that “Informants
embody an equally affective subjecthood during the ethnographic encounter” (Jackson,
2010, p. S281), and as such becomes a crucial way of practicing ethical research in an
age when informants and ethnographers are increasingly in contact with one another in
various aspects of professional, personal and political life.
Chapter outlines
My second chapter outlines the academic historiography of American evangelicalism focusing on evangelicalism as a counterpublic and a counterculture in American society and tracks how this history has led to the widespread digital habitus that this study
takes as its focus. From the early days of radio through today, evangelicals have been ear-
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ly adopters of media technologies and have attempted to create a parallel culture that is
the result of the twin and sometimes conflicting evangelical drives to retreat from and
engage with popular culture. In their many entrees into media they have continually revised what evangelicalism looks like and how it speaks in the public sphere. I argue that
as these historic impulses and imperatives have been ported on to the internet where new
publics and new imaginaries have taken shape.
In Chapter Three I explore the how digital habitus has changed the church world
and the physical instantiations of evangelical worship spaces over the past decade. I trace
the move toward multi-site, online, and virtual churches, and discuss the issues that
prominent evangelical voices have faced in attempting to implement these visions. I end
with a visit to a “startup church” in Oklahoma called Life.Church and explore how the
American social imaginary of technology has transformed evangelical spaces in material
and rhetorical ways and, in turn, how these transformations have successfully hailed a
suburban, middle-class, white population who see teched-up churches as proof that their
faith has a viable place in an increasingly technological American culture.
Chapter Four travels to Silicon Valley and beyond identifying faith-based startups–– that is, for-profit tech businesses with Christian missions. In this chapter I speak
with those CEOs and founders of faith-based startups to discover their motivations, their
business practices, and their vision of the technology industry. Many believe that by creating products that engage digital habitus they might have a role in “redeeming” and spiritualizing American culture, but they also express the negotiations that they have to en-
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gage in in order to fit in to tech culture. I argue that though they set themselves apart from
it, these Christian business people have in many ways internalized the lessons of Silicon
Valley culture, and in some ways have replicated the shortcomings of that culture as well,
especially in regard to race and gender.
Chapter Five takes as its central case study a network of missions-focused nonprofit organizations that call themselves “The Mobile Ministry Forum.” These evangelicals see the potential for missionary work changing especially through the ubiquity of
mobile phones. From the practice of “SD card evangelism,” to new, cloaked Bible apps,
this scene hopes to create technology in service of fulfilling “The Great Commission”
and hastening the return of Christ. In so doing, they struggle with thousands of years of
Western-dominated World Christianity–– a history that they try to overcome using digital
solutions, and, I argue, that they often replicate in part because they have internalized
many of the biases of the Western-based technology industry.
In Chapter Six I turn from technology producers to users and I turn from a maledominated landscape to a female one. This chapter focuses on how the technological affordances of social media have transformed authoritative structures in evangelicalism and
caused a “crisis” that is shaking the foundations of the church by putting into play the potential role of women as preachers and leaders. I employ Bonila and Rosa’s (2015)
method of “hashtag ethnography” to investigate an emerging evangelical feminist public
who have used social media to create a space for female voices in a male-dominated
evangelical culture.
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My study concludes with a discussion of how the many related moves to make
American evangelical Christianity a more modern, more technologically-savvy religion
have been challenged by some Christians who argue that the opposite is what is really
needed to revive evangelicalism. The chief critic in this realm has been Rod Dreher, the
New York Times best-selling author of The Benedict Option (2017).
Conclusion
Evangelicalism as an American populist religion is an especially receptive cultural
form that has been molded by dominant cultural discourses since the beginning of the
American republic. This study argues that the widespread digital habitus in American culture is shaping the social imaginary and the actually-existing practices and forms of
evangelical culture. Because of their long history as early adopters of media technologies,
evangelicals are particularly primed to accept and integrate new media into their lives and
communities. The two cultures at play here, evangelicalism and tech, both have a hold on
the American imaginary and I conceive of the particular assemblage of people that I study
as trafficking in a digital unconscious that is influencing and shaping the evangelical social imaginary. Finally, I hope that in thinking of American evangelicalism as reflective of
popular culture, we may also imagine pieces of the American social imaginary are refracted in the evangelical social imaginary and can reveal predilections in American culture more broadly conceived.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLVING EVANGELICAL ASSEMBLAGE
The shifting evangelical relationship to modernity, media, and technology

In the lobby of a Baptist church outside of Nashville, Tennessee, where it is apparently a minor scandal when the pastor does not to wear a tie on a Sunday, Darrel Giardier, the church’s Digital Strategy Director tells me his fears about the long-term viability of evangelicalism. Church leaders just are not keeping up, he worries. The church is
getting grayer, and the people in charge are not paying enough attention to what captures
the attention of younger generations. “I’m going to tell you that God’s word is relevant
for your life,” he begins, explaining how young people experience church. “I’m going to
tell you what He has pertains to what’s going on right now—but everything I surround
you with in that room you walk into is not relevant to your life. At home you experience
five screens while you’re watching TV. We’re not doing that at church” (Girardier, 2015).
For Girardier and others the problem with church and with evangelicalism as a whole is
that it is not attracting a younger generation attuned to media technologies and the entertainment value and social engagement they offer.
Giradier has worked in Christian institutions most of his adult life and though
he voices his concern more forcefully than others, most of the people I spoke with for this
study expressed some version of this same sentiment: the church is not keeping up and if
it continues to be oblivious to the technological changes happening in the world around
it, it will disappear. For many evangelicals the way forward is understanding and embrac-
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ing changes in the technological landscape. Their message, as they see it, is timeless, and
if the right tools are employed to express that message, the church will thrive. If not, it
will not. For many, this means churches and parachurch institutions must embrace technology, and even learn from the workings of those tech companies that clearly have a
hold on the popular imagination. As our conversation continues, Girardier explains that
the problem is not just that church is not entertaining people, it is that church no longer
understands how people think and operate in the contemporary world. He believes
churches should think about their parishioners more like companies like Google and
Facebook this about their customers. He tells me, “People have a deep desire to be known
and if people are giving over these massive amounts of data on Facebook and on other
platforms, churches should coalesce that data ... We have to think in such a way that we
really individualize stuff for people” (Girardier, 2015). For Girardier, the path forward
should be moving the church into the digital present by understanding the digital habitus
of young people conditioned by new media companies, and integrating this into church
services. His concern, however, is that the church as a whole is not up to the task.
Though most of the evangelicals I spoke with agree with Girardier’s assessment of the church as an institution that is a step behind culture, relative to other religious
traditions, evangelicals have often been on the cutting edge of media and technological
change. Throughout the twentieth century evangelicals have promoted evangelical participation in and adoption of technology for the same reason that Girardier voices–– to remain relevant. As Bethany Moreton explains about the “high-tech redneck, the rustic with
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a Bible in one hand and a Blackberry in the other,” the fact that these groups use the tools
of modernity to their advantage is “only paradoxical from the perspective of a stage theory of history” (2009, p. 7), meaning that it is only difficult to understand if we place
evangelicals on the losing side of a constructed dichotomy of modernity, which, Susan
Harding (1991) argues that the press and the academy has done since the Scopes trial,
when the modern notion of fundamentalism as modernity’s “repugnant other” was invented. Since then, evangelicals have been characterized in the press as parochial and as
righteous keepers of tradition. Yet by some polling estimates, forty percent of Americans
identify as evangelicals (see Smidt, 2013). And although evangelicals are often portrayed
in the media as fundamentalist Christians who harbor a strong, politically conservative
bent, there are many disparate strands of evangelical Christianity—from Michele Bachmann in the Midwest to rave-party-throwing millennial evangelicals in the Hamptons
(see Kisner, 2013). As Mark Noll notes, evangelicalism is “diverse, flexible, adaptable,
and multiform” (2001, p. 14). In fact one characteristic of evangelicalism in America
might be that it does not have a solid ground on which it pitches its wide tent. Some
scholars have even argued that because of its diversity of forms evangelicalism qua evangelicalism does not exist. D. G. Hart, for example, calls it, “the wax nose of twentiethcentury Protestantism. Behind this proboscis, which has been nipped and tucked by savvy
religious leaders, academics, and pollsters, is a face void of any discernible
features” (2004, p. 17). For Hart and others, there is no distinct theological, religious, or
social rubric that defines evangelicalism.
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Evangelicalism is a complex assemblage of organizations, messages, people,
ideas, traditions. This chapter traces the academic historiography of evangelicalism as a
means to explore the shifting habitus of evangelicals and their related understandings of
modernity, media, and technology. It should be noted that the history my interview subjects (all self-identified evangelicals) drew from was a much different one. I never, for
example, heard an evangelical reference the Scopes trial, though you would be hardpressed to find a book about evangelicalism that did not reference it. Instead, evangelicals spoke about churches in the Bible, specifically the churches described in the Book of
Acts, as their ideals. This emic understanding is important, and I hope to unpack it in the
chapters to follow, but before we get there I want to sketch the historical stakes of the
discourses and practices that this study charts, taking special care to understand how
shifts in evangelical habitus have created counterpublics, audiences, and countercultures
and how evangelicals have positioned themselves, and been positioned by their relationship to American culture, society, politics, and especially evolving media industries.
Evangelicals have continually used the most modern technological tools at their disposal
to transmit their message, understanding that American culture will not be receptive to
them unless they are perceived as modern and relevant. This chapter charts how evangelicalism became the robust counterpublic and counterculture that it is in American culture
today and points to how it is redefining itself, once again, in the face of media change. In
light of this complex and variegated history, I argue that widespread digital habitus has
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created a digital unconscious that is changing the shape of American evangelicalism in
the twenty-first century.
Beginnings, schisms and the birth of a counterpublic
The United States has never had an established religion, but in the early years of
the republic, Protestantism came close to being one. Early English colonists migrated to
North America because of religious persecution and these Puritans established Christian
churches and became dominant voices in early American politics and culture. American
Protestantism distinguished itself from its European roots during the First Great Awakening beginning in the 1730s, a movement that is characterized by its massive outdoor revivals. Hankins (2008) explains that these revivals were significant, defining events in
American history and were controversial because they featured preaching by women and
uneducated, unordained orators (11). This style upended authoritative structures of European Protestantism and proved to be incredibly popular in the early days of the American Republic. Similarly, The Second Great Awakening, beginning in Cane Ridge, Kentucky in 1801, saw mass, outdoor movements that both reflected and promoted American
Protestantism’s populism. Marsden (2006) notes that the style and themes of these awakenings have an outsized influence in American religion and in American culture because
the United States at the time had few older institutions (11).
American evangelicals spring from these roots, especially from the tradition of
revivalism, but they have often engaged in theological battling with their more liberal
Protestant counterparts. This schism goes back to the nineteenth century when an influen-
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tial cadre of preachers developed two Biblical exegeses that became theological lightning
rods: the theories of premillennialism and dispensationalism (or, when taken together,
premillennial dispensationalism). Premillennialists believe that Christ will return to rapture his followers before the millennium prophesied in the Bible, the thousand-year reign
of peace on Earth, and thus signs of the world falling into sinfulness and evil can be interpreted as signs of Jesus’ imminent return. Premillennialists often agree with the theological rubric of dispensationalism, which states that God has divided the history of the
world into ages or dispensations––the last of which was the millennium–– and each age
has its own cosmic purpose and logic. More liberal Protestants in the nineteenth century
instead sided with a postmillennialist interpretation of Biblical prophecy that believed
that Christ would return after the millennium.
Because postmillenialists, or “modernists” as they became known believed that
peace on Earth was possible before Jesus’ return, they often attempted to influence social
and political policy in order to make America into the New Israel, the Biblical model of a
Godly nation. Christians established temperance societies, they implemented policies that
would help the poor, and they involved themselves in causes that saw the betterment of
American society as the goal. Premillenialists, however, did not believe that human involvement in political affairs could bring about peace, and instead felt their first and
foremost mission should be spreading their message and bringing as many people to Jesus as possible before His return. This shift in Christian involvement in American social
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and political affairs is referred to by historians as “The Great Reversal,” because in effect
Christian political involvement became relegated to the back burner of Christian culture.
Popular premillennialists, like Dwight Moody of the Moody Bible Institute set
the stage for a new for a new generation of Protestants who became known as “fundamentalists.” This term was inaugurated by a series of pamphlets entitled The Fundamentals published between 1910 and 1915, financed by Lyman Stewart, President of Union
Oil in Los Angeles. It was these pamphlets, according to Lienesch (2007), that created an
identity for a burgeoning movement that before had been a scattered network of itinerant
and localized preachers, Bible Colleges, and organizations. They also gave the movement
a name: fundamentalism. The Fundamentals articulates a premillennial vision of the
world that relies on a strictly literalist interpretation of the Bible in contradistinction to
theological modernists of the time, whose Biblical interpretations tended to be more flexible.
Fundamentalism not only became a movement, through The Fundamentals, it
became a counterpublic. Theories of the public date back at least to Gabriel Tarde (1901/
1969) who, writing at the turn of the twentieth century––less than a decade before The
Fundamentals-- defined publics with recourse to print noting that “the invention of printing has caused a very different type of public to appear, one which never ceases to grow
and whose indefinite extension is one of the most clearly marked traits of our period” (p.
277). For Tarde, publics were fundamentally different entities than their correlate in the
street, the crowd (a category studied by Le Bon just previous to Tarde’s writing (1895),
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because they were mediated and thus allowed for connections across geographical distances. These connections also altered the sociality and psychology of the people engaged
in them in new, and different ways than the crowd had. This point was also central to
Benedict Anderson’s work on the rise of the imaginary of the nation state. For Anderson,
print, especially in the forms of the newspaper and the novel, allowed dispersed people to
see themselves as temporally connected to spatially distant others who nonetheless occupied the same “homogenous empty time” (a phrase that Anderson borrows from Walter
Benjamin) and these new conceptions of space and time became the basis for the modern
imagination of the nation (1989/2006). In both theories, publics are powerful modern assemblages because they allow for relations among strangers, that is people who have
never met face-to-face, to take place. The Fundamentals allowed Christians all over the
United States to understand themselves as part of a religious, social, and political movement. Moreover, this public cohered through reading and thus fundamentalist identity
was not only determined by church membership, but also by this habitus. And it was
through this that fundamentalism became a counterpublic.
Michael Warner explains that counterpublics are those publics that go against
the grain of what we might think of as the larger social imaginary (following Taylor,
2002) of a public (Warner, 2002, p. 56). In other words, counterpublics imagine the world
differently than the normative public. Important for Warner is the fact that counterpublics
are not only activist in the traditional political sense, but in the social sense; they want to
change the way that social life works (2002, p. 122). Where, for Habermas and many of
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his critics, the influence of the public sphere was to be felt in the realm of politics, for
Warner and others, the influence of multiple publics might be political without being directed toward politics writ large, especially because alternative, or minority positions
might not be considered or voiced in the larger public sphere. It is useful to think about
Chantal Moufe’s distinction between “politics” and “the political” here. While politics
refers to the normative, institutional order of society, the category of “the political” instead indexes the complicated social push and pull of diverse subjectivities inherent in
any society (Moufe, 1999, p. 754). Thus, what might be seen as purely a social consideration, may also be a political one, even if it does not directly connect to debates going on
in Congress, for example.
The first aim of the fundamentalist counterpublic was to reign in the relativism
and secularism they believed defined theological modernism. Fundamentalists encouraged a retreat from politics, and from the social concerns that preoccupied the modernists. Yet, appearing when they did, at the turn of the century when Americans were
struggling with the waves of immigration that were making American society more pluralistic, The Fundamentals still seeks to define a cultural space that is ultimately political.
From the outset fundamentalism was a primarily white movement, and a belief in AngloSaxon superiority and the Anglo-Saxon missionary imperative animates The Fundamentals. In Lyman Stewart’s personal correspondence, he makes it clear that spreading “Anglo-Saxon” ideals went along with spreading Christianity. He writes glowingly, for example, in a letter dated February 28, 1910 about all of the “Anglo-Saxon Protestant min-
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isters, missionaries and theological students in the world,” many of whom were engaged
in “foreign missions,” a passion of Stewart’s that led him to establish the Hunan Bible
Institute in China and the Bible Institute of Los Angeles (now Biola University) whose
mission was training students to evangelize around the world.
As the United States debated whether to enter World War I, fundamentalists––
continuing in the tradition of staying out of politics–– tended to want to avoid war, even
to the point of advocating pacifism (see Marsden, 2006, p. 143). And as the war continued, it revivified the debate over evolution which had began in the late nineteenth century. Many fundamentalists saw German barbarism as an outgrowth of the theory of evolution and were concerned that these ideologies could take over in the United States were
evolution to become a widespread belief. Though the schism between fundamentalism
and modernism had been primarily a theological issue, with evolution, fundamentalists
were able to cast themselves as protecting American culture and society as well as Christian religion (Marsden, 2006, p. 170). Evolution became a rallying cry of the fundamentalist movement in the 1920s. As Marsden describes it, “the more clearly they realized that
there was a mass audience for the message of the social danger of evolution, the more
central this social message became” (2006, p. 170). And thus the fundamentalist counterpublic found its entree into the public sphere with resistance to the theory of evolution.
Fundamentalist groups implemented a wave of laws aimed at preventing secondary schools and institutions of higher education from teaching evolution. But in 1925,
the American Civil Liberties Union paid John Scopes, a young public school teacher in

3! 8
Dayton, Tennessee to teach evolution in his classroom and violate one of these laws, Tennessee’s Butler Act. Clarence Darrow, fresh off of his famous defense of Leopold and
Loeb, two teenagers who in a supposed Nietzsche-induced frenzy murdered a young boy
to prove that they were “supermen,” travelled to Tennessee to defend Scopes. Christian
socialist and famous politician Williams Jennings Bryan, who had railed against the dangers of teaching the theory of evolution, took up the cause of fundamentalism and the
case for the prosecution.
With the Scopes trial fundamentalists had a place to give their movement a
public hearing and to cement their image as the guardians of a Bible-based American intellectual culture. The trial played out in the media and in churches around the country
where preachers dramatized the contest between Bryan and Darrow as the battle between
good and evil (see Lienesch, 2007, p. 151). And though the prosecution prevailed and
fundamentalists had captured the attention of the broader American public, their beliefs
were roundly dismissed in the media as parochial and backward. No journalist more
forcefully condemned them than the famous H.L. Menken of The Baltimore Sun. In his
writings on the trial his cosmopolitan disdain for fundamentalism comes through clearly
and at times viciously. He writes of fundamentalists:
Every step in human progress, from the first feeble stirrings in the abyss of
time, has been opposed by the great majority of men. Every valuable thing that
has been added to the store of man's possessions has been derided by them
when it was new, and destroyed by them when they had the power. They have
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fought every new truth ever heard of, and they have killed every truth-seeker
who got into their hands. (Menken, 1925)
Menken’s characterization of fundamentalists as backwards stuck, and became the commonly understood connotation of fundamentalism. Interestingly, as Marsden notes, after
Scopes, as the fundamentalist movement became identified with parochialism in the media, it also came to be more accepted in Southern, rural denominations (2006, p. 195).
Thus there was a reshuffling of fundamentalist regional and doctrinal affiliation. Perhaps
most significantly, the case and its echoes in the court of public opinion proved that a
fundamentalist vision of the world had fallen out of vogue. And fundamentalists, understanding that they had lost ground began to build institutions set apart from American culture such as Bible colleges and parachurch institutions, and they also began to accept that
their counterpublic voice would not be the dominant one in American politics, that is, unless, they could find a new way to gain entry into the public sphere.
Inventing a new evangelicalism on the airwaves
The fundamentalists’ situation worsened as the Great Depression deepened and
the donors that had kept separatist fundamentalist institutions alive dried up. During this
time, it was modern media technologies that sustained them and ultimately helped lead to
the re-emergence of new fundamentalist counterpublic. For fundamentalists, secularism
and modernism were the foes, but contra Menken’s caricature, technology itself was not.
Perhaps most central to creating a new public face for fundamentalism was radio. One of
the earliest evangelistic voices on the airwaves, and the first woman to broadcast an on-
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air sermon was Aimee Semple McPherson, the Los Angeles-based Charismatic who had
been known for her high-production-value revivals.5 For evangelicals like McPherson
who had travelled the country in her “Gospel Wagon” before radio, the new medium was
a natural extension of circuit riding. Preachers who would otherwise be traveling from
town to town could reach more ears through broadcast. Mcpherson continued in the tradition of other media-savvy Pentecostals, most notably black Pentecostals who produced
religious race records in the 1920s (see Walton, 2009, pp. 33-45).
Tona Hangen (2002) argues that radio helped fundamentalist Protestantism gain
a new national identity and furthermore, through their participation on the airwaves,
Christians could claim that they too had a place in contemporary American culture and
they could combat the image that had been created for them in the press in the previous
decades. Though firebrand preachers like the anti-communist crusader Carl McIntyre
gained national popularity, many Christians self-consciously defined themselves against
the rabid fundamentalism McIntyre embodied and began to call themselves “neo-evangelicals.” Neo-evangelicals had learned from the lessons of the Scopes Trial, chief among
them to avoid using the term “fundamentalist.” As Hart notes “After World War II until
the 1970s, evangelicals constantly looked over their shoulders to see who was going to
accuse them of fundamentalism” (2004, p. 83). Much like the later moniker “compassionate conservative,” “neo-evangelical” denoted a kinder, gentler Christianity. These
evangelicals still believed in the tenets of fundamentalism, especially in the inerrancy of
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the Bible, but they softened their tone and attempted to become more inclusive. They
wanted to shift their image from the stone-faced guardians of literalism and tradition to
that of a cadre of friendly folks spreading the Good News. In 1942 this new brand of
evangelicalism gained a public face, with the founding of the National Association of
Evangelicals (NAE). And at this time, the counterpublic inaugurated by The Fundamentals morphed into an evangelical counterpublic defined primarily by new voices transmitted through radio waves.
Charles Fuller’s Old Fashioned Radio Hour especially embodies the ethic of
the neo-evangelical. Hangen notes that though Fuller was a fundamentalist and a premillennialist, he toned down these themes in his broadcast and even claimed to be an apolitical figure. Hangen’s research shows that The Old Fashioned Radio Hour attracted a fervent national audience who communicated back to Fuller and his wife through letters
(2002, p. 88). The feeling of connection that these listeners had with the Fullers is an example of an early parasocial relationship (Horton and Wohl, 1956), and it is also evidence
that the medium helped Fuller and other evangelicals inaugurate a new counterpublic that
could connect Christians around the country through the habitus inaugurated by the new
medium of radio.
Around the same time, evangelicals were establishing publishing houses in
Grand Rapids, Michigan like Zondervan, which began publishing in 1931, that would
distribute evangelical texts to a wide audience. Like fundamentalists, neo-evangelicals
shunned what they perceived as encroaching secularism, but through media like radio and

!42
publishing they could package their dissent in a more appealing, more positive sheath,
and new evangelical organizations, especially Bible Colleges like the Fuller Theological
Seminary which opened its doors in 1947, added to the edifice of respectability that
evangelicals were constructing for themselves.
Also in the 1940s, Billy Graham, a young preacher from North Carolina who
cut his teeth at the parachurch organization Youth for Christ, began to gain national notoriety. Staunch fundamentalists criticized what they perceived as Graham's openness, but
the image that Graham embodied of the wholesome, clean-cut, all-American Christian
appealed to Cold War Americans en masse. Graham would exert an influence on national
politics and evangelical culture until the early years of the twenty-first century and one of
his strengths was that he understood that media was a crucial tool both for evangelism
and for strengthening evangelical identity. In the mid-twentieth century Graham set up a
network of Christian media outlets. With his father in law he founded the evangelical
magazine Christianity Today in 1956. In his autobiography Graham remembers that he
wanted the magazine to be a “counterbalance” to the liberal Protestant views provided by
The Christian Century. He also wanted to base the magazine in Washington D.C. in order
to “give it a measure of authority” (Graham, 1999, p. 286). His vision was that it would
have a positive tone–– a shrewd way to avoid seemingly like a fire-and-brimstone fundamentalist. In the same spirit, he threw his name behind myriad media ventures, including his film production house Billy Graham Films (later World Wide Pictures), and the
popular radio program The Hour of Decision. Graham was not alone in his embrace of
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media and business as a means to legitimize evangelicalism. Oral Roberts employed the
same tactics to legitimize the parallel movement of Pentecostalism in the 1940s and 50s
as well.
Graham was also a political figure. He was a close friend and confidant to all of
the presidents from Harry Truman through George W. Bush. In his autobiography he describes golfing with Dwight D. Eisenhower and then-Vice President Richard Nixon. He
recounts days on the ranch with Lyndon B. Johnson. He even speaks positively of Bill
and Hillary Clinton, popular punching bags of the Christian Right. As he travelled the
world as an evangelist, he brought with him his anti-Communist political agenda and he
was central in solidifying anti-communist rhetoric and enshrining capitalist individualism
as central ideologies in the evangelical social imaginary. As early as 1949, Billy Graham
connected the dots for evangelicals between anti-communism and evangelical theology,
which helped to push evangelicals to the political right (see Dochuk, 2011 and Kruse,
2015). As FDR’s New Deal programs went into effect in the 1940s, many fundamentalists and evangelicals feared Communism and by extension Atheism would follow as they
believed it had in the USSR. Because of their shared fear of Communism, evangelicals
developed ties to a coalition of business leaders led by the National Association of Manufacturers and with these networks in place, Billy Graham and others self-consciously intertwined business goals and Christian goals in America as Kruse (2015) charts, and central to the creation of this new identity for conservative American Protestants was the
evangelical media apparatus that circulated this discourse.
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The anti-communist tone that was struck American evangelicalism in the midtwentieth century is striking in comparison to the socialist evangelicalism that was
sweeping the globe in other places. Roger Lancaster (1988) for example found that Christian evangelical belief structured class consciousness in Nicaragua. Liberation theology,
which took hold in many South American countries in the middle of the Twentieth Century is starkly different from the pro-business evangelicalism promoted by Billy Graham
and others in the United States. Evangelical anti-communist political engagement in the
1950s prefigured evangelicalism’s politicization and concomitant reemergence into the
public sphere in the 1960s. In 1962 The Supreme Court of the United States banned
school prayer, prompting Christian activists to respond by supporting a prayer amendment that would enshrine public prayer as a constitutional right. Though the amendment
gained some political momentum, it ultimately failed to materialize as it was perceived as
too right wing for many politicians to support as Kruse (2015) notes in his study of the
issue (p. 203-237). It was also during this time that evangelicals became Republican enmasse, as they began to identify with Southern conservatism. This shift played out synecdochally when Strom Thurmond switched his party affiliation from Democrat to Republican in 1964 (Dochuk, 2011, p. 253). 1960s Southern California was the epicenter of the
growing political activism in evangelical culture. Christian activists based in Los Angeles
and Orange County supported Barry Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential election and
though Goldwater’s campaign failed, their political zeal for conservative issues set the
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stage for the “Creative Conservatism” promoted by Ronald Reagan first in California in
the late 60s and later on the national stage (see Dochuk, 2011).
Though it could claim some diversity, evangelicalism remained a primarily
white movement. And as the Civil Rights movement gained national attention, white fundamentalists and evangelicals mostly remained silent. Martin Luther King Jr. noted in
1953 that “it is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is eleven
o'clock on Sunday morning,” referring to the racially segregated nature of church going
in the United States. That white Christian communities were segregated from black ones,
typically by design, made the Civil Rights movement a difficult pill to swallow for many
white Christians. Collins (2012) notes that though Billy Graham began integrating his
audiences in the 1950s, Christianity Today conspicuously ignored Civil Rights and refused to cover it in their magazine (p. 82). Billy Graham was particularly nervous about
the movement’s methods as he believed that the civil disobedience tactics employed by
Martin Luther King and others could be disruptive to the American way of life (see
Collins, 2012, p. 83). Graham’s attitude is perhaps indicative of the larger body of white
evangelicals for which he was a figurehead. And though what became known as “the
black church” played a central role in the Civil Rights movement, a role that has continued to be a defining factor in black Christianity to this day, as a whole, white evangelicals
overwhelmingly did not support efforts toward racial equality and racial reconciliation. In
fact, as Dochuk (2011) asserts, racial fears often provided the impetus behind evangelical
political involvement, especially in California where evangelicals threw their support be-
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hind municipal measures that would allow for continued housing discrimination (see
Dochuk, 2011, p. 170-172). As thus whiteness remained central to the evangelical counterpublic identity as it had been in the early days of fundamentalism.
Evangelicalism also began to change theologically and culturally in the 1960s
in response to the growing Neo-Pentecostal movement which can be traced to a revival in
Van Nuys, California in 1967. Like earlier Pentecostals who had popularized speaking in
tongues or glossolalia and other gifts at the turn of the century, at Neo-Pentecostal and
Charismatic churches the power of the Holy Spirit was on display. A new experiential,
emotional dimension of popular evangelicalism opened up in these churches, and this
connected to the political mobilization happening in evangelical culture as Neo-Pentecostals “were political advocates who believed that personal and social morality were inextricably linked–– that the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on one’s personal life compelled the individual to hasten its outpouring in every realm of society” (Dochuk, 2011, p.
283). Also in California, “Jesus People,” derisively called “Jesus freaks” by some,
charismatics who dressed like hippies, played rock music, and spread the word of Jesus’
love, gained visibility (see Balmer, 1989 p, 12-30; Luhrman, 2012, p. 15-24). Tanya
Luhrman argues that their brand of free-form Bible study, belief in spiritual gifts, and
love of music was highly influential for the future of evangelical culture. She writes,
“One of the greatest paradoxes of a movement many people think of as right-wing threat
is that it was fueled by the most countercultural left-wing movement our country has ever
seen” (Luhrman, 2012, p. 16). The style and culture of evangelicalism changed in the
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1960s partially in response to the changing cultural climate, and because of these changes
it remained a popular form of American spiritual expression and continued to grow in
prominence.
Newsweek famously declared 1976 the “Year of the Evangelical.” Jimmy Carter, a
devout evangelical, had won the presidency and in so doing had brought evangelical culture center stage. At the same time, evangelical political involvement grew in other arenas and what later became known as the Culture Wars began. Former Southern beauty
queen Anita Bryant brought her anti-gay agenda onto the public stage while evangelicals
in California mobilized in support of Proposition 6, which would have made it illegal for
homosexual people to work in public schools. Proposition 6 failed–– even Ronald Reagan came out against it–– but fundamentalists and evangelicals remained energized by
the possibility of standing up for “traditional values” against what they saw as hegemonic
secularism. In the same vein, evangelicals saw feminist issues as threatening to their lifestyle. As Randall Balmer writes “No issue has caused evangelicals more consternation in
the second half of the twentieth century than feminism” (1999, p. 71). In the 1970s evangelicals organized and protested against feminist causes. Ultimately, the political coalitions formed during this period would defeat the Equal Rights Amendment which would
have guaranteed equal protection and equal pay for women in the workforce. It should be
noted that not all evangelicals embraced the right-wing political ideologies gaining steam
at this time. Jim Wallis, for example, founded Sojourners in 1975, a faith-based publication with a strong liberal, social justice bent that still remains one of the strongest voices
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in the evangelical left. Yet it was the Christian Right that gained the most ground on the
American political stage. And it was their tactics, especially their savvy use of media
technologies that gave the counterpublic of evangelicalism a powerful voice in American
culture and politics.
The Christian right and the public voice of evangelicalism
Jerry Falwell was the most prominent proponent of the Christian Right in the
late 1970s and 80s. Falwell was a Southern fundamentalist who believed, as Martin Marty and Scott Appleby put it, “Satan, who had inspired the philosophy of secular humanism that was eroding the Judeo-Christian foundations of American schools, courts, and
Congress was threatening to ensure that there would be no future generations of American Christians to educate” (1992, p. 39). To combat this, Falwell established political
lobbying organization the Moral Majority. The Moral Majority had some successes in
politics and it also staged and threatened boycotts of media it felt were promoting secular
agendas–– soap operas that included a gay character, for example. Falwell’s organization
also represents a shift in evangelical political engagement summed up by Hart (2002):
Evangelicals involved in politics during the depression and World War II were
generally interested in national and international politics and economics. They
identified collectivism, both at home (the New Deal) and abroad (Communism
and Socialism), as the chief enemy to American liberty. As evangelicals who
saw most problems through a spiritual lens, they accounted for communism’s
errors by looking to the Soviet Union’s atheism. For the religious right of the
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later years, however, the most pressing issues facing the United States were not
necessarily economic or political but personal. This explains why evangelicals
shifted from American to family values. (p. 160)
Evangelicals in the late 70s and early 80s began to come together around a few deeplyfelt issues that centered on the preservation of the traditional family structure. Along with
gay rights, the debate around the legality of abortion united and energized evangelicals
and also allowed them to develop ties to Catholic organizations, breaking their long tradition of anti-papist sentiment (see Dochuk, 2011, p. 346).
While evangelicalism was entering politics and public consciousness and laying the groundwork for the cultural issues that the religious right would mobilize around,
evangelical media outlets were thriving. As Joe Turow (1997) has demonstrated it was in
the 1970s that advertisers began to envision the United States as an aggregation of specialized niche markets. And Sarah Banet-Weiser has noted in the same vein, that the
communities that had become visible in the 1960s through Civil Rights and other movements, in the 1970s and 80s became market segments that advertisers could target (2012,
p. 32). And thus, white evangelicals became another market segment to be catered to.
While Christian cultural products had been sold since the nineteenth century (see McDannell, 1995), in the 1970s Christian businesses began to target evangelicals in the
United States as a consumer market (Hendershot, 2004). The 1970s saw an explosion of
religious radio stations (see Schultze, 1990), and evangelical publishing hit its apex and
morphed from boutique to big business (see Ferre, 1990). As Heather Hendershot’s book
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on Christian material and media culture argues, this shift from seeing Christians as poor
and rural––the image that had been painted in the public sphere since Scopes–– to seeing
them as middle-class consumers validated Christian respectability discourses. Hendershot
writes, “To purchase Christian products is to declare one’s respectability in a country in
which people are most often addressed by mass culture not as citizens but as
consumers” (2004, p. 30 emphasis in the original).
No one was more successful at mining this market than Christian psychologist
James Dobson who founded Focus on the Family in 1977, an organization devoted to
promoting “family values.” Focus on the Family, while often characterized as a political
organization, has become a multi-million dollar business by selling Christian-themed
media products to an evangelical audience. Their success has proven that catering to an
evangelical audience who seeks an alternative media culture is a savvy business decision
and it also shows that evangelicals are responsive to religious products minted on the latest technological platforms. Thus, a new understanding of an evangelical audience allowed Christians to identify as evangelicals not only on the local scale through church
involvement, but on a larger scale through the habitus engendered by consumerism and
media engagement. In so doing, evangelicals were connecting themselves with likeminded others in a countercultural movement.
The target consumer for the media that emerged in the 1970s was a white, middle-class suburbanite, not unlike “Saddleback Sam,” the fictional figure Baptist preacher
Rick Warren conjured around the same time using survey data about Lake Forest, Cali-
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fornia (see Warren, 1995). For Warren, the goal was to create a composite of the neighborhood he wanted to build his church for. Warren saw a market-based approach to
church building and church growth as a way for evangelicals to connect to the American
middle-class and his strategies proved to be extremely effective and birthed the
megachurch movement. Megachurches like Saddleback and Willow Creek Church in Illinois tried to present an informal and fun energy, Rick Warren could often be seen preaching in a Hawaiian shirt, parishioners sang along with a rock band rather than a choir, and
worship took place in an auditorium, rather than a steepled church. These churches
popped up all over the country starting in the 80s and 90s and as Kilde notes, they attempted to attract a middle-class, suburban, primarily white cultural aesthetic “by identifying with other contemporary places of peace, places where people spend their leisure
hours (hopefully) untroubled by the cares of the world: the shopping mall, the sports arena, the movie theatre” (2002, p. 219). In the 1980s and 90s church leaders began to selfconsciously discuss the marketing and branding of their messages and the megachurch
movement swept the suburbs. And though scholars and evangelical pastors have noted
that by appealing to a market-based understanding of culture, the religious message that
evangelical churches preach becomes somewhat watered down (see Hoover, 2000), the
megachurch movement proved that evangelicals can and will deftly adapt to cultural
trends and changes, in order to stay a relevant force in American culture. This marketbased approach to church building also had the effect of further deepening racial divi-
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sions in evangelical culture because it used demographic data to attract a specific type of
person, almost always coded as white and suburban.
Perhaps not coincidentally, as evangelical culture gained ground in populous suburbs, in 1980 all of the major candidates for President, Democratic incumbent Jimmy
Carter, Republican Ronald Reagan, and Independent John Anderson claimed to be evangelical. As such this election marks the solidification of what is now called the religious
right. Though many see this as a reactionary stance against the rapid socio-political
changes in the 1960s (Hart, 2002, p. 146), other scholars see it as a natural extension of
the political organization evangelicals had been doing since the 1940s (see Dochuk,
2011). In any case evangelicals in the 1980s rallied around a small number of core issues
and became active in promoting those issues to the national consciousness. They opposed
feminism, including the Equal Pay Amendment; they characterized medical abortion as
murder and the “Pro-life” movement came into being; they opposed homosexuality and
collectively, their passionate embrace of this set of issues became known as the Culture
Wars.
The 1980s also saw the apex of televangelism. As Stewart Hoover’s study of the
audience of the 700 club showed, as with radio, when evangelicals watched prominent
television preachers they saw their movement transcending “the local and particular, introducing their worldview into the public stage where it can receive the respect and hearing it deserves” (Hoover, 1990, p. 240). Erica Robles-Anderson (2012) writes of the logic
of televangelist congregations in reference to Robert Schuller’s Crystal Cathedral noting
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that these churches “take up the material conditions associated with the project of modernization, and thus secularization, in order to create a hyper-visible model of congregation. In so doing, they reassert the legibility of a Christian cosmology within contemporary technological conditions” (579). In the same way that popular radio evangelists
helped fundamentalism become a mainstream movement, that preachers from various
faith traditions within evangelicalism had a place on television validated their relevance
in American culture. And like the megachurch, televangelism appealed to a suburban
middle class. As Robles Anderson puts it, broadcasting church at the Crystal Cathedral
was “exercise in experiencing the mediating logics of a suburbanizing spatial order from
a sacred point of view” (583). Because in the suburbs what Raymond Williams calls
“mobile privatization” (1974) dominated, the idea that in scattered living rooms in various places, people engaged with community practices that used to be rooted in real space
through the medium of television, evangelicals adapted their forms and messages to fit an
American lifestyle increasingly mediated through screens. And for many believers, the
way that television preachers used the technology of television served to confirm that
evangelicals had a place in an American culture increasingly defined by televisual visibility. This was especially true for black televangelism which, Jonathan Walton (2009) asserts, functions as a liminal space in which “ the unjust realities of race, class, and gender
are suspended long enough for viewers to imagine themselves living and thriving in such
a world” (198). Though Walton concedes the potential for personal empowerment in the
popular narratives of black televangelism, he critiques the cultural myths that popular
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black televangelists traffic in and reify, especially the ideologies of “economic advancement, the minimizing of race, and Victorian ideals of the family” (Walton, 2009, p. 171).
Marla Frederick has asserted that black televangelism, through its notions of racial uplift
through wealth represents a break with the black church of the Civil Rights movement
and the beginning of a mediated, visual form of black Christianity that has become a
shaping force throughout the African diaspora. Frederick particularly focuses on the figure of the “religious dandy.” She writes, of this figure that he is “attempting to undo centuries-long assumptions about the role of black religion and the low social status of the
black worshipper...instead of equating poverty with godliness, religious dandies reinterpreted religious language and expectation by asserting that prosperity is associated with
godliness” (Frederick, 2015, p. 38). “Religious dandies” became popular in the black televangelical context and helped to popularize what is known as the “prosperity
gospel” (See also Bowler, 2013). The figure of the religious dandy also serves to elucidate how the visual mode of televangelism hailed different audiences and cultural contexts. Again, the habitus of American evangelicalism shifted such that television-watching became part of the identity of many evangelicals and became folded into evangelical
culture, though it remained segregated in much the same way that churches were––black
televangelists primarily hailed a black audience and white televangelists, a white one.
Despite the fact that evangelicals remained popular on television, the form was
beset by scandals, like that of Jim Bakker, prominent television preacher who was imprisoned for fraud, that damaged the form’s credibility and the credibility of evangelicals
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in the public sphere. Along with this, the dominance of evangelicals in politics began to
wane in the later years of the 80s and in the 90s. In 1989, Pat Robertson, a Pentecostal
televangelist, ran for president and many see the failure of his candidacy as a turning
point in the history of evangelical involvement in politics. The Moral Majority stopped
operating in 1989 and in its place, The Christian Coalition was established, helmed by
Robertson and conservative academic Ralph Reed. Reed, like Billy Graham before him,
attempted to be the exemplar of a clean-cut, all-American, white, middle-class and his
self-conscious posturing to this effect showed that evangelicals were still fighting against
their image as anti-modern parochials even as they entered into the 1990s.
By this time, their relative successes and failures in the public sphere had tempered the political zeal of the religious right and revealed what Marsden (2006) calls “the
establishment-outsider paradox” (p. 7) in fundamentalism, the suspicion held by many
evangelicals that they are a persecuted minority, a suspicion that exists alongside the
knowledge that they are in fact the majority religious voice in the United States. Nonetheless, as evangelical political stances increasingly became folded into the platform of
the Republican party and the Culture Wars continued, the idea of evangelicals under fire
became prevalent. Writing at the end of the 90s, Randall Balmer noticed “To hear Robertson tell it–– or Dobson or LaHaye or Sheldon or Wildmon–– Christian conservatives are
a persecuted minority perpetually under siege at the hands of Communists, Hollywood,
liberals, homosexuals, feminists, and Hillary Rodham Clinton” (Balmer, 1999, p. 109).
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Evangelicals were fighting a perpetual war against secular culture in the public sphere,
and even when they won battles, they felt as though there were losing that war.
Because of this, evangelicals began to open up new cultural spaces for themselves in which they could be assured that their values would be respected. The 1990s
saw a boom in Contemporary Christian Music (CCM), a genre that tweaked popular musical styles and added Christian messages as a way to remain relevant to a young Christian audience as Heather Hendershot’s (2004) study tracks. A network of religious media
producers cropped up and tailored films and television shows to Christian audiences.
These programs often co-opted the themes and forms of secular culture, but had religious
messages (Hendershot, 2004). While, as Hoover’s (2006) research into media audiences
revealed, Christians still participated in the “common culture” of television, they could
increasingly retreat into a parallel evangelical culture at the same time. This counterculture developed idioms and symbols specific to it, and those semiotics have been used by
Republican politicians (some evangelical themselves, some not) to hail evangelicals in
politics and mobilize their voting power. Frances Turek (2014) explores how George W.
Bush, himself an evangelical, was especially adroit at this. And Anthea Butler has pointed
out that Sarah Palin, Vice Presidential candidate in the 2008 Presidential election, embodied a new kind of “renewalist” persona who spoke in “coded language” that hailed the
religious base of the Republican party and especially those from Pentecostal faith traditions. Palin was also central to solidifying the theme of “persecution” as central to evangelical identity, especially vis a vis the media (see Butler, 2012). As evangelicalism en-
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tered the 21st century, this semiotic register voiced by popular politicians and pundits
helped to define how the evangelicals would engage with culture and politics.
But those that spoke from this counterpublic in the public sphere no longer
spoke in a unified voice as they had during the heyday of the religious right. Frances
Fitzgerald (2017) writes about Rick Warren as an example of what she calls the “new
evangelicals,” a movement that grew out of the disappointment and disillusionment
evangelicals felt as they were increasingly identified as “The Republican party at prayer”
during George W. Bush’s tenure. She notes that, “In the two years after Bush’s reelection,
half a dozen prominent evangelicals published books denouncing the Christian right for
what they saw as its confusion of religion and politics, its equation of morality with sexual morality, its aggressive intolerance, and its unholy quest for power” (Fitzgerald, 2017,
p. 539). Evangelicals, realizing that in some sense they had lost the Culture Wars began
to change the conversation. These new evangelicals tried to re-energize the evangelical
counterpublic by focusing on issues like poverty alleviation, climate change, and racial
reconciliation. Russell Moore, for example, as the head of the Southern Baptist Convention made racial reconciliation a central part of his platform.
Continuing their historical engagement with technology, as the internet and social media became drivers of American cultural engagement in the early aughts, evangelicals were there. As Heidi Campbell (2010) notes in her study of how religious organizations approach new media, for evangelicals “the goal of evangelism that can be realized
through this technology seems in many respects to outweigh the criticism and cautions
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raised” (Campbell, 2010, p. 39). The historic institutions that defined and redefined evangelicalism throughout the twentieth century have moved, sometimes unevenly, into the
digital age. Counterpublic spaces that express American evangelical identity have popped
up all over the internet and social media platforms and the countercultural register of
evangelicalism, too, has been ported into the digital realm. As a tradition that has enthusiastically embraced mass media technologies in the past, this is no surprise, and indeed is
consistent with the history of evangelical engagement in the public sphere. As evangelicals have moved online they have also created new forms, such as the online church,
which Tim Hutchings has ethnographically explored (2007; 2011; 2013). Relatedly,
Robert Glenn Howard has pinpointed what he calls a new movement of evangelicals
based on “vernacular Christian fundamentalism” that has come into being through digital
sociality (2011). Prominent evangelicals have written books about the possibilities for
social media (see Sweet, 2012; Wilson, 2008; Stephenson, 2011; Murrell, 2011; Rice,
2009), and alternative versions of church like Second Life Churches (see Estes, 2009)
and the overwhelming consensus has been that though technology can be dangerous and
corrupting, evangelicals must use it and shape it to their ends. And, as they have throughout their history, their forays into digital culture also show their willingness to shift along
with the larger cultural tide and their impulse to use the most modern technological
means to remain relevant and contemporary. In this way, the widespread digital habitus
that has emerged in evangelical culture was prefigured by evangelical engagement with
radio and television. And as with radio and television evangelicals who deftly use the
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medium of the internet prove to their fellows that their voice is still valid in the contemporary technological world. They also shape new publics through their use of these new
media, and as my study will show, in so doing they shape the social imaginary of American evangelicalism.
Another scorched Earth moment
In 2016 white evangelicals overwhelming supported Donald Trump for president and many in the press decried what seemed like a clear hypocrisy: evangelicals who
had touted the importance of family values for decades supported thrice-married casino
mogul Donald Trump. Evangelical scholars saw this election as revealing of evangelicalism’s worst instincts, and as especially indicative of their exclusionary past. Randall
Balmer has gone as far as to assert that white evangelicals’ support from Donald Trump
in the 2016 presidential election is a natural extension of their history of racial segregation and exclusion. And Sarah Posner concurs, writing, “By openly embracing the racism
of the alt-right, Trump effectively played to the religious right’s own roots in white supremacy” (2017). Evangelical support for Trump can be seen as the natural extension of
the religious right’s decades-long project of culture battling, and it has again positioned
evangelicals in the public sphere as reactionary and parochial.
Since the Scopes trial, evangelicals have created counterpublic spaces by establishing media outlets to influence the shifting winds of modernity and they have remained
arguably the most prominent religious voice in American politics. Yet the feeling that
evangelicals are losing influence in American culture persists in evangelical circles. One
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evangelical I spoke to went as far as to say that evangelicalism had reached a “scorched
Earth moment” in terms of how it is perceived in the public sphere because of the Culture
Wars and evangelical support of Donald Trump. For evangelicals, like Darrel Giardier,
embracing technology to capture a younger demographic is key to the rebranding that
needs to happen to keep evangelicalism alive as is letting go of the Culture Wars. Girardier told me, “Pastors right now are obsessed with the following question: gay marriage— should we or should we not be okay with it? And I want to look at them and go
‘Dude, that’s over. You lost that battle.’ The question you’re going to ask in the next 15
years is: ‘What does it mean to be human?’” (2015). For Girardier, if evangelicals continue to dig their heels in on “family values” discourses they will no longer be speaking
to the American people, they will lose their foothold. And he fears this is already happening. The church is getting grayer was a sentiment that I encountered throughout my
fieldwork. For those that I studied, the potential remedy was technological. If evangelicals could harness the power of the smartphone, perhaps they could reenergize the evangelical counterpublic and thus remain in the conversation and even shift it.
As in the 1920s with radio, the 1970s with publishing, the 1980s with television, and the 1990s with music, evangelicals today want to use technology as a means to
prove that their message still has a viable place in the modern world. As Darrel Girardier
implies, they also want to provide a touchstone for a rapidly changing technological culture but they can only do this by using the technology of that culture for their own ends.
Thus the path forward, for many, and indeed for the people represented in this study, is
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embracing digital habitus in all aspects of Christian culture and exploring and exploiting
it for Christian ends. The rest of this study deals with the many ways that evangelicals
animated by this imperative negotiate their place in digital culture and in new media industries and how their embrace of technology is changing the contours of this subculture.
I begin with the church, the central institution of evangelicalism. I look at
churches that have internalized the same logic as Darrel Girardier and have looked to
software companies and to Silicon Valley for inspiration as to how to run their institution.
In so doing, they have promoted digital habitus among their parishioners, making the
smartphone a necessary accessory to twenty-first century worship in mainstream evangelical churches.

CHAPTER THREE: THE CHURCH
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From the cathedral to the startup church

!
Figure 3.1: A still from the 8-bit-style animation used at the Echo Conference in 2013

Vintage video games are set up in a large, loft-like room with exposed beams and
industrial-style fans, and bearded men wearing stylish t-shirts and jeans cradle iPads as
they wait for their turn at the nearest console. This building and its inhabitants look like
they could be in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, the epicenter of hipsterdom, but they are standing in the lobby of Watermark Community Church, an evangelical megachurch in Dallas,
Texas. This is the scene at Echo 6, a yearly conference that promises to be the meeting
place for “artists, geeks and storytellers who serve the church” (EchoHub, 2018).

6

The Echo Conference ran from 2007 through 2013.
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The theme of the 2013 conference I attended was “8-bit”, an early form of
computer animation, so named because it only allowed for 8 bits per pixel. This animation was developed in the late 1980s and used in video games. The conference organizers
used 8-bit in all of their promotional materials and even created Nintendo-style 8-bit animations that were accompanied by bass-heavy electronic music to introduce each of their
main speakers [see figure 3.1]. The organizers at Echo chose this theme because, as one
explained in his introductory remarks, his generation of Christians came of age spiritually
at the same time as video games were coming of age technologically. Thus a generation
of millennial evangelicals share a collective memory rife with coexisting Christian and
technological narratives, and this was externalized in Echo’s promotional materials and in
the stylings at the conference. The 8-bit imagery that pervaded the event signified the
personal engagement with media that members of this group overwhelmingly had in
common. The attendees at Echo were mostly church professionals, some even bore the
title “pastor,” but their authority was performed far differently than those senior pastors
who are often seminary-trained professionals. Instead, it was performed in and through
their deep familiarity with media technologies and their effortless ability to interface with
them, in other words through their digital habitus. At this conference, those who identified as “church creatives,” or “church geeks” (both of these terms were used at the conference but are also used in broader circles) hailed each other and reinforced their social
bonds. Many people who had followed each other on Twitter for years shook hands for
the first time at Echo. As the conference organizers posted on their website, “Echo has
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created a tribe… and one that we love. We love connecting with hundreds of like-minded
creative types in the Church. Echo has become an annual reunion of sorts for us and
many others. We deeply cherish this reunion and the friends we get to see” (Echo Hub,
2018).
In her ethnography of hackers, Gabriella Coleman has theorized the conference
as a social ritual that can “reconfigure the relationship between time, space, and persons,
allow for a series of personal transformations; and perhaps most significantly, reinforce
group solidarity” (2012, p. 47). Though church conferences are different than hacker conferences in that they do not include the element of making as a central activity, they have
this ritualistic aspect that is heightened, I found, by the ritualistic activity common to
evangelical gatherings, for example, prayer––which at Echo often occurred before or after a conference presentation.
So what is this group whose solidarity is on display at the Echo conference? Who
are these church creatives and church geeks? The people who came together at Echo, are
the vanguards of a new generation of evangelical church professionals that hope to push
the church into the digital era. Though churches remain centers of community and local
worship, with the megachurch and multi-site movements many churches today resemble
corporations, which, as I explore below, is the result of a strategy that began in the popular church growth movement of the late 1970s and 80s. At every point in the history of
evangelical churches since this time, leaders have taken cues from corporate paragons
and in the contemporary moment, they have looked to technology companies in order to
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shape their organizational and outreach strategies. They have also integrated the products
that this industry creates into their liturgy and spaces, thereby encouraging digital habitus
in the central spaces that define evangelicalism. This chapter charts evangelical church
forms from the megachurch movement, to the multi-site church, to the online church first
through experiential vignettes using attendance at three different types of Life.Church
services, and then through theoretical analysis. I then take a trip to Edmond, Oklahoma,
where Life.Church has its central offices. I argue that Life.Church 7, which likes to call
itself a “start-up church,” represents the apotheosis of a large, dispersed network of
churches that have attempted to integrate technology and digital habitus into the spaces of
their churches and the strategies that define their outreach. As such, they have created
spaces in which digital habitus is encouraged and where the digital unconscious of evangelicalism becomes conscious.
This chapter is based on a variety of qualitative sources. I conducted semi-formal interviews with church leaders: communications directors, pastors, and others; attended two church conferences, one in Dallas in the summer of 2013 and one virtual conference in the summer of 2017; I analyzed 26 books 8 written by evangelicals on how
churches should approach the digital era; I attended evangelical church services in Los
Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, New Jersey, and Nashville and spent three days
at the church that provides the central data for this chapter, Life.Church in Edmond, Ok-

7
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Life.Church was formerly called LifeChurch.tv. They changed their name in 2015.
Books are cited when quoted and a complete list of these titles is located in Appendix B.
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lahoma. At two Life.Church locations in Edmond and at their central offices I conducted
roughly 30 informal interviews with parishioners, volunteers, and staff members.9 In my
analysis I argue that the hybridized discourse growing from the megachurch movement
that saw the twinning of business speak with Christian strategies and now takes cues from
the world of high technology has fundamentally changed the central institutions that define evangelicalism today.
One Church, Many Locations

Figure 3.2: Photograph taken by the author at Life.Church’s flagship location in Edmond, Oklahoma.

“Is this it?” Asks the Lyft driver. Even though I am expecting a relatively nondescript building, I am not sure I am in the right place until I see the two large satellite
9

Pseudonyms are used for the names of all informal interviews from Life.Church.
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dishes out front [see figure 3.2]. “This is it” I tell her. This Life.Church’s flagship location in Edmond, Oklahoma where Craig Groeschel preaches in person every weekend.
His sermons go out to twenty-six connected campuses, to “networked
churches” (“churches” housed in people’s homes, in community centers, or in other locations), and to a large online church audience. Life.Church estimates that about 70,000
people watch some version of Groeschel’s weekly sermon each weekend. On the front
page of their website they claim that they are “One Church, Multiple Locations” and explain, “A church isn't a building—it's the people. We meet in locations around the United
States and globally at Life.Church Online. No matter where you join us, you'll find
friendly people who are excited to get to know you!” (Life.Church, 2018).
Throughout my interviews for this project, in on and offline spaces, in churches, conferences, chat rooms, listening to podcasts, participating in the mediated discourse
that springs from the digital unconscious of evangelicalism, one name always recurred as
the paragon of what a church in the digital age should strive to be: Life.Church. This
church is a touchstone for those people who might understand themselves as belonging to
a movement of digitally-minded evangelicals, and for good reason. Life.Church calls itself a “startup church.” And that moniker has been reinforced by their very successful
app, the YouVersion Bible App. In 2012, The New York Times reported that YouVersion
was the result of a multi-million dollar investment that the church made in technology. In
2013 alone, Life.Church reportedly spent 20 million dollars on the app (see O’Leary,
2013). Life.Church parishioners tell me that they believe that their church is in the center
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of a revival. One says “God could turn the tap off at any time,” but as for now, they tell
me, they are growing, they are reaching people, and they are doing it by staying on the
forefront of technological innovation.
Below I sketch my experience of attending Life.Church and watching Craig
Groeschel preach in person, attending a multi-site Life.Church location, and attending
church online. Evangelical church spaces have evolved throughout the last forty years,
from the megachurch movement, to the multi-site, the online church, and Life.Church’s
strategy encompasses all of these iterations. The scenes below are only meant to give a
sense of Life.Church’s brand and they are not ethnographically embedded pieces as I did
not engage in a long-term participant observation at each location. Still, I hope to use my
experience to vivify the theoretical assertions made in my discussion of the evolution of
evangelical church spaces below.

Flagship
Outside the auditorium in Life.Church’s flagship location are high-top tables
and black leather couches for people who came early for the church service to sit and
gather. Coffee, tea, and cookies are on offer. The church, as all Life.Church locations, has
an industrial aesthetic with polished concrete floors and exposed ductwork. Simply-designed text posters on the wall quote Life.Church’s central tenets, like “Our mission is to
lead people to become fully devoted followers of Christ” but other than the references to
Jesus in these quotes, the church has very little religious imagery. There is not a steeple
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outside, instead there is the red Life.Church trademark sign. Volunteers for the church
wear red branded t-shirts with the Life.Church logo on them, and jeans, and they smile
and greet people as they walk in. Inside and out it looks more Costco than cathedral. On
the day that I attended, the church was decorated for Christmas and several small sets had
been constructed with Christmas scenes. The church offered a professional photographer
at each of these so that attendees could take Christmas photos with their families. The
crowd at this location was mostly white, and judging by the cars in the parking lot, and
the self-presentation of the people including their various technological accoutrements
such as iPhones and Apple watches seemed to indicate that they were middle to upper
middle class suburbanites, the majority of which were families and older people.
About fifteen minutes before the service was set to begin I entered the auditorium which is set up like a theater with padding on the wall to maximize sound, Two
broadcast-quality cameras loom above the parishioners who sit on folding chairs. Before
the service began “trailers” played on the three movie-sized screens at the front of the
room. On this day, there were two videos that were roughly four minutes in length. The
first was a behind-the-scenes look at a new song being produced by the church and the
second was an interview with a Christian singer who uses the YouVersion Bible app and
who called it “life-changing.” Both short videos had high production values; they could
have played on any television network.
The service began with the band playing two praise songs, as is typical of a
contemporary evangelical liturgy. Parishioners rose to their feet and were encouraged to
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sing along (the lyrics played across the screens along with the songs) and clap, dance, or
raise their arms. Then the campus pastor came on to the stage, urged the congregation to
tithe, and introduced another video. This video showed a tribe in Zambia who were able
to read the Book of Acts in their native language for the first time through the YouVersion
Bible App. He emotionally said that “Bible poverty” might be eliminated in our lifetime
because of the work going on right here at Life.Church. He told the audience, “The
prophecy is happening.” And then he introduced senior pastor, Craig Groeschel.
Groeschel is a highly charismatic preacher who uses his droning voice well,
making it rapid and loud when he is trying to emphasize a point in the manner of a hip
hop artist. He darts back and forth across the stage, adroitly and seamlessly looking into
the audience, then the camera, then back to the audience. He tells personal stories about
working out, about his wife and children, about a sleepless night tossing and turning in
bed. He tells a story about hearing of a friend's’ tragic death during Thanksgiving dinner
and going outside to weep and pray. Throughout his sermon Groeschel was careful to include all of the Life.Church locations. He said things like, “Somebody in Wichita say it
with me,” when asking the congregation to repeat a biblical phrase. In introducing the
concluding prayer he said, “All of my churches would you pray aloud.” In these ways he
hailed the congregants in the crowd in Edmond as part of a larger, dispersed network of
people all worshipping together. Near the end of his sermon music began to swell behind
him. The service ended with another praise song. I cried and laughed along with
Groeschel and with parishioners in the audience during his sermon and I left the auditori-
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um feeling like I had just had a particularly emotional conversation with a friend, who
despite everything remained optimistic, upbeat, and secure in his religious faithfulness.
Though some people brought their own physical Bible, most, like me, used the
Life.Church YouVersion Bible App during the service and there were no physical Bibles
available in the makeshift folding-chair “pews.” On the YouVersion App you can search
sermon plans, and I found the plan for the day I was visiting, and I followed along and
took notes on my iPhone. The app in some ways gamifies the experience of church going
by offering “badges” to users when they perform certain functions on the app. For example, I earned a “YouVersion Badge” when I subscribed to a reading plan on the app. The
App also integrates with iOS functionalities. Because I have installed YouVersion on my
iPhone, when I send a text message my phone offers a widget that would allow me to
send Bible verses from the app through text. And in this way, Life.Church’s app is folding
into the digital habitus of its users.

Multi-site
The following morning I saw the same sermon preached at another location,
Life.Church’s second campus, also in Edmond, Oklahoma. This time my Lyft driver
knew all about Life.Church. He told me that he was not one to cry easily, but that he cried
every time he went to service at Life.Church because of the music and the preaching and
the Holy Spirit present in the congregation. He asked if I had heard of the YouVersion
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Figure 3.3: Craig Groeschel preaching in person at Life.Church’s flagship location in Edmond, Oklahoma.
Photo by the author.

Bible App and he told me that millions of people had downloaded it. Life.Church is just
so “relevant,” he explained.
This location, like the first Life.Church location, had the branded sign out front
and though this one had a large cross outside, the inside was similarly devoid of traditional religious imagery. At this service, Groeschel’s sermon was book-ended by appearances from the “campus pastor,” in this case a woman named Erin Crain. Walking into
the auditorium was the same. The turnout was the same. In-person singers and a band
played just as they had the day before. The videos played on the three screens were the
same. And again, I cried and laughed along with Groeschel and the congregation.
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Outside of the auditorium before and after the service parishioners greeted each

Figure 3.4: Craig Groeschel preaching as seen from the audience in a networked congregation where
Groeschel is not physically present. Photo by the author.

other as they had at the first location. I saw a list of “small groups” offered by this location that people could sign up to be involved in. I spoke with a volunteer who told me
that it was great to be able to travel and go to a Life.Church in another location. He had
recently taken his family to another networked Life.Church location in Kansas City and
they had seen their pastor, Groeschel preach there. He told me when you walk into the
Kansas City Life.Church location it looks just like the location in Edmond that he attends.
“Like In and Out?” I say referring to the way that chain locations of corporate stores tend
to look the same. “Exactly,” he responded.
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Figure 3.5: Screenshot of Craig Groeschel preaching as seen through the Life.Church online interface. Chat
screen to the left was omitted to protect the privacy of those involved.

Online
Life.Church’s church online opens with a short “Welcome” video that shows
quick crosscut images of people logging on, Groeschel energetically preaching, a band
playing on a stage and the phrase “Our goal is to lead people to be fully committed followers of Christ.” Then the live feed starts. The service online begins with music, in the
same way it does in Life.Church’s physical locations, though the experience is different
because the shots of the band are seen through multiple cameras in the manner of a music
video, rather than from a vantage point of an audience member in the auditorium. I do not
stand up from the music like I would if I was in an auditorium though I bob my head a

!75
bit, and tap my feet. I notice that I have not thought about how I am dressed, as I would
have before attending a church service. I sit at my desk, watching the feed, as I would
with any other online video. I resist the urge to toggle to another tab, and check Twitter,
an urge that is consistent with my online behavior. There is an empty heart shape at the
side of the screen that when clicked on it launches a colored heart animation across the
screen. This is a similar functionality to Facebook which allows “likes” to stream across
live videos. I see other people’s hearts go by when I assume that they want to indicate
that they agree with or like something going on on screen. And this serves as a reminder
that there are other people watching along with me from various locations.
There is a chat screen next to the live feed and there are people on it labelled
“hosts” who greet users by their usernames as they come into the chat. In many of my
experiences of church online I have found that trolling is a persistent problem for church
online. Sometimes comments by trolls when they are particularly inappropriate or threatening are deleted from the chat screen immediately. But often, the hosts will try to engage
with the troll, ask the troll what is wrong and whether they would like the hosts to pray
from them. Others in the chat are regulars who greet the hosts cordially. The hosts chat
back and forth with the regulars, with the trolls, and with each other throughout the service, and occasionally someone says something like “Okay, I’m going to go full screen
now, see you later!” People in chat “sing along” by typing the words to the song they are
listening to. People sometimes post emojis to indicate how they are feeling. The chat
screen can be toggled to another in a long list of languages at which point it will immedi-
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ately auto-translate. This constant chatter is markedly different from the experience of
attending a church in person.
Yet this is hardly a “virtual world,” as Tom Boellstorff’s (2008) definition
would have it. Boellstorff explains that to be a “virtual world,” an online platform must
meet three requirements. First, it must be a place with a sense of placeness. In Second
Life, residents buy “land,” and understand themselves in relation to a spatial reality created by the world. Second, for a site to be a virtual world, it has to have people in it. Thus,
it has to be a site of sociality. Third, and perhaps most obviously, it has to be online.
These three requirements paint a specific picture of virtual worlds as online “places” in
which a social world is performed and there is some evidence that proponents of online
church hope that attending a church online feels like entering a place, and indeed a social
world. However, there is no sense of placeness in Life.Church’s online church, or any
online church I have attended. Instead the sociality of Life.Church’s platform resembles
that of Twitter, Facebook, or other online, text-based spaces. As in those spaces there is a
different type of sociality at play. People say things to others that they would never say in
a face-to-face environment. Trolls are the clearest example of this. Trolls in a physical
church space would be either reprimanded by the people around them, or in the case of
disruptive behavior, would be ejected from the service. Similarly parishioners do not tend
to speak to each other throughout a church service if they do not know each other. Clearly, there are different social rules governing the online church space as opposed to the
physical space.
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After the music, the online pastor, Alan George, comes on screen. He tells a
story about an African refugee coming to the United States that illustrates that church online through Life.Church is a “global community.” He encourages online church members to invite people to the church. Then he introduces Craig Groeschel.
Groeschel’s preaching is still engaging, but it is more difficult to pay attention
to him. Because church online is located on my personal computer, a tool that I am used
to controlling and adapting to my own preferences, toggling back and forth, multi-tasking, etc. I do not feel the social pressure to be paying close attention that I would feel in a
church auditorium surrounded by fellow parishioners. In the chat, during the service one
person mentions that he believes that he is a curse. The online church parishioners in chat
try to encourage him and convince him that this is not so. This is a common experience in
church online that is less present in a physical church where people do not talk to each
other during services and where people generally act in according to established social
norms.

Many Locations
Attempts are made to make the services across three different formal structures
feel consistent. Each iteration has a campus pastor and throughout the service pastors
emphasize that Life.Church is one large, global family, rather than a single building or
experience. Life.Church is a brand that makes its parishioners feel comfortable because
each location has a sameness to it. That the multi-site model borrows from the strategies
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of chain stores is appealing to middle class parishioners who see this as a way that the
church is remaining “relevant” in American culture. Several parishioners praised the efficiency of this model and excitedly agreed that the church was borrowing strategy from
the corporate world. Like the Lyft driver that brought me to Life.Church and told me that
they were “so relevant,” the fact that Life.Church borrows business models from the corporate world and, as I show below, also from the world of tech, in their growth strategy
appeals to its congregants who see this fact as evidence that Life.Church is particularly
suited to growth in the contemporary consumer marketplace. In their attempt to equate all
modes of church service such that to watch Groeschel in person, on a large screen, or on a
laptop screen all invoke the same feelings of community and worship, they also encourage digital habitus. Technology is used as a way to excite congregants and make them
feel as though they are actionably involved in the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy. And
the “life-changing” technology that is most central to the experience of Life.Church is
their YouVersion Bible App, which they constantly promote. For many, the app is another
piece of evidence that Life.Church is a contemporary, practically-focused church.
Life.Church is “one church with many locations,” and as I hope to show below,
this model is the result of decades of evolution in evangelicalism and this evolution has
been sparked by following business models from the corporate world, and increasingly,
by using technologies and practices imported from these worlds, rethought and remixed
Christian purposes.

!79
The Multi-media Megachurch
Though the earliest evangelical churches in the United States emulated the style
of European cathedrals, as Kilde (2002) explores in her study of evangelical architecture,
as American evangelicalism’s populist leanings began to dominate, evangelicals experimented with different forms of church, including housing church services in theaters.
This willingness to adapt formal structures to the preferences of parishioners and potential parishioners reached an apex with the megachurch movement, which began in the late
1970s. Megachurches have been defined as those churches that house 2,000 or more
parishioners per weekend (typically churches offer several services between Saturday and
Sunday). Many megachurches house many more people; and as the movement has grown
and matured, megachurches have become even larger, some accommodating tens of thousands of people per weekend. In their “Megachurch Report” (2015) the Hartford Institute
reports that in 2015 the median megachurch had 1,200 seats in its auditorium.
Megachurches also typically host many “small groups” in which smaller groups of
parishioners come together to do Bible study, or otherwise create communities that are
meant to act as a weight to the largeness of church worship.
As megachurches began to spring up in the suburbs in the 1970s, “church
growth consults” proliferated and myriad books were and continue to be written on the
subject. The Christian publisher Zondervan has a “Church growth section” on its website
that contains over one hundred titles. The church growth strategy relies on a focus on
“seekers”; seeker-focused churches want to grow their church by converting previously
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unaffiliated or otherwise affiliated people. As sociologists of religion have asserted, after
the 1950s American religious affiliation changed. No longer was it assumed that one
would follow the religious traditions of their family or community, instead, the popular
focus shifted to individual notions of spiritual progress and reward. Wade Clark Roof
(1999) has called this phenomenon America’s “spiritual marketplace,” 10 a field in which
religious producers use various strategies to attract spiritual “seekers.”
Rick Warren’s classic church growth manual The Purpose Driven Church
(1995), which has sold over a million copies, maps out how churches can attract these
seekers. Warren’s strategy relies on catering to specific demographic and cultural norms
which he gleans, as a business would, using survey research and census data. Blending
into the community is of paramount importance to Warren’s strategy and he relates the
experience of another pastor noting,
When my friend Larry DeWitt was called to pastor a church in southern California, he found a small clapboard church building in a high-tech suburban
area. Larry recognized that the age and style of the building were a barrier to
reaching that community. He told the church leaders he’d accept the pastorate
if they’d move out of the building and start holding services in a Hungry Tiger
restaurant. The members agreed. (Warren, 1995, p. 269).
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There is an extensive body of scholarly literature on the American spiritual marketplace. See especially
Ellingson (2007) on the megachurch and the spiritual marketplace and Banet-Weiser (2012) whose work
looks at how Christian preachers have mobilized an understanding of branding and marketing to attract
spiritual seekers.
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The traditional style of the central steepled church did not appeal to those suburbanites
who saw it as as anachronistic. Instead they cast the more familiar environs of a corporate
chain restaurant as a more appropriate setting for a church. For Warren, this story illustrates the fact that to grow, a church must tap into the style and culture of a community. In
Warren’s words, “To penetrate any culture you must be willing to make small concessions in matters of style in order to gain a hearing” (1995, p. 196). These concessions can
even influence how and if churches display crosses, the central symbol of Christian theology and worship. Stewart Hoover (2000) points out that Willow Creek Community
Church (one of the first and most iconic megachurches) does not display a cross. Instead
church leaders think of the cross as a “prop” and only bring it out for ceremonial occasions like weddings and baptisms. Hoover concludes that the lack of a cross at Willow
Creek means that megachurch culture is a “new, voluble, embodied, and effervescent
kind of religiosity articulated to cultural-symbolic practices which it can never fully escape” (2000, p. 156). In other words, as times change, evangelicals are involved in a discursive relationship to contemporary culture that forces them to restructure their style,
aesthetics, and forms. To this end, the megachurch:
locates itself on a separate plane of respite outside of the stresses of everyday
life by identifying with other contemporary places of peace, places where people spend their leisure hours (hopefully) untroubled by the cares of the world:
the shopping mall, the sports arena, the movie theatre. The church home is no
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longer relevant, but the mall provides the feeling of worry-free comfort for
which the megachurch strives. (Kilde, 2002, p. 219)
Old church buildings carry the baggage of an what many view as an oppressive religious
past, while malls, theaters and restaurants speak the consumer-driven present of the
American suburbs.
By emulating malls, theaters, and chain restaurants, in order to appeal to a specific
demographic subset of white, suburban consumers on the American spiritual marketplace,
megachurches could be termed what Marc Auge (1991) has called “non-places.” For
Auge, the central community church in Europe epitomized anthropological place—it is
the ultimate marker of a local culture. Auge writes about the French context, explaining
that,
The smallest French towns, even villages, always boast a 'town centre' containing monuments that symbolize religious authority (church or cathedral) and
civil authority (town hall, sous-prefecture or, in big towns, the prefecture). The
church (Catholic in most parts of France) overlooks a square or open space
through which many or most cross-town routes pass. The town hall is nearby;
even where this defines a space of its own, the place de la Mmie is seldom
more than a stone's throw from the place de l'Eglise. Also in the town centre,
and always close to the town hall and the church, a monument to the dead has
been erected. (Auge, 1995: 65)
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Auge conjures the image of a towering religious symbol presiding over provincial life.
Twinned with civic authority, this church provides a connection with a cosmic order, one
that would be clearly read by the citizens who passed it daily. The notion of anthropological place relies on a belief that there are places that embody a culture that is bounded. He
writes that it represents a fantasy “of a closed world, founded once and for all long ago;
on which, strictly speaking, does not have to be understood” (Auge, 1995, p. 44). He goes
on to explain that placeness, when thought of in this manner is holistic and social. An entire, bounded, cultural world can be grasped through the experience of any part of it and
thus every sign is pregnant with cultural meaning. Auge contrasts this understanding of
anthropological place with what he calls “non-place.” He defines non-place with regard
to place noting simply, “If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned
with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-place” (Auge, 1995, p. 78). Rather than reinforcing a
collective, shared history, non-places are those spaces in which individuals create a meaning from their experiences that is more self-reflexive than reflective of a collective community or history. One experiences the non-place “Assailed by the images flooding from
commercial, transport or retail institutions, the passenger in non-places has the simultaneous experiences of a perpetual present and an encounter with the self” (Auge, 1991, p.
105). By fashioning megachurches in the manner of non-places like retail institutions,
than, evangelical culture catered to the American proclivity for an individualized, selfreflexive form of worship and an American habitus shaped by non-places.
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Megachurches also encourage a reflexive encounter with the self with their
embrace of media technologies, especially by using movie screens and high-tech audio
equipment. In her study of megachurches, Kilde explains that “the newest megachurch
auditoriums not only include stage areas designed to accommodate large screens––Grace
Church, for instance, has two huge screens on either side of the stage––but also eliminate
all natural light from the room to optimize video clarity” (2006, p. 243). Screens are the
focal point of the worship space in evangelical megachurches and as such have more
prominence than crosses or traditional religious imagery. In sometimes stadium-sized
megachurches, screens are a necessity. But the fact that “the role of congregants in worship ritual consists primarily of watching screens,” (Kilde, 2006, p. 244) is also an extension of the seeker-focused strategy that realizes that, as Rick Warren asserts, “Television
has permanently shortened the attention span of Americans” (1995, p. 255). Because
television has become the primary mode by which suburbanites interact with culture,
evangelical churches understand the power that screens hold for them and they employ
screens as a means to attract these spiritual consumers. The experience of the church,
both in personal worship (singing along with the worship band on stage, repeating
prayers after the pastor), and community worship (the understanding of a collective experience), is mediated through large screens at the front of the auditorium. Schultze (1991)
however, voices a common criticism of megachurches when he notes that they contain
"mere collections of individual believers who happen to be in the same place for worship" (p. 210).
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Screens are to the megachurch what rose windows were to the Gothic church.
They provide a visual narrative that serves to guide and augment the worship experience.
But unlike rose windows, digital technologies allow for continuously changing content
and producing this content becomes one of the main concerns of megachurches. The
website for Northland: A Church Distributed showcases a documentary called “What is
Worship?” that explains how they prepare for weekly services. This documentary reveals
that Northland focuses just as much on the technological setup than on the substance of
the message. One church leader explains that “We let a voice-over and scripture and the
music and the lights and the video kind of tell the story” (Northland, 2011). Telling the
story does not only mean crafting a sermon, it means producing an entertaining and technologically advanced service that can keep the attention of parishioners who have been
trained by mass-media environments. The crew follows Northland’s “Lighting/Staging
director” and shows him renting a fog machine. Throughout the documentary church
leaders have discussions that focus on “creating an environment” for the audience. In the
Middle Ages, the Catholic Church created an environment for their church goers, making
worship into a ritualistic event that was meant to transport the individual into the realm of
the sacred, or spiritual. Conversely, in the megachurch, church leaders instead borrow on
the familiar paradigms of the secular entertainment industry ostensibly to achieve the
same end. In the Northland documentary, as the camera focuses on the church auditorium, it seems as though it could be the set of a high-budget, Broadway blockbuster. The
stage is decorated to look like the Garden of Eden with a giant screen providing the ever-
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changing backdrop. Throughout the service this screen will display the words to worship
songs, the text of Biblical verses and it will play video to introduce segments.
Megachurches understand that they are preaching to an audience that expects entertainment, expects production values, and expects screens, and this is where “church creatives” come in. To be successful, megachurches need people who can produce media.
Churches hire MFAs, they employ people who have worked for production houses and
studios. Not unlike the days of the rose windows, evangelical megachurches have to hire
artists who have a familiarity with the entertainment industry and a knack for storytelling.
These multi-media-saturated megachurches have become the most recognizable
institutions of evangelicalism, and as centers of community worship they are what Birgit
Meyer calls “aesthetic formations.” Meyer defines aesthetic formations with reference to
Anderson’s (1991) concept of “imagined communities,” which explains how print media
gave rise to a collective understanding of the nation-state, and Meyer begins with this in
order to keep the concept of mediation at the center of her theory. In place of “imagined,”
Meyer posits the term “aesthetic,” which she uses in the Aristotelian sense, referring to
embodied, lived experience. For Meyer, the idea of imagination is too limited to encompass religious experience, which not only exists in minds, but is also performed through
bodies. Meyer also substitutes “formation” for community to move away from the spatial
bindedness that community implies toward a more fluid and flexible structural image. Put
simply, aesthetic formations are the structures that mediated groups of religious believers
take.
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Meyer adds a layer of complexity to her theory when she introduces the concept of sensational forms. Sensational forms are the specific communicative practices that
structure social relations within aesthetic formations. Meyer defines “sensational forms”
as “both religious content (beliefs, doctrines, sets of symbols) and norms. Including all
the media that act as intermediaries in religious mediation practices, the notion of sensational form is meant to explore how exactly mediations bind and bond believers with
each other, and with the transcendental” (Meyer, 2009, p. 13). Sensational forms make
manifest the often invisible aesthetic formations behind them. Meyer explains that, “in
order to achieve this and be experienced as real, imaginations are required to become
tangible outside the realm of the mind, by creating a social environment that materializes
through the structuring of space, architecture, ritual performance and by inducing bodily
sensations” (Meyer, 2009, p. 5). In evangelical megachurches, screens have become the
central sensational form by which believers mediated their experiences and their relationships with the church community around them, people whose eyes are also fixed on
screens. These sensational forms have transformed the non-places of evangelicalism into
complex visual spaces in which an ever-changing visual liturgy whose tropes are borrowed from popular entertainment addresses parishioners. That mediation has become a
central experience in megachurches has been the impetus behind a change in how evangelical churches are structured. It also provides the logistic means by which megachurches become multi-site churches.
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The Multi-site Church
The seeker-church strategy relies on continual change and flexibility as a means
to attract new initiates, but as megachurches grow, logistical problems can limit growth.
Books on church growth note that parking becomes an oft-lamented issue and seating becomes another. One way that evangelical churches have escaped this problem is through
establishing satellite churches in other locations; megachurches become “multi-site”
churches. Research from the Hartford institute found that 62 percent of megachurches in
2015 were multi-site churches. In contrast, in 2010 only 46 percent of megachurches
were multi-site. As this data indicates, multi-site churches are a growing trend.
Some multi-site churches hold concurrent worship services in which video
from one site (proponents advise against using terminology such as “main site”) is simulcast into another or many other sites. Other churches transfer their brand of worship to
various locations through non-simultaneous video teaching. And still other multi-site
churches develop teaching programs to train new pastors in their style of preaching and
revamp old sites with their style in order to attract new followers in new locations. One
proponent of this model explains that “The multi-site movement is a strategic response to
the question of how to maintain momentum and growth while not being limited to the
monolithic structure of a megachurch” (Surratt et al, 2006, p. 7). Multi-site churches extend the reach of a successful church’s style or brand. And because many churches rely
on the charisma of a lead pastor – Bill Hybels of Willow Creek, Rick Warren of Saddleback and Craig Groeletsch of Life.Church all embody this charismatic preacher archetype
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and all run multi-site churches—multi-site churches allow a megachurch to extend the
reach of a charismatic leader’s particular brand of preaching. Some multi-site churches
have locations in many states, others even boast satellite campuses in other countries. On
pastor notes “multi-site summarizes today’s approach to church in which geography is no
longer the defining factor” (Surratt et al, 2006, p. 27 emphasis in the original). By going
multi-site and overcoming the restrictions of a single building, churches rely on media,
technology, and a cadre of “church geeks” to facilitate these increasingly important sensational forms.
Joel C. Hunter is the leader of the Florida church: Northland: A Church Distributed. In 2007 he wrote a manual outlining how and why his church adopted the multi-site model. In it, he expresses a commonly voiced frustration with the narrowness of
the local church. Hunter casts the building of the church as a binding space, one that confines bodies and by extension, the minds of the parishioners. He explains that “we will
miss so much if we limit our exuberance to what happens within the walls we’ve
built” (Hunter, 2007, p. 47). He says that the traditional model runs the risk of being “enclosed and self-limiting” (Hunter, 2007, p. 23). To solve these problems, Hunter established multiple satellite locations all connected together to enable concurrent worship
services. Hunter was able to justify this move by framing his understanding of a “networked model” of church as similar to the trinitarian nature of the Christian God who is,
in Christian theology, simultaneously three beings: The father, the son, and the Holy Spirit.
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Hunter explains the earliest iteration of this model:
The worship services began with T1 phone line hook-ups for video and audio
capabilities. Then, because of the geographical proximity we laid fiber-optic
cable between the two worship sites, enabling us to worship interactively in
real time. We have responsive readings duets, and other types of worship leadership exchanges between the two sites. There is truly a feeling of togetherness.
On occasion, I start my sermon at one location, only to finish it at another.
(Hunter, 2007, p. 41)
Interactive technology allowed Hunter’s megachurch flexibility. No longer were the spatial realities of the church building a concern. As megachurches become multi-site and
new technologies open up new frontiers, evangelicals see themselves as defeating the
limiting category of space. For many this is cause for celebration. Consider one evangelical response: “The possibilities are limitless, especially with contemporary
technology” (McManus, 2006, p. 8). At the root of the enthusiasm underlying the multisite model is the idea that church is a scalable project. The church can expand in geographical reach without losing its essential purpose as a place of congregation, community and worship. Anna Tsing (2012) discusses scalability as a central ideology of contemporary capitalism, and as in the megachurch, evangelicals have looked to corporate ideals
for guidance on how to scale churches in the manner of chain restaurants. One how-to
manual on multi-site churches mentions the Holiday Inn, Krispy Kreme donuts and a
chain restaurant from the South called “Sticky Fingers,” as models churches might emu-
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late (see Surratt et al, 2006). And at both of the conferences I attended for this study there
were several presentations devoted to creating and maintaining a church “brand” that
drew on influences from the corporate world.
The issue of scalability is also related to the time-space distanciation that also
underlies the multi-site church project. Anthony Giddens has defined time-space distanciation as “the conditions under which time and space are organized so as to connect presence and absence” (1990, p. 14). Globalization is predicated on the modern ability to
connect distant spaces in real time just as the multi-site church model does. Giddens
writes,
The separating of time and space and their formation into standardised, "empty" dimensions cut through the connections between social activity and its
"embedding" in the particularities of contexts of presence. Disembedded institutions greatly extend the scope of time-space distanciation and, to have this
effect, depend upon coordination across time and space. This phenomenon
serves to open up manifold possibilities of change by breaking free from the
restraints of local habits and practices.
(Giddens, 1990, p. 20).
This phenomenon requires that social relations be “disembedded” from their local contexts which he explains, “by disembedding I mean the "lifting out" of social relations
from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of timespace” (Giddens, 1990, p. 21). And this is why the process of disembedding is fundamen-
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tally related to trust for Giddens: when people no longer trust our own senses to reveal
truths of the social world, they place that trust in other systems such as brands. Where
once a local church goer would have trust in his pastor and his congregation which were
both rooted in his local community, he now places that trust in the greater institution, the
church brand. This is not a difficult transition for most Americans who spend much of
their life living in what Sarah Banet-Weiser calls a “brand culture” (2012). But for Giddens, there are stakes to this process, especially the loss of “ontological security.” Giddens states that “the locality in pre-modern contexts is the focus of, and contributes to,
ontological security in ways that are substantially dissolved in circumstances of modernity” (1990, p. 103). The church was the center of ontological security in the pre-modern
world, just as it was the embodiment of anthropological place, but as the church becomes
a scaled project, multi-site churches disembed church from the social structures of the
local context. Though many church leaders express exuberance for this model, it also
severs the church from its earlier definition as a safeguard of ontological security. Instead
the church becomes another abstract institution, like the supermarket, or the mall. It
moves further into abstraction, into the realm of the non-place.
As a megachurches move beyond their buildings, they take a step into further
spatial abstraction and in doing so abstract the social relations of a community that were
once the defining factor of the idea of a local church. Media technologies allow for multisite churches, but they also change the notions of time and space that are central to
church worship. The multi-site model relies even more heavily on screens and on video
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production. While churches can potentially reach more people by deploying charismatic
preachers through video, those people may never meet the pastor or preacher who inspired them to come to their faith. One multi-site pastor expresses the anxiety this can
breed when he explains that “it is also a challenge to feel like a pastor in a church that
you never see and that only sees you on video” (MacDonald as quoted in McConnell,
2009, p. 22).
Church is no longer a singular building nor is it even the sprawling campus of
the megachurch, it is instead a network in a city or a state, or a network mapped onto the
globe, it comes down to earth at certain points, in certain spatial realities, auditoriums,
schools, even prisons. Church online takes a further step into spatial abstraction, letting
go of the category of space virtually completely.
The Online Church
Doug Estes’ book Sim Church: Being the church in the virtual world begins with
a description of church as a spatial instantiation: “Each one has a building with a front
door that you open; each one has people who shake your hand; each one has pastors, ministers, elders, or leaders who proclaim God’s Word to you; each one is real, tangible,
physically present. There are differences, but there are more similarities” (2009: 17).
Both the megachurch and the multi-site church fit this description. But now,
A change is occurring in the Christian church the likes of which has not happened for centuries. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the church is
beginning to be different not in style, venue, feel, or volume but in the world in
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which it exists. A new gathering of believers is emerging, a church not in the
real world of bricks and mortar but in the virtual world of IP addresses and
shared experiences. (Estes, 2009: 18)
Estes book charts his experience as a pastor of a church in the then-popular online game
Second Life. For Estes, Christians have an unprecedented tool at their disposal that can
allow them to completely rethink the way church is done. He explains that in a way this
model is much like the model of church in the Book of Acts, before Christian worship
was formalized and this is a common theme that came up in my interviews, the sense that
the internet both allows for something that has never been tried before, and the sense that
it represents a more biblical and ancient model of Christianity than contemporary forms
of worship. Many people based this exegesis on an understanding of the Apostle Paul and
his approach to creating and shepherding young Christian church communities through
letters or epistles.
As Tim Hutchings (2017) documents, online churches have existed in various
forms since the 1980s. Experiments with online worship have come from many denominations and countries, including the United States, Germany, and South Korea, but it was
Life.Church (then LifeChurch.tv) that first debuted the “Internet campus” model of online church in 2006 and this has come to be the predominant form of evangelical online
worship. 11 As Hutching writes of Life.Church’s online church, “Church online relies on
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For a succinct history of the many forms that online churches have taken see Hutchings (2017), Chapter
One “A brief history of cyberchurch,” pages 10-23. And for a history of Life.Church’s Online Church and
the various changes it has undergone it its history see Chapter Eight “Church online at LifeChurch.tv.”
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centralized production of high-quality video resources, including the message of a popular preacher and new music from skilled performers” (2017, p. 200). In his ethnography
of various forms of online churches, he notes that the Life.Church model has proven especially effective at attracting and keeping parishioners (253). And this model has been
used by churches all over the country. Indeed in 2015 thirty percent of megachurches
hosted an online campus (Thumma & Bird, 2015).
Proponents of church online see it as a natural extension of the digital habitus in
American culture. If suburbanites––the target of megachurches––are increasingly living
their lives online, than churches should be online too. Just as twenty years ago church
leaders saw that television had captured the attention of their target demographic, they
see the smartphone as doing the same today. Then, their answer was to integrate screens
and high-production value media products into their church services, today, the answer
has been to put church online.
I first discovered church online in 2009 and when I began talking to online church
pastors around this time, most of whom were in their early twenties, I was confronted
with boundless enthusiasm for the potential of this new way of doing church. In the early
days of internet campuses many people believed that the online church could be a way to
create communities of Christians all around the world, and shared the excitement evident
in the quote from Doug Estes above. But by 2013, much of that enthusiasm had been
tempered by the realities of church online. At the Echo conference an online church pastor explained that her church had bought iPads for all of their bedridden or older parish-
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ioners and they had attempted to provide training on how to attend church online. Still,
however, they had seen very little result. In another session I heard a different pastor bemoan the fact that millennial evangelicals, the presumed demographic of church online,
were not taking to it in the numbers her church had hoped they would. In 2017, I caught
up with another online church pastor, who had been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of church online in the early days. By 2017 his initial zeal had dissipated. Though
he still believed that church online was an important aspect of contemporary church culture he no longer thought it was the primary tool through which Christian churches might
evangelize the globe. Church online in some ways, then, was a fad, but it continues and
has become an expected part of evangelical worship.
The church online that has been integrated in evangelical megachurches is different than the model Doug Estes hoped to see, the model of the virtual world church. Instead it is a platform that mimics other social media and streaming platforms endemic to
the web. Online church campuses have become a way for churches to add another site to
a multi-site megachurch, and again, they rely on screens as the central sensational form.
This screen, an individual's’ laptop screen for example, or an iPhone, can be the entry into
a church community. But this screen is even more individualized, even more personalized
than the screens that dwarf parishioners in the mega- and multi-site churches. The anthropological place of the church has been disembedded completely in this version of
church, or, as some evangelicals hope, it has been remade in a world of pixels, as such
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online churches have charted new paths through the digital unconscious of evangelicalism.
The Start-up Church
Life.Church encompasses all of the three models of church discussed above, and
as such it represents each of the progressive instantiations of evangelical church spaces.
But Life.Church has also taken another step beyond these, and as it is a leader among
technologically-focused evangelicals. In a video produced by the church entitled “LifeChurch.tv’s Vision and Values” they state, literally in red letters, “we are not a
megachurch, we are micro. We are a startup church with a mega vision” (Life.Church,
2012). Life.Church considers itself a “startup church” which indexes the history of
“church planting” movements and micro churches that are often praised in evangelicalism, but of course, also connotes the colloquial understanding of the tech startup. In this
way, Life.Church represents another iteration of the evangelical church’s zeal for shifting
strategies in order to appeal to Americans on the spiritual marketplace. And though many
people at Life.Church’s central offices told me that they were just stewarding a movement whose spiritual power came wholy from God, Life.Church also employs strategies
borrowed from the corporate world but also specifically from tech companies to help
them succeed. In turn, the fact that Life.Church employs these methods appeals to the
middle-class professionals who populate the pews at Life.Church’s many locations and
who fund the church’s surprisingly sophisticated and complex operation. I had the chance
to tour Life.Church’s central office in Edmond, Oklahoma, in December 2017 and I was
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struck by how complex and diversified it is. It runs like a Silicon Valley tech startup, and
this is not lost on the people who work there, and are proud of their startup church.
Fittingly, Life.Church began in a two-car garage in Edmond, Oklahoma. As with
tech startups, churches often emphasize their humble beginnings and these origin stories
are often taken as proof positive that God is on the side of the church or movement in
question. Their congregation outgrew site after site before finally amassing the capital to
build their flagship church in Edmond, Oklahoma. In the mythology of Life.Church, it
became multi-site by accident. Craig Groeschel’s wife Amy went into labor on a Saturday
and their child was born on Saturday night. Groeschel had to make a choice, spend the
next day with his wife and new baby or head back to the church and preach Sunday services. He decided to take his chances and play a video of him preaching on Saturday at
the Sunday service. As he tells it, nothing changed. At the altar call people still raised
their hand indicating that they wanted to come to Christ. And as congregants continued to
flock to Life.Church, the church decided to set up satellite sites where worshippers could
gather to watch a video of Groeschel’s service in other areas: first in Oklahoma, then in
Texas, Florida, Tennessee and New York—in 2017 they have twenty six satellite locations across the country and Groeschel has announced that in 2018 they are slated to open
four more locations in four more states. In their central offices they have a wall with pictures of each locations in the order that they appeared and what is striking about these
photographs is how similar each of the locations looks. This is not an accident.
Life.Church has an interior designer on staff, and they employ a marketing team whose
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whole purpose is to make sure that branding remains consistent in all of their multi-site
locations, again, this strategy emulates the chain-restaurant business model and takes this
idea of a “church brand” seriously.
In touring Life.Church’s central offices on a bustling Monday I was struck by
the complexity of the operation. A staff member told me that was due to the fact that a
man named Jerry Hurley was on the directional leadership team which is abbreviated as
“the DLT” of Life.Church. Hurley was a District Manager from the Target corporation
and he brought his experience managing a chain of corporate stores to Life.Church. The
corporate feel of the church is especially evident at the central offices. Individual offices
have glass walls to indicate transparency and openness, I was told. At each staff member’s desk is a placard with a printout of their Meyer’s Briggs personality score. You
might run into an INTJ, a ENFP, and seeing that, I was told, you would know exactly
how to approach that person and how to speak to their strengths. Speaking to strengths is
important; at Life.Church, the staff is never meant to emphasize weakness. And when I
asked someone about whether they had gotten criticism from another, related ministry, I
was told that they have a policy of never speaking badly about any other ministries. Thus
the atmosphere at Life.Church is overwhelmingly positive by design, but beyond that,
people seem to genuinely want to be working for the church.
At one point I asked a Life.Church employee if there was anyone working at
Life.Church who was not a Christian. He seemed genuinely flummoxed by the question
and he told me that their mission was to lead people to become fully devoted followers of
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Christ so...no. Unlike a business, Life.Church does not have to abide by religious antidiscrimination laws that bind, for example, faith-based business startups. And this influences the work environment at Life.Church. People have come from all over the country
to work here. Several told me that they believed they were called by God to work for the
church. And some saw their position at Life.Church as the answer to a prayer. I was told
that people came from large tech companies like Amazon and Apple and took a pay cut to
work at Life.Church because they believed that they could use their “gifts” in the service
of a greater mission there. Life.Church’s parishioners know this as well and it enhances
the enthusiasm they feel for their church’s mission. One parishioner proudly told me that
Bobby Gruenewald, the church’s “Innovation Leader” and the central figure behind the
YouVersion Bible App, had left a company worth 20 million dollars to work for free at
Life.Church. Both the fact that Gruenewald had been a successful businessman and the
fact that he had left it behind to work for Life.Church were admirable things in this man’s
opinion and they proved to him that Life.Church was an important, successful, again
“relevant” place.
At Life.Church’s central offices, Bobby Gruenewald leads a team of developers
that are called the “digerati” team, and this is what ultimately sets Life.Church apart from
other megachurches and multi-site churches and makes it a “startup church.” Gruenewald
and the digerati team create various “digital missions,” which are meant to be tools that
evangelicals can use to evangelize in the digital environment. One of their digital missions is “Open.” “Open” offers sermon series for adults and children; various media that
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smaller churches might pair with their sermons; financial worksheets tailored for churches to help them with payroll and tithing; free Christian music; and software and apps for
church use including the platform on which Life.Church hosts church online. Basically,
Life.Church offers all the resources one might need to start their own church from the
simply logistical to the high tech. On the FAQ section of the “Open” site, they state their
purpose clearly: “We give away free resources to churches because we believe that they
belong to God and His entire Church. So no need to give us any credit, just give all that
credit to God!” (LifeChurch.tv, 2014). Life.Church sees its work as instrumental to an
imagined global church community united under the authority of God. When I visited the
office for “Open” at Life.Church I spoke with five of the staff members there who told
me that they were experimenting with what they call “Open digerati” which will be an
Open Source Software platform that anyone can tinker with, in effect it will truly “open”
Life.Church’s digital resources.
Life.Church also has an office for their church online team which fields thousands of online prayer requests everyday. This part of the digerati team stewards church
online and they try to grow their online audience by buying keywords for whatever people are searching on the Internet in order to get them into church online. They mine the
digital unconscious of the internet to find people who may be struggling and then they
have the ability to track those people through the Google Ad Dollars system. I asked them
about trolls and they said it was a big part of how they had to manage the church online
platform. Because people might see an ad for Life.Church’s online church campus when
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they search for, let’s say, “porn,” (this is a keyword that Life.Church buys) some are not
too happy to be redirected to a church service. Yet they were optimistic about church online’s success. They said that at a recent service 11 people had raised their hands (an option on the online platform) to become followers of Christ. “That’s eleven more people
who know Christ!” I was told by an excited Life.Church employee. Though they use
Google Ad Dollars to track online parishioners, as this reaction indicates, the stakes for
the church are different than those of a business startup.
Near the church online team is another office that houses people tasked with
coming up with whatever is next in the technological realm. These people (I only saw
two men working in that office on the day I was there) sit in a room all day anticipating
what might happen with technology and how Life.Church might use new innovations to
reach more people. They are trying to come up with the next YouVersion, in whatever
form that might take and like many tech companies, they institutionalize future-casting as
a means to stay on the cutting edge of technological innovation.
The digerati teams’s most successful “digital mission” is the YouVersion Bible
App, which is a free smartphone application with which users can access a digital Bible
and connect with friends or churches to participate in Bible study. As of December, 2017,
this app has been downloaded nearly 300 million times and has been translated into every
major language. In fact, Life.Church created a version of the Bible app for the 1,140 people who exclusively speak Samoan, and they have done the same for similarly under-used
languages like Huilliche (Chile), Longto (Cameroon), Hupde (Brazil) and Ama (Papua
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New Guinea). By doing this, they hope that their app, and of course the Good News that
it contains, can reach every person on Earth. YouVersion has a large space in the central
offices that houses programmers, engineers and designers and it is set up like the offices
of a tech company. Coders sit at desks outfitted with multiple monitors. Engineers’ desks
are outfitted with a light that is either green or red, indicating whether or not they can be
interrupted. I spoke with one man wearing an Apple sweatshirt and he excitedly told me
that he had gotten to go to an Apple event to test the YouVersion app.
That Life.Church uses business strategies borrowed from the tech world in service of their church makes them appear to parishioners and to their own employees as
particularly “relevant.” And as a leader in the digital church movement, they have been
able to attract church creatives and church geeks from around the country who see their
work at Life.Church as purposeful, important, and in many cases directly guided by God.
Through their focus on technology, then, Life.Church makes the case that evangelicalism
is a modern religion with a role to play in the digital world.
Conclusion
Life.Church, the “startup church,” is the apotheosis of a movement in evangelical church culture that began in the late 1970s with the rise of suburban megachurches.
This movement has borrowed strategies from the corporate world and has lately drawn
inspiration from technological innovations in that world and from tech companies. Debate within evangelical church leadership continues as to how to incorporate technology
and how to change the space of the church to adapt to an American populace inundated
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and awed with consumer technologies but it has erred on the side of fostering constant
innovation and growth and catering to the digital habitus that has become central to
parishioners’ lives, especially to those in the target demographic of evangelical
megachurches. Churches like Life.Church are hybrid spaces in which business-speak,
tech-world jargon, and church culture commingle. And because of this they appeal to
middle-class suburbanites who believe that this style is a particularly “relevant” form of
religiosity in the contemporary era.
Progressive spatial instantiations of evangelical worship spaces reveal the polysemic reality of the church as a cultural, and ontological object. Church may be experienced in an auditorium where thousands of voices sing along to the words of a Christian
rock song flashing on an overhead screen. Church may be experienced in a theater where
the smiling, familiar face of a distant pastor beams, larger-than-life out of a movie screen.
Or, church may be experienced in a living room, with a laptop or even an iPhone providing the interface. At every turn, evangelicals have created new spaces for worship and
community engagement in evangelical culture and these spaces display new social logics
and customs. Increasingly church spaces have been infused with digital habitus and the
church world has been somewhat ported into the digital realm. This realm does not always resemble a church yet there are people there seeking spiritual fulfillment and human
connection. That megachurches solidified the role of screens as sensational forms and
that multi-site churches successfully disembedded church from the local context provides
the impetus for churches that equate the online realm with the physical one. In these ways
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evangelical churches have changed in response to the digital unconscious of evangelicalism and have become wholly new entities in the process.
In my next chapter I look at those tech companies in the sub-industry of faithtech, many of which provide churches with technologies that can be used to make them
more digital, and which see the digital habitus in evangelical culture as a business opportunity. The world of faith-tech, like the church world, looks to corporate, business ideals
as a means to understand how they might fit into contemporary culture, but unlike the
church world, the evangelical business people that traffic in the faith tech industry have to
negotiate their place in a cultural milieu that emulates Silicon Valley. In the negotiations
between what it means to be a Christian business and what it means to be a tech startup,
these entrepreneurs give voice to the particular reified place that tech business has in the
American imaginary and express their hope that their presence in this industry might help
redeem it, and by extension might help to spiritualize the world.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE STARTUP
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The promise of redemptive entrepreneurship and the hybrid culture of faith-tech

Vaynermedia’s New York office is on the 16th floor of a Park Avenue skyscraper. Exiting the elevator, a visitor is immediately bombarded with posters bearing
quotes from one of Silicon Valley’s most successful gurus, author of Crush It! (2009),
Gary Vaynerchuk or Garyvee12: “We are a family first and an agency second.” “We’re
rogue and we like it.” “Shhh. We love social media because it sells shit.” It’s a sprawling
open office and the aggregation of quiet conversations and keyboard clicks give it a
bustling atmosphere. In one corner sits Willie Morris and the FaithBox team. One Christian entrepreneur described FaithBox to me as “BarkBox but for Christian stuff,” meaning
it follows the popular box-subscription model and sends a monthly box of products from
businesses that promote ethical business practices, along with Christian-themed media
products like devotionals, to digital subscribers.
When I met Morris in the fall of 2015 he was wearing leather boots, an Apple
Watch with a gold band, and a white t-shirt that revealed an elaborate tattoo on his forearm––he looks like the kind of person that works in the tech industry. He told me that he
had cut his teeth in tech at Amazon working in user experience design and had worked at

12

See Marwick (2013) p. 163-204 for a detailed analysis Vaynerchuk's persona and his role as both a mani festation and a promoter of the values of Silicon Valley. Marwick describes Vaynerchuk and another popular author Tim Ferriss as “self-improvement gurus in the tradition of Oprah, televangelists, and Landmark
Forum facilitators, but they emphasize the techno libertarianism of Silicon Valley rather than the therapeutic, Christian, or New Age principles” (Marwick, 2013, p. 170).
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startups before FaithBox. He describes FaithBox as arising out of a conversation with
Garyvee in which the venture capitalist encouraged Morris to use his personal experiences to create a new brand. Morris recalls that he thought,
This could be really interesting using the subscription box model to build something that is meaningful and impactful. The cool thing about it is for me is
we’re not just sending a box, we’re building a community which we can then
do great stuff with. We can feed kids every month like we’re doing now or as
the community grows and we listen to them we can figure out where are those
other gaps how can we serve them better with technology and applying it to
their faith which to me is the long term goal. Let’s figure out where those gaps
exist and try to fill them in the best we can and see how that can impact individuals and hopefully impact other things as well. (Morris, 2015).
Willie adroitly mixes Silicon Valley buzzwords like “impactful” and “meaningful,” with
evangelical argot like “community,” “faith,” and “serve.” He characterizes FaithBox as
another app that might help “save the world,” a particular preoccupation of tech startups,
and he says that he wants to do that by appealing to faith communities. In many ways
Willie and the story of FaithBox is an illustrative example of the world of faith tech. Faith
tech is a space in which Silicon Valley ideologies blend with Christian visions of technology, business, and the future. Here, the digital unconscious of evangelicalism is transformed into digital products that both spring from and further enforce the digital habitus
in evangelical culture.
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There is a constant negotiation in faith tech between what it means to be a tech
startup and what it means to be a Christian company. Christians fit into startup culture by
using the style and jargon of of it but are nonetheless somewhat apart from it. Much like
the Christian imperative to be “in but not of the world,” Christian tech startups are in, but
not of Silicon Valley–– sometimes literally sitting in hubs apart from Silicon Valley as in
those communities of tech entrepreneurs in Nashville, Dallas, and Atlanta–– which raises
a set of questions about faith-tech business: How do Christians imagine the tech sector
and how do those working in it see their work? How does a company that targets a Christian audience and is run by Christians run differently than any other company? What are
the big and small concessions these Christians have made to fit into Silicon Valley’s cultural milieu and how have these values influenced and been influenced by evangelical
culture? How do these startups manifest and shape both digital habitus and the discourses
about technology circulating in evangelical culture?
This chapter is based on four months of ethnographic fieldwork at a faith-based
startup in Los Angeles as well as interviews with seventeen founders and CEOs of faithbased companies and two venture capitalists who focus on Christian startups. Interviews
were conducted in person in New York City, Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and Nashville
and via Skype or phone with those startups located in other places in the country and in
one case in Australia. I interviewed two of my informants more than once and kept in
touch with many of them via Twitter and via the apps that they had created. Most of the
startup founders I interviewed were running small businesses that had been in operation
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on an average of two years, however, one founder had been in the faith tech sector for
over 25 years. Most of the startups were in the app business, meaning they were working
to create smartphone applications, four of the CEOs I spoke with had founded VR companies, and were creating content for the burgeoning virtual reality scene. Most of the
startups I looked at had very few employees, but one had three hundred. Faith-tech businesses sometimes sprung out of the church world, for example Tithe.ly a successful
tithing app created by a former pastor, while others, like FaithBox, came from the tech
world. My sample reflects the continuum of businesses in faith tech, yet what came to the
fore in my conversations with these businessmen–– and they were with only one exception men––was a strong nearly reified belief in the power of business and entrepreneurship in American culture similar to that found in places like Life.Church, the “startup
church.” Yet though Christian entrepreneurs often spoke of the laws of markets as though
they were natural laws, they also challenged many of the cultural norms of tech business.
The discourses circulating in the faith tech sector, than, reveal an evangelical social imaginary of entrepreneurship and technology influenced by the techno-Utopianism of Silicon
Valley. At the same time, the negotiations taking place within faith tech also lay bare
some of the problematic foundations on which these ideologies are built.
Silicon Valley culture and its place in the American imaginary
To understand the hybridized faith tech space, we need to understand startup
culture and its genesis. Specifically, how Silicon Valley's counterculturally-inspired aims
of social revolution serve as an ideal harbor for the new arrival of sub-spaces like faith
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tech, and how its historic shortcomings are also replicated by industries and institutions
who emulate it. As Fred Turner documents in From Counterculture to Cyberculture the
roots of Silicon Valley culture go back to the 1960s (2006). For Turner, Stewart Brand,
the radical thinker behind the Whole Earth Catalog, inspired by Marshall McLuhan,
Buckminster Fuller, and others created a counterpublic that believed in the world-changing potential of the internet (Tuner, 2006, p. 89). These “New Communalists” had what
Thomas Streeter deems a romantic vision of the potentials of the new medium and injected a sense of play into computing, which had previously been dominated by an understanding of the managerial and business possibilities of the computer (Streeter, 2011, p.
45). Their romantic vision of computing ultimately went mainstream when the personal
computer entered the consumer marketplace in the 1980s.
In Silicon Valley Fever (1984), a portrait of Silicon Valley written in the midst
of this heady time, the authors paint a picture of the Valley as a place where capitalism in
its purest form thrives. They note that, “Meritocracy reigns supreme in Silicon
Valley” (Rogers & Larsen, 1984, p. 139), and in this business world there is a “sense of
power of the future” (23). As this description shows, a mystique was beginning to surround the industry in the 1980s. This mystique especially shrouded the new poster boys
of the personal computer revolution. The American media characterized Steve Jobs and
Bill Gates as young anti-establishment figures whose counter-cultural affectations set
them apart from other businessmen of the time. Streeter (2011) notes that Jobs especially
fit the bill of the 1980s entrepreneur and his iconoclasm only served to solidify his place
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in “The mythic American narrative of the entrepreneur, who in popular fantasy came
from nowhere and needed no outside support” (Streeter, 2011, p. 69). The dazzling financial success of these self-made men proved to many that the right-wing economic policies
promoted by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, were justified. As Streeter explains, “The
microcomputer thus provided a sophisticated, high-tech glitter to the Reagan era enthusiasm for markets, deregulation, and free enterprise; it became an icon that stood for what’s
good about the market, giving leaders the world over an extra incentive to pursue neoliberal policies” (2011, p. 87). And these tech businessmen continued to assert that their
products could improve the world, or in Jobs’ iconic (and appropriately ambiguous)
phrase, could “put a dent in the universe.”
In the 90s, as the internet transformed into the World Wide Web, companies
like Apple, Microsoft, and America Online proved the tech sector was no longer simply
the domain of iconoclasts and hackers, rather it was crucial to American economic
progress (see Schulte, 2013, p. 83-112). It was during this time that the countercultural
beginnings of the web were married to libertarian ideology as both Fred Turner and
Thomas Streeter have discussed in relation to Wired magazine an outlet that extolled neoliberal ethics but remained cloaked in a hip aesthetic (see Streeter, 2005; Turner, 2006,
p. 207-236). Relatedly, as tech businesses grew they began to adopt what Barbrook and
Cameron call “the California Ideology,” which they assert “promiscuously combines the
free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies” (1996, p.
1). The California Ideology is an inherently optimistic attitude that assumes that the
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world’s problems may be ameliorated with technological, market-based solutions–– and
without the unnecessary intervention of government entities. Those who ascribe to the
California Ideology see a techno-Utopian future, and this vision is often so powerful that
it allows for a denial of the structural inequalities that are necessary to produce technological products. This is why Barbrook and Cameron characterize it as “an optimistic and
emancipatory form of technological determinism” (1996, p. 14).
Also in the 1990s, investors flocked to companies with dubious value other
than the dot com at the end of their domain name and the stock market briefly soared in
what became known as the dot com bubble. Streeter characterizes this era of speculation
as fueled by romanticism and a new imagination of the potentiality of computing and the
internet’s role in society: “Change the world, overthrow hierarchy, express yourself, and
get rich; it was precisely the heady mix of all of these hopes that had such a galvanizing
effect” (Streeter, 2011, p. 133). Importantly this bubble was not only fueled by the promise of financial success, but also by an understanding of high-technology businesses as
particularly unique and special, again, sublime, in the American imaginary.
Though the dot com bubble eventually burst in 2003, the sense of sublimity
was then transferred to the new technology companies cropping up and rebranding as
“Web 2.0.” “Web 2.0” referred to all of those companies that were able to harness and
monetize the content creation and sharing aspect of the web––ventures like Facebook and
Twitter soared. Scholars began to write about the potential of a new participatory culture
in which those who were once merely consumers of hierarchically-produced media con-

1! 13
tent could actively create or remix content (see Jenkins, 2006), and some even asserted
that the ideals of deliberative democracy could be realized through networked political
participation (see Benkler, 2006). That Silicon Valley’s understanding of itself as a worldchanging industry had taken hold in the American imagination was particularly evident
during the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 which was initially dubbed in the American media as “the Facebook revolution,” a term that many scholars criticized as it seemed
to simply repackage Silicon Valley technological determinism and sloganeering rather
than interrogating the historical and cultural factors at play in the protests that swept the
Middle East (see Schulte, 2013, p. 139-163).
In 2008 Steve Jobs, the then-CEO of Apple created the App Store and allowed
third parties to create applications for the iPhone, a move that inaugurated yet another
tech boom. As Brian Merchant notes, this development led to the explosion of tech startups and mini Silicon Valleys (Silicon Beach in Los Angeles, Silicon Savannah in Nairobi,
etc.) all over the world (2017, p. 148-184). The app economy fueled investor excitement
and led to top-dollar valuations for applications like Instagram and Uber. Apps in the aggregate have “disrupted” many social and economic norms ––for example Uber and Lyft
have crippled and contested the traditional taxicab industry and have been a driving force
behind the rise of the “gig economy” that has spread to other sectors as well. App-based
companies also tend to continue the long Silicon Valley tradition of framing their businesses as potential powerful agents of change.
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The ideologies surrounding and bred in Silicon Valley have also been disseminated widely through the products that the tech industry has created. Related to what I
have been calling “digital habitus,” Zizi Papacharissi, in conversation with Thomas
Streeter has called the particular set of practices that develop around the ever-expanding
assemblage of technological products all touted as the next big thing that will revolutionize modern life as “the habitus of the new” (Pappacharrisi, et al, 2013, p. 600). Thus,
through the widespread use of digital technologies created in Silicon Valley, the ideologies of that culture find purchase in American culture broadly conceived. This in turn has
led to the culturally held belief in the productively disruptive nature of “new” media—the
sense that the media itself holds the key to revolutionary change (Pappacharrisi, et al,
2013). Tech, in the American social imaginary, is thus seen as a particularly powerful
type of business and one that is indeed expected by many to solve a number of the
world’s problems.
Yet, the tech industry is rife with its own problems. Silicon Valley’s unwillingness
or inability to hire people of color, especially black people, has been both well documented in the media, and mostly ignored by the tech industry (see McCorvey, 2015). Alice
Marwick (2013) provides another salient critique of the industry in her ethnographic account of Silicon Valley. She documents several instances of explicit and implicit sexism
voiced by her subjects and argues that the widespread belief that the tech industry is a
meritocracy serves to doubly exclude women and people of color by first being run by
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men who do not notice their own bias and second by assuming that the lack of women
and people of culture in the tech world signifies their lack of drive or intelligence.
Silicon Valley and the many places that seek to replicate it, spring from a specific type of business culture defined both by techno-Utopianism and a reliance on neoliberal economic principles. Since its inception, Silicon Valley startup culture has aspired to "world-changing" impacts, whether in hardware or software pursuits, though
what was meant by these lofty goals was often ill-defined. Still, because Silicon Valley
has proven to be a site of innovation and profit generation, and because it has developed
products that have become central to the habitus of American culture, it has come to occupy a reified space in the American social imaginary. The entrepreneurs who populate
the sub-industry of faith tech sometimes embrace and sometimes wrestle with tech culture, but, as my research shows, they believe in its potential and have internalized many
of its ideologies.
Making a faith-based startup
Origins and motivations
The oft-repeated fact that Apple began in Steve Jobs’ garage in Los Altos, California has become a parable demonstrating the possibilities of business greatness stemming from humble, hobbyist beginnings that connects to the ideological predispositions
of a Silicon Valley-based understanding of meritocracy. Garages have synecdochally indexed this idea in commercials like the one produced by Xfinity in 2014 in which an
Xfinity customer opens his garage and finds that his kids have created a tech startup––
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with the help of their powerful internet connection of course–– and are already experimenting with drone and hover-board technology (https://www.ispot.tv/ad/7RRN/xfinityinternet-tech-startup). At one point in my fieldwork the CEO of the company at which I
was an intern abandoned the office to work in his garage with his CTO, presumably to get
back to the roots of what tech innovation is about–– the romantic feeling of the garage
rebel.
Many of the founders of startups that I interviewed similarly highlighted their
humble beginnings. CEOs of faith-tech startups, just like founders of any startup, have a
founding story that they repeat. The only difference is that some in the faith-tech world
characterize their business ideas as having been guided by God or Providence. One
founder, who asked to remain anonymous, told me that the idea for what would ultimately become his faith-based app came to him when he was deep in meditative prayer. He
said that after some setbacks in his tech career he had asked God what his purpose was.
As he describes those formative moments, “One thought kind of set in my mind and it
was stillness around it, there was no other thought. It was no distractions but that thought,
which was to enrich media lives by creating technology that empowers churches to provide greater impact to their communities. And I was sitting there and I felt like, ‘Oh this
is it!’ I felt assured, ‘I felt no doubt that that’s what it is. That’s my life goal!’” For many
this sense of being called to their app is a real and deeply-felt motivation for their business that connects with the common discourse in Silicon Valley that says that startups
should be agents of “disruption” or positive change.
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Most of the CEOs and founders that I spoke with did not put their founding story
in such spiritual terms, but still retained the sense of calling implicit in the story above.
Aaron Martin, one of the two designers behind Neu Bible, a popular Bible app, explains
that he and his partner were tossing around ideas for collaboration while camping in
Yosemite and the idea for the Bible app was the one that felt right. He said it did not
strike him as too much different than a lot of startups whose goal is to create something
that will be monetarily successful but that will also have a social impact. He noted that in
Silicon Valley, where he had worked for many years, it was common to have a secondary
reason for your business, namely, that it would provide a social good, “So I don’t think
it's necessarily a Christian idea, but, it felt more deeply rooted for us than some of the
other ideas that we had toyed around with” (Martin, 2017). The term “impactful” is one
that gets used a lot in Silicon Valley and it connects to the ethic that the entrepreneurs I
spoke to want to put out into the world. They want to make technology that can positively
“impact” the world and, often, what is known in evangelical culture as “the Body of
Christ,” ––referring to the global aggregate of all Christian believers. That their founding
stories sometimes take on a spiritual dimension is not surprising, and in fact it is also indicative of the nearly-spiritual understanding of the entrepreneur in tech culture. Often
described as “visionaries,” tech founders are elevated to near-God-like figures in Silicon
Valley. Alice Marwick in her ethnographic account of tech culture notes that “the highest
position on the status hierarchy is reserved for entrepreneurs” (2013, p. 80). Perhaps it is
easy to mythologize the origins of a startup given the cultural cache these businesses and

1! 18
their founders have. Faith-tech entrepreneurs, than, do not flip the script when they describe their startups as driven by a spark of divine inspiration, they just add a Christian
flair to it.
What these founding stories also point to is an understanding of the power of
business and especially the technology business as an agent of change. The discourse of
startups connects to the social imaginary of Silicon Valley’s role in society, the idea that
these businesses are all doing their part to “save the world” and it is one that many Christians in tech believe and have internalized. Being able to characterize the creation of
technology as a life purpose indicates the power that tech holds as an agent of change in
the American imagination. For Christians, this possibility is tantalizing because for Christians working in tech, digital habitus, if guided in the right way, could make people better
and more faithful. One venture capitalist, Shawn Cheng working in New York City put it
clearly when he described the ways he could imagine technology transforming faith:
You may not even have a mobile device, it will be your glasses or it will be
contact lenses or it will be the shirt you are wearing and it will say, “Hey you
haven’t stood up all day long you’ve been sitting in front of this computer,”
“It’s been 36 hours since you’ve actually seen your wife,” or “You missed the
10 day streak of having bath time with your kid. Bad dad point.” But technology should empower and help change behavior and get out of your way. All that
meta-data all that stuff is here but making it useful and available and changing
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how you as an individual and as a collective group and as a society thinks.
(Cheng, 2015)
Cheng’s vision reads like science fiction, but the idea that technological products could
improve the way that people live and even think is a common one in Silicon Valley discourse and it is particularly appealing to Christians who want to help “redeem” or spiritualize the world. As Cheng does above, Christians interpret the world-changing promises
coming out of Silicon Valley within a religious framework. If Silicon Valley entrepreneurs promise to “make the world a better place” than faith tech entrepreneurs hope to
make the world more faithful, more Christian place through their technological products.

Yet, Cheng, as a Christian venture capitalist is in a unique and somewhat privileged position to speak to the potential for faith tech and though businesses are often begun with these goals in mind, many face the typical obstacles of tech startups. Startups
tend to be small. Some employ only two or three people who might not ever work in the
same room together. Businesses that employ some transnational workers are common. At
the startup where I interned I never met the lead designer who worked remotely as he
travelled around the world. Conferencing apps like Zoom and Uberconference facilitate
this kind of collaborative work over distance. During the interview process I sometimes
met the CEOs of faith-based startups in their home offices, sometimes I met them in rented co-working spaces, and sometimes I met them at the large tech companies that remained their day jobs. One startup I visited was housed in a church–– their church had

!120
offered to let them use the space. Typically, startups don’t advertise their smallness as
they worry it may be indicative to others (potential founders, business rivals) of a struggling operation. I once sent an email from a person that didn’t exist for the CEO because
he did not want it to seem like his business was just a one-man show (though it mostly
was).
The smallness of these business environments allows for a lot of play to take
place. The office takes on an intimacy as ideal Spotify playlists for workflow are discussed. Many faith-tech startups also emulate the cultural spaces of the larger companies
who inject a sense of playfulness into the work space. While I visited Yahoo, for example, I was shown their donut wall–– a large vertical wall covered with differently flavored
and colored donuts. Facebook and Google famously have game rooms in their offices and
hope to keep employees entertained probably for the purpose of keeping them on the
work campus (see Stewart, 2013). Small faith-tech startups often emulate this culture of
playfulness as well. The startup where I was an intern had an old video game console installed in it and the CEO asked me what I thought about converting part of the office into
a “chill space.”
There is, of course, also a precarity to this kind of business. The smallness of it
means that it can easily fail. Many of the faith-based startups I interviewed had not received venture capital funding. Some had received funding from personal and business
networks–– sometimes even church networks, but most were self-funded. One CEO told
me that money was often tight and even once “we had no money in the bank and this
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friend was like ‘I’ll write you a 5,000 check’ so we just went up to midtown picked up
the check put it in so we could clear our next payment.” Yet these problems are common
to startups of all kinds, and also part of the romantic appeal startup culture.

Fitting in
Though these startups emulate the aesthetics of tech businesses, use the same
products and speak the same language even for those working in the central node of tech
culture, there remains an outsiderness to their endeavors. For example, I met Aaron Martin at the cafeteria on Yahoo’s Sunnyvale campus in the spring of 2017. When we met
Martin had worked at Yahoo for three years as a design director. Together with another
friend who is employed at Facebook, he created Neu Bible in 2015. From the early days
of beta testing his app he received insulting comments. He tells me “We’ve had people
say that Christianity is stupid and there’s no way I would put this on my phone. I don’t
care how well designed your stuff is I’m not helping you test this” (Martin, 2017). Others
in the faith tech space told similar stories. One faith-tech CEO who focuses on video production and works in Los Angeles told me that among his peers “if I told somebody that I
was shooting porn they would probably think it's cooler than if I said I’m shooting religion or faith.” And the CEO of Faithlife, a large faith-based company in Washington,
who started his career at Microsoft said that he was used to the condescension he received from people. He told me “I have a thousand episodes of cocktail parties of getting
the funny look when you tell people you build Bible software” (Pritchett, 2017).
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For Aaron Martin at Neu Bible, though, the flak he received from beta testers
and others was par for the course and he accepted it in stride. Ultimately his app was covered by the tech press and received good reviews from well-regarded Silicon Valley publications. Though there is a challenge to branding a company as a Christian organization,
he thinks that Christians are much too sensitive to not fitting in, especially those who did
not start their careers in the tech industry. He tells me that often Christians in other regions do not really understand Silicon Valley and assume that because it is a “less
churched area,” as a Christian he might face persecution for his faith. For Martin, that has
not been the case. He tells me:
I was at a startup that was in Dallas so I’ve been through the South that’s where
my Mom’s family is from. There’s an idea that it should have been persecuted
for doing this but I don’t think that was the case.It would have been for a great
story like overcoming this persecution to make this great Bible app! But I think
we knew it was going to be a hard business because we had multiple things we
had to try and overcome the fact that it was a faith business that makes your
market segment a little smaller so it's just another business challenge that we
had to overcome. (Martin, 2017)
Martin subtly rolls his eyes at what he sees as Christian oversensitivity and he thinks this
is especially present in regions of the country where there are a lot of Christians. In these
places the Christian echo chamber and the sense of the “establishment/ outsider paradox,”
to use Marsden’s (2006) term, contributes to the evangelical belief that powerful media
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industries like tech and Hollywood have values that are at odds with Christian culture and
that all Christians working in these industries must have to adopt a crusade-like mentality.
Others I interviewed responded to this idea agreeing with Martin that it was an
overstatement prevalent in evangelical culture. Silicon Valley is a religiously pluralistic
place, but it is an ultimately agnostic culture. What matters most is what you produce not
what you believe. Shawn Cheng explains that he openly discusses his faith with his coworkers:
We as Christians I think are called to be witnesses and you know say “Hey,
what do you live for and what drives you?” And you know inevitably they’re
going to say “My love for my God and my love for my family, and really bringing renewal to all of the things that I touch and do” I think people respect that. I
think people when they think about “Oh, you take time to meditate? That’s
great! To not go insane? That’s great.” (Cheng, 2015)
Tech culture can be brutal. As Shawn Cheng explains, it is full of “type A alpha males”
who see the industry as a zero-sum game (Cheng, 2015). Cheng points to the other side of
the problem of fitting in here. What does it mean for a Christian to fit into a cutthroat
business culture? And what might be lost if one does?
For one CEO that I spoke with, the culture of Silicon Valley and the relentless focus on success is one that he felt like he had to escape. Before starting his app, geared
toward churches, he worked for years and was successful in Silicon Valley. Now, though
he still lives in the area, he does not attend the parties or social events as he once did and
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he does not want to get sucked back into a culture he sees as toxic to his spiritual growth.
He told me “I know a lot of people in Silicon Valley are obsessed with success building
the next big thing. And closing the next big round by whatever means necessary. I think
that’s what I see more and more is like you lie, you cheat, you do whatever you want but
as long as you become successful that’s what people are doing to talk about.” At one
point, he believes that he also became obsessed by the idea of making money and gaining
prestige and he tells me that it affected his faith and his marriage. It was only after he let
go of his place in the tech hierarchy that he felt like he could grow as a person. He put it
to me bluntly: “I feel like more and more people in Silicon Valley need Jesus.”

Prayer hands equals one hundred dollars
With two exceptions all of the CEOs I spoke with ran for-profit businesses and
making money was a clear driver for their work–– even when they believed that their
work was important for other reasons. Dean Sweetman tells me that he had no problem
garnering investment and interest for his venture Tithe.ly, an application that helps
churches collect digital donations, because the numbers supported it, “Anyone who invests in a startup is going to really look at the basics of the numbers. The market that
we’re involved in you’ve got about 300 billion dollars that are given to faith-based organizations in North America and 85 percent are still cash and check so the enormity of the
market is kind of a no-brainer for investors to back a company like ours” (Sweetman,
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2017). For Sweetman, the religiosity of the audience means little to investors. Like any
audience, their value lies in their buying power.
When we spoke Sweetman was pitching “emoji giving” to his church customers. Parishioners would be able to text and emoji that was associated with a level of
tithing, for example, “prayer hands equals 100 dollars.” He said he is also pioneering
turning Facebook and Instagram likes into donations––so if a parishioner likes their
church’s Instagram photos a certain number of times in a month that number would be
multiplied by a dollar amount and determine their tithing for the period. Sweetman is using digital tools in an innovative way to appeal to the digital habitus of a young Christian
audience and his success in the faith-tech business proves what purveyors of Christian
media have know for a long time, Christians make up a big market in the United States.
At the same time, Sweetman expresses a common sentiment among faith-tech entrepreneurs, namely the idea that their business, because it is run by Christians is different than
other startups. “I think to say that we’re just a company that’s about trying to get to the
biggest market share, to try and sell this company so we can all make money that’s really
the furthest thing from our intention, Our business is to serve the body of Christ with
great technology” (Sweetman, 2017).
Sweetman is influenced by his church background–– before he was a businessman, he was a pastor–– and he notes clear differences between the culture of church and
the culture of business:
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In the church world things are very black and white and you’ve got a clear
guide on how to live and if you’re in adherence to the Bible you have a guide
on how to live life and treat people and so on. Business is almost the opposite,
it’s anything goes. It’s all just about money. So if your motive is just money,
you are going to cross lines all day long but if your motive is to do good and
help people with good products than I think you can live within those boundaries and ultimately add value to not just your business but to the community
that you serve (Sweetman, 2017).
Sweetman tells me that money is not the evil, but the obsession around money in the tech
business can be. His sentiment gets to the root of the problem that faith tech entrepreneurs face. They want to make money, many even expressed that they had started their
business because they thought it was a good business opportunity. Maybe, some even
thought, they would found the next “unicorn”–– a term for that rare startup that earns a
billion-dollar valuation. Yet, these hopes for financial success had to be negotiated with
Christian values.
Sweetman’s understanding of business is illustrative of the bind that many
Christian tech CEOs find themselves in. They are business people who run for-profit
businesses, but they also understand that their faith makes them different. They have to
actively construct their companies and their own images in such a way as to represent
what they believe to be Christian values and these are not always compatible with the
values that dominate Silicon Valley startups. Some faith tech CEOs shrugged off this
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problem as just one of optics–– because they are explicitly running Christian companies
and targeting Christians they have to be sure that their branding appeals to their demographic.
But many noted to me that this reliance on a religious audience was sometimes a
burden. Bob Pritchett who has been in the faith-tech sector since he started his company
in 1991 noted that, “People call us to a higher standard. I get a different set of creative
insults from customers who are angry. Because people want to use the spiritual stick to
beat you with or something. Something happens like the product crashes ‘well I expected
higher quality from a Christian company!’” (Pritchett, 2017). Pritchett uses a comical example here of a petty complaint, but he voices a common theme that came up in my interviews: When a company brands itself as Christian it then has to make sure that its public face is Christian enough or it risks facing backlash.
For Pearry Teo of BibleVR, this has been an annoyance. He feels that people
are constantly trying to judge how religious or spiritual he is. And though he is a committed Christian, he shows me his tattoos and says, “I’m not exactly poster boy Christian
here” (Teo, 2017). He does not want people to judge him, but instead to judge his company and he uses the metaphor of parenting to talk about how he ran his business (“The
company is the baby I’m growing up”). It is important for him to imbue his Christian
values into the business, but as this metaphor implies he wants there to be a separation
between his persona and the character of the business. Teo believes this separation is a
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particularly important one in the faith-tech sector, where there is a different set of expectation from faithful customers and investors.
There is always a negotiation, then, between running a business and being a
faithful person. Though there is money to be made in the faith tech sector, money-making
cannot be the only goal of faith-based startups and the ways in which faith tech entrepreneurs interpret this balance sets their sub-industry apart from that of Silicon Valley.

Redemptive entrepreneurship
I spoke with two Christian founders of an app company that does not label itself
as Christian. For them it was a business decision first–– why would you limit your market
share? But it was also a reflection of their understanding of the role of Christians in culture. One of the founders, Phil Anema told me that when he sees companies brand themselves as Christian he thinks,
Just do what you’re doing. Do the thing you are doing and do it for everyone. I
think U2 does a good job of that, but Jesus does a good job of that. Be excellent in
what you do and offer really great service that meets people’s needs and do it
excellently but there’s this unneeded step of being like “...and we’re Christians!”
If you do that you do this subculture identification and you kind of win this group
of people but you also ostracize yourself from a lot of other people because you
are are doing this for the Christians and it's like why not just do it for the world
and do it really well.” (Anema, 2015).
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Anema does not want to specifically focus on a Christian audience for his app not only
because he does not think it is a good business decision but because he does not think it is
a good Christian decision. A good product is more likely to have a positive impact on the
world than a specifically Christian one, in Anema’s view. Christian businessmen like
Anema see their businesses as a chance to connect to people, in the way that a song by
U2 might connect to listeners, and they believe that the values that they imbue into their
businesses might translate to those people and influence them in some way. He references
Jesus, who did not “preach to the choir” but brought his message to everyone. This, he
believes, should be the basis of a business, not “subculture identification.”
A venture capital company called Praxis is illustrative here. The goal of Praxis
is to fund and incubate companies with Christian missions. By actively promoting, training and supporting Christian entrepreneurs, Praxis hopes to inject business culture with
Christian values–– though the businesses that they incubate do not have to only cater to
Christians and they do not have to explicitly brand themselves as Christian businesses.
Praxis takes a “missional” approach to thinking of business, which means they see work
and particularly entrepreneurship as a place in which Christians might influence society.
As with many of the startups I have discussed so far this vision comes from an understanding of the power of businesses in American culture.
The founder of Praxis Dave Blanchard writes: “Only as we step back and explore what seems unthinkable can we truly begin to imagine creating ventures that might
shift and shape culture. We might think of this as the cultural renewal analogy to Clay
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Christensen’s ubiquitous disruption terminology. With our short lives and Western privilege, what if entrepreneurs aimed to be cultural pioneers and explorers instead of
moguls?” (Blanchard, 2014B). Business is the most powerful agent of change in culture,
in Blanchard’s view, and thus this is where Christians need to be. Christians cannot be
normal businessmen, though, like those who would aim to be moguls, but they must
serve a higher calling. Though Blanchard privileges business, he also sees it as a sector of
society that needs to be “redeemed” or imbued with Christian values. He writes, “It is
hard work maintaining integrity and a right motive in the world of Mammon, which is
consistently and ruthlessly recruiting us to the lesser, decadent pleasures of power, prestige, and possessions, each of which can be instead used winsomely to benefit others to
His glory” (Blanchard, 2014A). The goal for Blanchard is not to fund and incubate a crop
of companies that are simply going to make money (though of course that is part of it) it
is to incubate companies that they believe will spread Christian values by creating a
Christian work culture that does not make profit the ultimate goal, but instead takes glorifying God as its mission. Like the CEO who feels he needs to avoid Silicon Valley parties because they are toxic to his faith, Blanchard criticizes a culture obsessed with “lesser pleasures.” Yet, at the same time, because this culture is influential he implores spiritual warriors to brave it.
Praxis has funded various companies, most of which do not have an explicitly
Christian mission. The Giving Keys is one. This business employs homeless people in
downtown Los Angeles to make necklaces stamped with simple, positive messages that
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say, for example, “love.” The Giving Keys’ business model is a benevolent one that hopes
to empower homeless people. Praxis also funds Lasting, a marriage counselling app, and
Cladwell a startup that uses artificial intelligence to help people curate their clothes and
buy fewer products. Though none of these companies are explicitly Christian, in keeping
with the philosophy of Praxis the businesses that they support hope to imbue their work
and by extension American culture with Christian values. Praxis calls this strategy “redemptive entrepreneurship.”
I spoke with Kurt Keilhacker, the board chair of Praxis about Praxis’ goals and
he reiterated Dave Blanchard’s vision of cultural pioneerism: “Ultimately we want to influence culture. So that’s absolutely our goal and we are very intentional. If you were to
ask yourself back in 1950 how does the parachurch or the church influence culture we
would have one set of answers. If you were to ask that question today we think that entrepreneurship would be the key through which to influence culture” (Keilhacker, 2017).
For Keilhacker there is a biblical precedent to this, he explains that the Apostle Paul
evangelized through his tent-making and tells me “You know there was a reason why
Paul was in the Agora in the marketplace because that’s where things happen” (Keilhacker, 2017). Entrepreneurship is where Praxis believes that culture happens, and so, theologically, it is a place where Christians need to be and need to be thinking about their role
in culture.
Keilhacker has worked for many years in venture capital, and has focused on
Silicon Valley. Perhaps because of this he is more gimlet-eyed than many about the role
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of Silicon Valley as a great savior. “When you work in tech you are around a lot of positive — oh this is great stuff! This is exciting! And yet you say to yourself you know that’s
true and we are very fortunate to be part of it but you know is humankind really different
today? Is humankind really interested in more human flourishing than it was 20 years
ago?” (Keilhacker, 2017) Keilhacker makes the point that though Silicon Valley has often
promised to solve the world’s problems, they have done very little to deliver on those
promises. For Keilhacker and Praxis, one way that business might begin to do some of
the work of helping “human flourishing” is by starting with Christian values. For Keilhacker this happens on micro and macro levels. It happens when Christians are in the
workplace, subtly evangelizing to their co-workers through their behavior. It happens on
the macro level when business people make decisions based on Christian values rather
than bottom-line values. The philosophy of “redemptive entrepreneurship” then, believes
in the premise that business, and especially new startups, can save the world but only if
Christians can first save business culture.

Shortcomings
Despite their sometimes lofty goals, the faith-tech industry displays many of
the same problems endemic to the larger tech industry. There was nearly no diversity in
the start-ups I researched. All of the people that I spoke with for this study were men and
they were all white or of East or South Asian descent and though my study was not ex-
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haustive, it was nonetheless clear that the world of faith tech is primarily white and male
dominated just as the larger tech industry is.
Interestingly, Shawn Cheng told me that he believed that Christian values might
be able to help the tech industry’s problem with diversity, “A Christian ethic is like you’re
supposed to value everybody and diversity is really important not just demographically
but both sexes and also socio-economically and even just psychologically like people that
are of different thought. Like you should be valuing people coming from different walks”
(Cheng, 2015). For Cheng, the discourse of diversity in technology is one in which a
Christian ethic might benefit the industry. Yet, there was nearly no diversity in the startups that I looked at. In this way faith tech looks a lot like the larger tech industry, but it
also looks a lot like evangelical culture.
Though gender politics in evangelical culture are complicated–– as Cheng’s
comment points to and as I explore in Chapter Six of this project, men still occupy most
leadership roles. Many of the men I spoke with talked about supporting their wives and
families as part of the anxiety that surrounded the success or failure of their businesses.
Many had wives who did not work outside of the home, and this is common in evangelical culture.
In terms of racial diversity, faith tech reflects both the problematic messaging
of Silicon Valley culture and of evangelical culture. On the one hand, the technology industry purports to be a meritocracy, yet on the other hand, it consistently fails to hire candidates of color. As in evangelical culture, racism is seen as a faraway problem. The un-
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derstanding is that individuals should not be racist. As influential evangelical Rick Warren explained in a Tweet, “racism is a sin problem.” Beyond that, however, there are very
few structural understandings of racial exclusion put forth by white evangelicals, just as
there are few attempts to meaningfully address diversity in the tech industry. The feeling
is that the market will take care of the problem and that good people will rise to the top.
This feeling is so strong and so widely held that it obscures the structural and cultural factors that make racial parity an impossibility.
The strategy of “redemptive entrepreneurship” similarly relies on the idea that
if Christians are in business, business will be better, but apart from imbuing values and
potentially evangelizing to co-workers, there is no coherent strategy to change the tech
industry for the better. And thus, though faith tech companies hope to both change the
tech industry and change the world through tech by imbuing digital habitus with Christian values, the industry has in a sense remade the tech industry in their own image and
have duplicated many of its shortcomings.
Conclusion
In the spring of 2017 Willie Morris Tweeted that FaithBox would be suspending operations. Like many startups it had reached the end of its run. Two months later
Morris put up a vlog where he enthusiastically explained that FaithBox had been bought.
I caught up with him and he said that ultimately he was really happy with the way things
had gone with FaithBox. No, it had not been a unicorn and he was not going to get to retire, but that was the business. You start something, see what happens, and then hopefully
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get a chance to start something else and the fact that FaithBox had been bought by a
Christian company with a lot of resources was a good fit. Willie had been CEO, CTO,
CFO of FaithBox for two and a half years and he was ready to move on.
The business of tech startups is a volatile one. It moves quickly and sometimes
relentlessly. I met several entrepreneurs whose initial hopes had not panned out and some
that seemed genuinely jaded by the tech industry. Despite the fact that all of the people I
spoke to who had started faith-based companies believed that they were doing important
work, there was certainly a realism and a general malaise in the air. Yet Christians remain
in the industry and new faith-based companies pop up regularly because Christians in
faith tech see business and particularly the tech sector as a way to gain influence in American culture more broadly conceived. Not unlike Christian political activists who have
supported “values candidates” since the 1970s, these evangelical business people theorize
their place in technology as a means to “influence culture,” in Praxis’ terms. What this
reveals in the power that business, and especially the myth of the tech startup has in the
evangelical imagination. The tech startup is seen as a place where real “disruption” might
happen and where Christian values might break through into mainstream culture by becoming integrated into digital habitus. In this way the discourses and practices of these
evangelical entrepreneurs follow the logic of neoliberalism, the idea that free market
businesses pave the way to a better society. Government policies are not seen as effective
means of influencing or changing society, instead entrepreneurship is. And the most pow-
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erful type of entrepreneurship and the most lauded in the American imagination in this
moment is that of the tech startup.
The products that this industry has created add the assemblage of digital tools
and products in Christian culture and in their implicit embrace of technology and the
technology industry, they influence the Christian social imaginary of tech. Each of these
apps and websites is a piece of digital habitus and the fact that they continue to proliferate
is further evidence of the emerging digital unconscious in American evangelicalism. By
seeking to infuse the technology industry with Christian values and by creating products
that they hope will aid spiritual development, faith tech business people see digital habitus as a dual opportunity, to both make money and perhaps to “save the world.” As in the
church world, they embrace the corporatist sloganeering and the strategies of Silicon Valley and they see technology as a mean to remain relevant in contemporary American culture.
But, as I will show in the next chapter, their attitudes also display problematic
blind spots primarily by resting on the assumption that technology is culturally neutral.
As evangelicals attempt to take technological innovations into the missions field, they run
into problems with the corporatist leanings of the faith tech sector and are forced to rethink how technology and the technology industry is culturally, and racially coded.

CHAPTER FIVE: MOBILE MINISTRY
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Proselytizing on the electronic frontier

Figure 5.1: A “Pastor Box” produced by Cyber Missions. Photo by author.

On the second floor of a small stucco office building in Torrance, California, John
Edmiston and his partner make raspberry pis–– tiny single board computers equipped
with wifi and bluetooth [see fig. 1]–– to be shipped to remote areas of the globe. Edmiston explains to me that the device has to be “ruggedized”so that “it can be dropped it can
be in mud it can be out there. It can be in heat, it can be in dust it can be in the
tropics” (Edmiston, 2017). This is the latest project of Cyber Missions, Edmiston’s nonprofit. Edmiston hopes these “Pastor Boxes” will offer seminary-level training for indigenous Christian leaders in various locations where mobile phones are plentiful but internet and cellular network connections are scarce. This project fits into the stated goal of
Cybermissions which is “using computers and the internet to facilitate the Great Commission.” (https://www.cybermissions.org/) Edmiston is part of a network of Christian
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non-profits and individuals who believe that technological products when conceived in
the framework of Christian missions work can be used to evangelize the world or fulfill
what evangelicals call “The Great Commission.”
Evangelicals trace the missionary imperative to the Bible, specifically to the
verses in the Book of Matthew that describe Jesus telling his followers: “Therefore, go
and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the
Son and the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 28:18-20). And another verse in the Book of Revelation sets the stakes for missionary work when it describes a vision of the end of Christian
history: “Then I saw another angel flying in midair, and he had the eternal gospel to proclaim to those who live on the earth—to every nation, tribe, language and people” (Revelation 14:6). In my fieldwork and interviews, it was not uncommon to hear evangelicals
explain that they believed that they might be part of the end of times and that spreading
the gospel to every nation, tribe and tongue was an agentive force in fulfilling this
prophecy. Many who I spoke with believe and expressed to me that fulfilling the Great
Commission was the most important task set out for Christian believers. And this structures how evangelicals see media use, and especially new technologies in missionary
work.
In this chapter I document the ways Christian missionary organizations see
digital tools. I begin with a focus on the most visible proponents of digital missionary
work, those involved in what is known as “mobile ministry.” This is a world in which
self-proclaimed tech geeks come up with workarounds to get Bibles into underground
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churches in China by practicing what is known as “SD card evangelism.” It is a world in
which programmers rejoice when their apps are opened in Saudi Arabia. It is a world
where coders construct secret Bible apps that cloak their religious content. And I argue in
this chapter that it is a world in which the problematic history of Christian missionary
work is in some ways being challenged and in some ways being continued by a new set
of digital Utopians who often echo the rhetoric of those in Silicon Valley who want to
“save the world” by spreading technological products and digital habitus. Yet, unlike the
other spaces this study explores–– faith-tech entrepreneurs, networked and online
churches, and Christian social media users–– this is a space that challenges the norms of
corporatist technology in favor of the early visionaries of the web and especially the discourses of the Free and Open Source Movement (FOSS).
The Missionary tradition in Christianity meets digital evangelism
The history of missionary work, or Missiology as it is known in seminaries and
Divinity Schools, is vast and is comprised of myriad theological, historical, and ethnographic monographs. Christian scholars see the paradigm for missionaries traced out in
the Book of Acts. Christianity from this time, as Lamin Sanneh (2008) writes, was a religion that relied on an understanding of the centrality of individual believers, rather than
on a homeland or a sacred, revealed language, as, for example, Islam does. Because of
this it was conceived of as a mobile faith that could move throughout the world and express itself in any cultural context and these theological underpinnings opened Christianity to the possibility of linguistic and cultural translation.
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As it moved throughout territory and history, Christianity became cemented as
the religion of Europe and during the Age of Colonization, missionary work was folded
into and informed the imperial project. Christian missionaries were cast as civilizing
forces, or, in other words, as carriers of what Rudyard Kipling famously called “The
White Man’s Burden.” Lamin Sanneh writes about how Christianity is still seen as a
Western religion because of this history explaining the accepted view that, “Christianity
was already so firmly anchored in the Enlightenment milieu of its origins in the modern
West that in whatever forms it emerged in the rest of the world it was bound to sow the
seeds of its formative Western character” (Sanneh, 2008, p. 217). This view holds that
missionary work is a one-way process, inextricable from the history of Western imperialism and inevitably a carrier of racist and ethnocentric worldview. Sanneh’s work complicates this, however. And Jay Case Riley (2012) similarly pushes back on this historical
narrative to make the argument that
the missionary encounter did not simply encompass imposition and resistance,
as many scholars have painted it, or simple proclamation and acceptance, as
many evangelicals have described it. New movements of world Christianity
emerged from a complex process of engagement in which local Christians selectively took resources brought by missionaries and adapted them to their own
contexts” (Riley, 2012, p. 7).
Riley makes the point that missionaries were not particularly good at changing or “civilizing” indigenous cultures and were just as likely to adapt their theological and religious
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frameworks to fit indigenous cultures. He uses the Mukti Revival as an example. In 1905,
a group of American Christian missionaries at a girls’ school in India heard about a young
woman who had had visions of fire that she interpreted as visitations from the Holy Spirit. As Riley recounts, these missionaries, excited by the idea of these supernatural visitations, actively encouraged them, sought out their own visions, and ultimately brought
back a new form of Pentecostal Christianity to North America that later became a primary
religious form in South America. As this dizzying story reveals, for Riley and others,
missionary work was never a one-way movement, but was always hybridized. Furthermore, that hybridization circulated back to the West, challenging and changing the shape
of Western Christianity in the process. Riley also notes that missionaries who returned
from the field in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were among the only
voices challenging accepted beliefs in white supremacy and civilization. He writes, “Arguably world Christianity did more than academic theories of human difference to undermine racism in nineteenth century America. More often than not, the academic trends
of that era intensified racist thinking” (Riley, 2012, p. 10).
In the Twentieth century the growth of Christianity in Africa and South America
particularly challenged the idea of Christianity as an Occidental religion (see Jenkins,
2011) and Western Christians have been attempting to publicly reconcile their history of
racial supremacy and cultural dominance since at least 1910. In that year the World Missions Conference met in Edinburgh. Though this conference set the stage for an understanding of Christianity as a unified world religion (this movement is known as Christian
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ecumenism) rather than a Western one. But it has proven difficult or impossible to extricate Christian missionary work from global politics, and all of this historical baggage has
become a structuring force in the American evangelical missionary project in the twentieth century. After the neo-evangelical revision of evangelicalism in the 1940s, Christian
missionary became institutionalized in non-profits, large churches, and Bible Colleges
and an accepted evangelical lens on the globe was developed.
Contemporary missiology has identified what it calls “unreached people
groups,” a term dating to a 1974 missiological conference (see Pratt, 2016 ). This idea
shifted what missions work meant. Rather than identifying countries to send missionaries,
Christian organizations now identify people groups by their ethno-linguistic identifiers.
By dividing the globe into ethnolinguistic communities that sometimes transcended national borders, the Christian missions movement again reframed the globe. The emphasis
was placed on translation of the Bible into thousands of dialects representing “unreached
people groups” or “the unreached,” And this especially put what is called the “10/40 window” front and center. The 10/40 window, also known as the “resistant belt” refers to the
area at 10 or 40 degrees North latitude and the areas that surround this point. This area
comprises much of North Africa and the Middle East, places where Islam is typically the
dominant religion. Frances Fitzgerald chronicles how evangelical missionary organizations in the 1990s and early 2000s began to focus on converting people of Muslim faith in
majority-Muslim countries which followed from evangelical theories of the “resistant
belt.” As she notes, this particularly became a problem when the Bush administration
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agreed to allow missionaries into combat zones in Iraq, a move that many foreign policy
experts saw as a dangerous conflation of military and religious goals that signaled to
many in the Arab world that the United States was fighting a war against Islam (see
Fitzgerald, 2017, p. 479-483). And thus, American missionary work, despite what many
ecumenicists have hoped, has remained closely married to geopolitical power.
While the history of Christian missions is linked to a history of colonization,
white supremacy, and American exceptionalism it also cannot be disentangled with the
history of media use and innovation in American Christian culture. Evangelizing through
printed tracts, through radio, through television, and then satellite and cable has always
been framed in terms of reaching the unreached and spreading the gospel. And in the contemporary American consumer technology saturated landscape, this tradition has been
continued and it has also been amplified by those promises coming out of Silicon Valley
that claim that technology can be a way to positively impact the globe. For example,
Nicholas Negroponte, head of the MIT Media Lab and techno-Utopian conceived of the
One Laptop per Child project in which cheap computers would be given to children in
underserved areas of the globe. The project’s assumption was that the technology itself
could bring about positive societal change just by being present in people’s lives. And
though the project did little to alleviate poverty or raise literacies levels (see Kenny &
Sandefur, 2013, p. 75), projects that employ rhetoric like this are common in American
technological and business circles. These ideas borne in the tech industry, then, when met
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with the longstanding evangelical enthusiasm for using media tools in global missionary
work inform each other rather naturally, as I will show below.
Furthermore, the digital habitus in American evangelicalism is influencing new
ways of thinking about the mechanics and ethics of missionary work. It engenders new
metaphors about the globe and new visions of global Christian community. When missionaries meet indigenous people who seem just as enthralled with their cell phones as
Americans, they begin to imagine new possibilities for reaching them or introducing
them to the Bible and these ideas have become products, businesses, and non-profits. As I
sketch out below, an influential network of digitally-minded missionaries is contributing
to the digital unconscious of evangelicalism and creating new social imaginaries in American and global Christianity.
The new Roman roads
Given that technological innovation has been a part of missions work for hundreds of years, it is not surprising that missions-focused Christians and organizations
would see the new media revolution as an opportunity to find new ways to proselytize.
The most visible and institutionalized form that this has taken is the movement known as
“mobile ministry.” Mobile ministry refers to the idea that mobile phones, and the suite of
technological products that come along with them such as e-readers, mobile apps, sim
cards, SD cards, and video players, provide a new way for Christians to get their message
out to a global audience that is increasingly adopting digital habitus. Some of the indigenous people that the mobile ministry movement hopes to connect to could be considered
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“unreached people” in the Christian sense of the term, but they have nevertheless been
reached by mobile technology. The Mobile Ministry Forum was started in 2010 and it
represents a network of about thirty missionary organizations–– some large like the International Missions Board, and some small like John Edmiston’s Cyber Missions–– that
are all devoted to the idea that new media, and especially mobile tools, should be the focus of Christian innovation and experimentation. As they explain on their website, “The
Mobile Ministry Forum is a network of missional innovators fostering a mobile ministry
movement so that every unreached person will have a chance to encounter, experience
and grow in Christ through their personal mobile device” (Mobile Ministry Forum,
2017). Because of the growth and ubiquity of mobile technology, the people involved in
the Mobile Ministry Forum believe that the Great Commission can be fulfilled in their
lifetime. In 2010 they set a goal for fulfilling the Great Commission in ten years, by
2020. When I ask Keith Williams, one of the leaders of the Mobile Ministry Forum, about
this goal in late 2017 he told me, “That was ten years from that when we first got together. And boy, I’m just watching something 100 million more people just got on the internet
in India last year. The dream becomes more achievable even if we are not necessarily
moving the ball forward as fast as we would like. God is moving that ball forward is what
I would say” (Williams, 2017). As technology expands, Williams believes, so do the opportunities to spread the Gospel through mobile-connected devices. The vision of the
mobile ministry forum and the movement known as mobile ministry shares a lot in common with those techno-enthusiasts who believe that closing the so-called “digital divide”
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is the most important step in curing global inequity. Again, it is reminiscent of Nicholas
Negroponte's ill-fated “One Laptop per Child Program.” Both assumptions rest on the
idea that the technology itself is emancipatory and once every person has access to it, the
world will fundamentally change. Of course for mobile ministry the message is just as
crucial as the medium and getting the proper message transmitted through the proper
medium is the central goal of the Mobile Ministry Forum.
Williams’ revelation about the power of mobile technology happened while he
was a missionary in the field. He had gone to the Arab world (he declined to specify
which country) armed with cassette tapes meant to transmit culturally relevant Biblical
messages, because research had shown that many in the area drove old trucks with builtin tape players. When he got to the region, however, he found that the cassette players
were mostly not in operation. He told me, “we started seeing that they were putting up
their tents where they could get cell phone reception instead of where they could get water and that was kind of an Aha! moment” (Williams, 2017). This led Williams to think
deeper about the role that mobile technologies have to play in the Christian mission to
evangelize the globe. He used a metaphor that I head echoed by two other of my interviewees, that of the Roman Roads. He told me that “We compare the Roman roads that
Jesus and his disciplines walked down and we say, God knew the perfect time to create a
place where Jesus would come in right at the time when these Roman roads were connecting the entire world and that would just be this avenue that could be used for the
spread of his Kingdom and we look at in the same way right now with mobile telephony”
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(Williams, 2017). Williams sees the world growing ever-more connected through mobile
technology and it is through this technology that a Christian message can be spread, just
as the Roman Roads facilitated the spread of Christian messages in Biblical times.
Williams expresses a sentiment that I heard a lot in my fieldwork, the sense that technology has been given by God and that Christians should use it, or as they put it, “steward” it
in a way that expresses their message. And again, this idea syncs well with digital optimist rhetoric endemic to Silicon Valley. Like those technologists these Christians believe
in a determinist vision for the New Roman Roads of mobile technology that is not unlike
what Marshall McLuhan described as the “global village” that he believed electronic
technology would create (1964).
Keith Williams described Antoine Wright to me as “the granddaddy of mobile
ministry,” a moniker that seems silly when you see Antoine––a young-looking thirtyeight year old––but appropriate given the speed in which technological change has happened in the last twenty years. People in the mobile ministry scene have dubbed him the
granddaddy because he was the first to start publicly advocating for bringing mobile,
digital devices into missionary and ministry work through his online outlet Mobile Ministry Magazine which ran from 2004 through 2016. When I spoke with Wright he was
wearing airpods that connected to his iPhone, an Apple Watch, and a ring that doubled as
a GPS-enabled fitness tracker. He told me he had his Spectacles ––Snapchat’s video-capturing sunglasses–– inside. He has always been an early adopter of technology; he said he
owned a Palm Pilot when it was commonly mistaken for a GameBoy. And it was at this

1! 48
time around the year 2000 in a church, when he tells me he was looking at his Palm Pilot
and he thought to himself,
What’s going to happen when everything that this leader, this pastor or teacher
is saying in front of me is accessible in this handheld device? Will that person
matter? How does that change the threading of this community that I’ve come
to love, appreciate or know and: Oh crap! Are we ready for that as a local
community? Are we ready for that as a faith community and oh my God is
Christianity Judaism, Buddhism, is anybody ready for that? (Wright, 2017).
He tells me that it was these initial questions that led him to start writing the magazine
and helping to assemble a network of church and tech professionals interested in how to
use new media technologies for Christian evangelizing and community building. And
with that Wright became the mouthpiece of a growing movement of evangelicals interesting in using mobile devices, as they put it, “missionally.”
For most evangelicals using technology missionally means using digital tools to
spread the Gospel or to connect individuals into digital networks that ideally become virtual communities. Wright, however, has a more expansive view of mobile ministry. As he
sees it, the world is becoming more and more connected––we are close the living in
McLuhan’s “global village”–– and that requires a more mobile definition of faith itself
because, “A decade ago it was disconnected first connected later but if the default is connected and if the default means that we are connected we are probably more like plants
and less like rocks— every plant in the world is connected at the root system” (Wright,
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2017). In his view, faith has to be a lens through which believers can interpret an increasingly connected culture. And in this way, he tells me that he sees a potential Christian future looking more like the distant past, as in the past of Medieval Europe when “The
thing that made Christianity valuable is that Christianity was able to spread because you
could embed it into every area of someone’s life. It was in art if you were a noble it was
you literally owned hymns or creeds while you were working in the field it was very
much a part of who you are. I believe we get back into that.” (Wright, 2017). Wright believes faith has to infuse every aspect of life in order to succeed in a connected world, it
has to be part of every connection, it has to create connections, it has to be immersive and
ever-present in believers lives. In other words, it has to be on your iPhone. For Wright the
challenge that the church faces is understanding how to embed Christian directives in
ever-present mobile phones and he views this imperative in a global framework. He does
not only fear losing a new generation of American millennials to agnosticism as others I
spoke to for this study did, but he fears that globally Christianity could lose out to other
religious voices. He predicts that “If the Christian church drops the ball and generally
speaking another religion comes in and picks up the ball— that's just kind of the way history has happened––and it's like crap, now we are marginalized now we are back to being
the little church in the corner trying to figure out what our beliefs are” (Wright, 2017).
Wright hopes that Christians can avoid this future by taking to technology and understanding the world as a vast, connected, digital network of believers who increasingly are
viewing their world through mobile phones. His vision is not too distant from the vision
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of the man he calls his “intellectual mentor,” Howard Rheingold. In Homesteading on the
Electronic Frontier (1993) Rheingold writes glowingly of the potential for communities
to spring up on the internet. He uses his experience with the online community WELL as
an example. And like Wright, he sees the importance of having knowledgeable stewards
of this technology deeply understand it in order to use the technology to enhance democratic discourse. For Rheingold, in the context of democracy, a more connected world
could be a Utopia or a dystopia because,
technology offers a new capability of ‘many to many’ communication, but the
way such a capability will or will not be used in the future might depend on the
way we, the first people who are using it, succeed or fail in applying it to our
lives. Those of us who are brought into contact with each other by means of
CMC technology find ourselves challenged by this many-to-many capability––
challenged to consider whether it is possible for us to build some kind of community together.” (Rheingold, 1993, p. 12).
Wright takes Rheingold’s simultaneously optimistic and precautionary stance when describing the connected world though his hopes are about the future of Christianity rather
than the future of democracy. Wright hopes that the ubiquitous connection that the New
Roman Roads facilitate will change Christianity for the better, but he also fears that if
Christians are unwilling to change and adapt it could change them for the worse. In either
vision, change is inevitable, the technology functions like Pandora’s box, it cannot be
closed or willed away, it has to be dealt with, and ideally, “stewarded” correctly.
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The Open Church
Though they are optimistic about digital technologies, and tend to adopt the language of early tech visionaries, unlike evangelicals working in the faith-tech sector,
Christians promoting technological tools in missionary organizations, many of which are
non-profits, do not as fervently believe in the power of tech businesses. Whereas those in
the church world and those in faith tech admired corporate tech businesses and often tried
to emulate them, my interviewees in the mobile ministry field often pointedly critiqued
what they saw as the increasing corporatization of the internet. For example, John Edmiston prides himself on having been one of the first people to take to the internet, even before the introduction of the World Wide Web. He tells me that he had the first prayer
website on the internet, the first Bible teaching website and the first Christian dating
website. Yet, despite his enthusiasm for the early web, he is now cautious, because “it has
been massively corporatized so that Facebook and Google and a few companies basically
own the internet” (Edmiston, 2017). He goes on to tell explain his concerns about private
surveillance, about the impossibility of being forgotten, and about problems with unmasking of missionaries on social media. For Edmiston who had seen the early potential
of the internet in the 1980s and 90s, the rise of Facebook was an example of problematic
corporatization happening in the tech space. Others echoed these concerns. Though Antoine Wright was typically optimistic about the trajectory of technology he told me, “I’m
also as scared as everybody else because I read the terms of service for everything, so I
understand the nature of surveillance culture” (2017).
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While the culture of faith tech emulates startup culture and sees stylish entrepreneurs extolling the potential of redemptive entrepreneurship, the mission field is more
likely to attract self-proclaimed “geeks,” “techies,” and “hackers.” Because of this, evangelicals in the missions field who emphasize technology often quoted people like Richard
Stallman and Howard Rheingold rather than Sergey Brin or Steve Jobs. They prefer the
early visionaries of the internet who believed that the connective power of the medium
had Utopian potential and my interviewees especially expressed affinity with the Free
and Open Source Software movement (FOSS). FOSS refers to a long-established computing community that creates and contributes to software with an open source code. This
type of software allows hackers and computer enthusiasts to freely copy and improve
upon digital products. The ethic of sharing that is the basis of the FOSS movement was
articulated by Richard Stallman in the 1980s who laid forth a set of moral rules for computing, for example, “As a computer user today, you may find yourself using a proprietary program. If your friend asks to make a copy, it would be wrong to refuse. Cooperation is more important than copyright” (Stallman, 2010, p. 52). In her ethnography of
hacker culture, Gabriella Coleman explains that FOSS gave a generation of young men
(and to a much lesser extent, women) who were fascinated by computing a rallying point.
The software provided a chance for these proto-hackers to tinker, and in so doing, to take
ownership of the process of computing. It also allowed for a community to develop that
took FOSS as its lingua franca and that began to take the ideology of sharing as its central
moral tenet (Coleman, 2013, p. 26). Both within and outside of the hacking community

!153
FOSS has been taken as a touchstone for a variety of ideological positions. Richard
Stallman conceived of it in a socialist framework, but others have read it as a libertarian
ideal (like Raymond, 2001) or as a Marxist ideal (like MacKenzie Wark (2004). The
Christians in the missions field that expressed enthusiasm for FOSS saw it in Biblical
terms. Yet uniting these fractions is a social imaginary challenges the dominant neoliberalist capitalism that predominates in the tech world today. David Berry explains that the
collective production that FOSS programmers perform challenges received cultural understanding of the necessity of Fordist and post-Fordist production models (2008, p.101).
Because it is a challenge to dominant market modes, than, the logic of FOSS extends beyond just software. It allows for “a form of collective action that has crystallised in response to capital's quest to commodify ideas, knowledge and information” (Berry, 2008,
p. 101).
Many of the people I spoke with had worked on Open Source platforms and
they echoed the rhetoric of the FOSS Movement precisely because it challenged dominant economic models. For example, Antoine Wright told me, “the open source community and the Bible sharing community have seemed to almost work lockstep at least in the
last decade they did in terms of making content available for least of these” (Wright,
2017). For Wright it is the fact that the FOSS community produces content geared toward
older devices that proves their idealistic goals, the same goals shared by missions organizations who hope to proselytize to “the least of these.”
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Life.Church has also taken on the ethics of the FOSS movement. On their expansive website they have a section called “Open” that offers church resources for free
download. They explain: “We give away free resources to churches because we believe
that they belong to God and His entire Church. So no need to give us any credit, just give
all that credit to God!” (LifeChurch.tv, 2014). Life.Church sees its work as instrumental
to an imagined global church community united under the authority of God. And the lead
pastor of Life.Church, Craig Groeschel writes about the impetus behind “Open”
recalling,“What if, we asked idealistically, we just gave away our creative content—for
free?” Groeschel describes this as a breakthrough in LifeChurch.tv’s approach to ministry, and he says he immediately conceived of it as “open sourcing,” a concept that he
traces to “a few computer companies who started sharing their in-house software with
anyone who wanted it, trusting (hoping) that others would follow” (Groeschel, 2007).
Groschel sees this as an ethic common in the tech world, but he also places it in a distinctly Christian framework when he explains that “open sourcing is giving away the
rights to use what already exists. In the ministry world, we could define it as giving away
what wasn't ours in the first place. (It all came from God, anyway)” (Groeschel, 2007).
Groschel takes the concept of “open sourcing” and places it in a theological context in
which God is the ultimate rights holder, not an individual or a church.
In the same vein, Jonathan Pulos runs a non-profit organization called Missional
Digerati, another organization involved in the Mobile Ministry Forum. He tells me that
the idea for Missional Digerati was sparked by an eight-week ministry course called
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“Perspectives on the World Christian Movement.” At the time he took this course he was
working as a programmer in a large company. He says this course prompted him to imagine that his role as a programmer could be creating an organization that was basically a
full-time hackathon where programmers and engineers could get together to create technology to support missions work. As he explains, “I’ve always dreamed about the idea of
Missional Digerati becoming a think tank where you get these techies together their heart
and their mission is fulfilling the Great Commission and they’ve got all the resources
they need on hand to just do stuff: build the right projects, test it out, see the results” (Pulos, 2017). He explains that this was not a business idea –– the goal was not to charge
anything for these services. And in this way Pulos exemplifies the ethics of the mobile
ministry community. In this world, making money is beside the point. The organizations
that I looked at were all non-profits, but beyond that status, the people involved in them,
like Pulos seemed to regard money and money-making as merely a hindrance to their ultimate goals––no one expected or even wanted their project to become a “unicorn.” In the
five years since he has been running Missional Digerati that dream has not totally been
realized; he says now he mostly works with missions organizations, consulting with them
and building their technology. But it remains important for him to encourage his clients to
Open Source everything that he produces for them. For him, Open Source Software is the
key to his goal of having a frictionless innovative atmosphere of Christian technologists
working to evangelize the globe.
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Tim Jore started his career working in Bible translation and in tandem with that he
also participated in the Open Source movement. Because of this, he recalls, “I learned
how the community works how very different it is from commercial products and really
started to internalize some of those principles and more importantly started to recognize
that much of it is I believe deeply rooted in biblical principles” (Jore, 2017). Like Pulos
and Life.Church, he spins the ideology of FOSS in a Christian way, seeing the principles
of sharing as biblical ones. Jore tells me he also read Lawrence Lessig, who applied the
logic of FOSS to cultural production. Lessig created Creative Commons, a non-profit organization whose mission is to create and maintain open licenses specifically tailored to
the concerns of the digital age, in 2001. Creative Commons translated the ethics of the
FOSS movement to cultural production and instigated what is known as the Free Culture
movement (see Boyle, 2008, p. 182). The ideas Jore gleaned from FOSS and the Free
Culture movement eventually prompted him to write The Christian Commons (2013). In
it, he describes being a missionary in the field in Papua New Guinea and trying to use
software to help local Christians translate the Bible into their dialect, and he notes that
“everything had been going fine until the software installer prompted us for a license key
to translate the Word of God, but since we did not have a license key, we could not proceed with the installation of software” (Jore, 2013, p. 15). For Jore this experience was
significant because, “In the legal context of ‘all rights reserved’ the global church is unable to work together without restriction or hindrance to leverage Internet and mobile
technology to the fullest for the purposes of God’s Kingdom and the equipping of His
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Church” (Jore, 2013, p 14). His book describes an alternate paradigm in which Christian
technologists, translators, and publishers might work together to create a free and open
Christian commons that might be accessed by anyone. And when I caught up with Jore in
the fall of 2017 he excitedly related that, “What had been described mostly from a theoretical standpoint in Christian Commons in 2012 is just accelerating globally and it's
thrilling to be a part of” (Jore, 2017). Jore works in innovation and strategy at an organization called Distant Shores, which has developed a model that allows indigenous Christian communities to get access to Biblical resources of all types in “gateway languages”
that they can then use to translate into local dialects and spread throughout their region.
All of the media he transmits is open through Creative Commons licensing, meaning that
it can be shared, remixed, and rebranded in any way the user sees fit.
Jore tells me that the most pushback on his ideas he has received comes from publishers and established Christian organizations. For example, he expresses frustration that
the Greek New Testament has been protected by publishers who have copyrighted their
translations in effect making them inaccessible for people who cannot pay for them.
Though evangelical outreach strategies have historically been based on giving away free
things, especially Bibles, they have also always been involved in a balancing act between
giving away the cultural products that they create and retaining ownership of the right to
these products. Because of this there have been controversies about how churches should
interpret copyright law in regard to sermons (see Smietana, 2014), Contemporary Christian Music (see Gormly, 2003), and other cultural forms (see Berg, 2003). The Christian
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intellectual property regime established in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s has proven to be profitable for Christian businesses; Bibles especially are a source of millions of dollars in
revenue for a variety of Christian organizations every year (see Balmer, 1989 p.
193-208). But Jore, inspired by what he believes are the biblical principles of the FOSS
and Free Culture movements believes that to truly steward technology Christians have to
get away from a paradigm that has valued business and money-making over sharing and
free transmission of messages.
For Jore, the Open Church movement is also a paradigm shift because it gives
more power to those in indigenous populations in the Global South to control content. He
explains,
Perhaps the most important aspect in all of this is getting away from the idea
that we are going to come up with the best solution here and then we are going
to ship it globally. That’s more of a commercial model and that’s fine. It’s a
business model, that’s great. And sometimes it's extremely effective but where
I’m going with this is very similar to our take on the content and the licensing.
We are very interested in letting the church have the freedom to solve their own
problems. Not in a disconnected way, not in a this is your problem you take
care of it but in the sense of let's give everything that we’ve got with the freedom so that everyone can be creative to meet the needs together. (Jore, 2017).
Through open technology, open resources, and a connected globe, Jore imagines new
nodal points in global Christianity emerging. He believes he has seen the beginning of
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this in parts of India where he has seen the sharing, remixing, and circulation of Christian
content accelerate in the past few years, and he compares this to a flame hitting gasoline:
it cannot be stopped.
A global paradigm shift?
On the surface, Jore’s understanding of how to translate media messages through
indigenous cultures by giving those cultures control and opening content to remixing and
sharing without restriction is reminiscent of the anthropologist Faye Ginsburg’s view of
indigenous media production in the “digital age” (2008). Ginsburg urges scholars to think
beyond the common argument that points to the problematic existence of a vast digital
divide, and instead introduces case studies that show that indigenous media producers
often have different views on how technology might be used than those prescribed by
Western observers. She shows that indigenous producers have especially critiqued what
they see as the hegemonic insistence on Western intellectual property norms. For Ginsburg this is important to keep in mind when we refer to the “digital age” as a unified ideological moment because, “the language smuggles in a set of assumptions that paper over
cultural difference in the way things digital may be taken up––if at all–– in radically different contexts and thus serve to further insulate thinking against recognition of alterity
that different kinds of media worlds present” (Ginsburg, 2008, p. 129). In other words we
have to get away from the technology industry’s understanding of “edge cases.” In her
book, Sarah Wachter-Boettcher (2017) explains that the technology industry, especially
given its demographic makeup as a male-controlled space, has blind spots that influence
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how they imagine technology use. Everything outside of the frame that they set up is considered an “edge case.” This is problematic given that the technology industry is concentrated in a relatively few areas and there is very little input taken into consideration from
people who inhabit “alternate media worlds.”
Because of this, some organizations in the mobile ministry movement are dedicated to using digital tools explicitly to empower indigenous communities to create their
own products and content geared toward spreading Christian messages. Code for the
Kingdom, for example, hosts weekend-long “hackathons” all over the world because they
hope to be “igniting the Christian passion and purpose of technologists and entrepreneurs
to innovate culture shaping technologies that would reclaim our times for the
Gospel” (Code for the Kingdom, 2017). They have hosted events in places such as Jakarta, Bogota, and Addis Ababa as a means to engage indigenous media producers. Another
organization called Indigitous is also illustrative here. Indigitous is a portmanteau of “indigenous” and “digital.” They explain that both of these concepts are crucial to their mission. “Indigenous because it reflects our desire for locally-generated strategies that work
in each generation, language and culture. Digital because we believe digital tools, resources, platforms and strategies can accelerate God’s mission” (https://indigitous.org/
about-us/). To this end, like Code for the Kingdom, they sponsor hackathons around the
world and they host a global network of volunteers, and offer social media training to
Christians globally.
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I spoke with two Indigitous volunteers Jeyanti Yorke and Janakan, a married
couple living in Singapore. They have also created their own app, called Oikos which offers church management services to churches around the world on a sliding pay scale.
Janakan told me that the Western and especially American focus of Christian technology
production is a problem because it excludes non-Westerners from the means of production. Janakan believes that this deficit in the balance of technological production exists
because of the structure of the global economy. He stresses that “there’s no lack of innovation in the rest of the world, in the majority world. We have been to places in Ethiopia
where they have internet for half an hour a day and they are able to code things at the
same level as these American developers. The difference is they don’t necessarily have
access to market” (Janakan, 2017). Because they do not have access to the market, and
thus cannot easily sell their products, they do not have a voice in how technology is produced. Creative indigenous producers are in effect, silenced.
In one sense, the way that Jore, Code for the Kingdom, Indigitous and others in
this movement have reimagined how media might be used in indigenous contexts follows
from Ginsburg’s understanding of alternate media worlds. Because indigenous producers
can openly use content in any way that they see fit, they can for example put their own
branding on a teaching video, or they can add their own Biblical exegesis to a openly
shared cultural product these Christians believe they are ceding their power as theological
and cultural gatekeepers to indigenous communities. Yet, as Janakan alludes to above, the
problem goes beyond access to materials and tools. And this is a problem that comes into
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many programs constructed in a Western context that hope to aid the majority world, and
a focus on technological production and technology use may enhance that problem. In his
book on the development of the iPhone and the app economy, Brian Merchant visited
Nairobi’s “Silicon Savannah” and found that though Western technology companies and
NGOs had enthusiastically pushed local producers to create technological products as a
means to bring money into the region, these Western organizations had not understood
how entrepreneurship worked in Africa. Merchant writes, “The idea of mobile revolution
or an app-based revolution ported poorly from the U.S. or Europe, where it was a cultural
phenomenon, to Kenya, where the reality was much different” (2017, p. 179). And Yuri
Takhteyev’s (2012) study of coders in Rio reveals the complex relationship that those
working at the periphery have with those in the center, i.e. in Silicon Valley. Takhteyev’s
work also points out that technology production and especially Open Source Software
presents a high barrier of entry for those programmers that do not speak English as the
dominant coding languages all rely on English and FOSS particularly uses English as its
lingua franca. He writes, “participation in open source projects involves a complex negotiation of culture, language, and geography, and is often harder than engaging in other
forms of software practice, since it requires more fluency in foreign culture and demands
more of the resources that may be hard to find” (Takhteyev, 2012, p. 9, emphasis in the
original). Thus, porting the idea of a “hackathon” to Bogota, may not be as empowering
as the people who run these organizations hope it to be. Similarly cultural products ini-
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tially produced in the West may have a high barrier of entry for indigenous people, or
may not be relevant in indigenous cultures.
Though mobile technology has been heralded as the means by which the world
might truly be united in a McLuhian “Global Village,” the way that it has been received
and produced in local places belies this idea. Ultimately, then, the movement is still oneway. Now not only are the messages designed in the West, but so are the technologies
used to transmit them. Like the iPhone, they are “designed in California, assembled in
China.” As Bill Wasik points out, “the smartphone — for all its indispensability as a tool
of business and practicality — is also a bearer of values; it is not a culturally neutral device” (2015). Mobile technology allows Christians to imagine themselves as part of a
globally-connected network of believers and allows for predictions of new global nodes
emerging to challenge the historic Western dominance of Christianity, but because these
technological products are produced in a Western, capitalist context, they have in effect
excluded the majority world from their production. As Langdon Winner (1980) reminds
us, artifacts have politics and the mobile phones that have found their way into the hands
of people all around the globe are no exception. The politics that these devices carry with
them are not neutral and though evangelicals have tried to tinker with intellectual property norms, with software, and though they have hacked and innovated, they remain reliant
on an Orientalist vision of the world seeded throughout hundreds of years of problematic
history. They also remain reliant on the system of global capital flows. By assuming that
the increasingly ubiquity of technology and a global digital habitus will create a globe
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connected by the new Roman roads, these Christians are falling into the same trap as their
counterparts in the technology industry who see technological spread and the closing of a
global digital divide as the central problems of the “digital era.” To return to Faye Ginsburg’s critique, in the spread of these culturally, historically situated technologies is the
spread of the ideologies that accompany them and while many Christians are trying to
reimagine and rethink these hegemonic views of technology they have fallen into the
same trap of digital Utopians throughout Silicon Valley’s short history.
Conclusion
In reimagining the global and they ways they might approach it, the evangelicals
involved in the mobile ministry world are also reimagining themselves and their role in a
vast global network connected by the “new Roman roads.” Unlike those in the faith tech
space, these Christians are not out to make money, but rather want to spread the Gospel,
and they see technology as a prime way to do that in an increasingly connected world
defined by the ubiquity of digital technologies and digital habitus. At the same time, their
technological influences are those like Richard Stallman who want to keep technological
products free and open and as such these evangelicals explicitly and implicitly critique
the neoliberal economic principles that govern the technology industry. While some hope
that a connected planet will shift power dynamics and unite the global church, the
rhetoric espoused by many in the mobile ministry movement continues the problematic
rhetoric that has infused missionary work for hundreds of years. And it also reveals the
problems of a technologically deterministic discourse inherited from techno-Utopianism.
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Perhaps more importantly, the Christian missions field has historical baggage
that it carries with it into the digital age. Though the missionaries that I spoke with tend
to see themselves as John Edmiston does, as “ a servant to the majority world” (Edmiston, 2017) and though many spoke about the problematic assumptions that have been
built into missionary work there is still ample evidence that the norms of mobile ministry
are Western, especially American. Furthermore, by emphasizing the importance of technology and borrowing the ideologies of techno-Utopianists like Howard Rheingold and
others, I argue that evangelicals may in fact be intensifying the Orientalist leanings of
Christian missionary work that Christian ecumenicism has been trying to fight against
since 1910.
Digital habitus has changed American evangelical culture and it has changed
the way that many American Christians imagine global outreach, however, this habitus is
culturally and socially situated and may not translate as readily as many evangelicals
hope. Evangelicals have been successful attracting people to their suburban, American,
churches by incorporating technology and strategies from corporate and technological
businesses. Similarly, those creating digital products for Christians have been able to capitalize on the digital habitus in American evangelical culture and in so doing, have promoted it. But in both of these contexts Christian technology enthusiasts have failed to
grapple with the exclusionary basis of the technology industry and of the church world.
Because of this, in the mobile ministry world, when missionaries try to use some of the
same tactics to attract believers in other contexts who they perceive as similarly engaged
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in digital habitus, they run up against the Western, and indeed, white biases of digital culture and of American evangelicalism.

CHAPTER SIX: #AMPLIFYWOMEN
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Evangelicalism and “the crisis” of authority on social media

On April 27, 2017,writer Rachel Held Evans Tweeted in all caps: “LITERALLY
THREW MY PHONE ACROSS THE BEDROOM OVER THIS PIECE” (rachelheldevans, 2017a). Evans was referring to a Christianity Today article entitled “Who is in
charge of the Christian blogosphere?” written by a female Anglican priest, Tish Harrison
Warren (2017). According to Warren’s article, popular Christian bloggers were causing “a
crisis” in Christian culture. Warren used the example of Jen Hatmaker, a social media
celebrity or “micro-celebrity” with over 750,000 followers on Facebook. In 2016, Hatmaker publicly came out for gay marriage and the inclusion of LGBT people in evangelical culture, breaking with the larger church’s stance on homosexuality. In response,
LifeWay Christian stores, a for-profit business affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), the largest Protestant organization in the United States, stopped selling
Hatmaker’s books and prominent evangelicals were forced to take sides–– for or against
Hatmaker’s stance and Hatmaker as a figure. For Warren, Hatmaker was a symptom of a
larger problem, namely the fact that many popular Christian female bloggers have massive followings on social media and thus, outsized influence. As a corrective, Warren’s
article called for increased accountability in the Christian blogosphere, she wrote “If we
are to help build not just a personal brand but a beautiful, faithful church for generations
of women (and men) to come, we must work to strengthen and shape institutions larger
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than ourselves and submit ourselves to the authority and oversight of Christ’s church,
even as we are honest about its frailty and faults” (Warren, 2017).
Rachel Held Evans’ was not the only impassioned response to this article. In fact
the social media response, which centered around Twitter in the days after the article’s
release, but also saw responses cropping up on Medium, personal blogs, and Facebook,
tended to be emotionally driven and connected to the personal stories of hundreds of
women. In many Protestant denominations women cannot be ordained, while in others
they may be allowed to preach but often face cultural barriers to doing so. For many of
these women the Christian blogosphere has been a means to get around the patriarchal
structure of church culture. Because of this, on and around the hashtag created by Christianity Today, #AmplifyWomen, Twitter users passionately debated the role of women
bloggers in evangelical culture.
This chapter examines the #AmplifyWomen hashtag 13 using the method of
“hashtag ethnography” proposed by Bonila and Rosa (2015) and analyzes this discourse
in order to illuminate how social media is giving rise to a new type of evangelical feminism. The conversations generated through the #AmplifyWomen hashtag cast in sharp
relief the uneasy balance between popular postfeminist empowerment discourses, academic feminism, and traditional evangelical gender roles. This discourse reveals a new
13

Interestingly, the same hashtag was used before the Christianity Today article by organizers of the
Women’s March, and then five months later in September of 2017 in an attempt by some Twitter users to
focus on women’s voices on the platform. It is unclear whether or not Christianity Today, in promoting the
use of this hashtag for respondents to their article series on women in evangelicalism was trying to connect
the conversation to the Women’s March, and it is also unclear whether the use of it later was connected to
their earlier use of it by the Christian Tweetosphere. My analysis focuses, then, on the time period in which
this hashtag hailed a specific group of Christians responding to the issues raised by the first Christianity
Today article in the series posted in late April 2017.
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evangelical feminism that has come into being through social media and has created a
crisis of authority in evangelical culture. As such it provides another example of the ways
in which digital habitus is transforming evangelical culture and creating a digital unconscious that has real stakes for the American evangelical social imaginary. But, while the
previous chapters in this study have focused on evangelicals producing technological
products for Christian ends who were by a large margin men, this chapter looks at users,
and more specifically female users, and analyzes how digital habitus fits into their lives,
how it forces specific types of performances, and how because of this, it shifts and complicates the established norms of evangelical culture.
Investigating an affective public on Twitter
Twitter has become a robust site for academic study because it has been seen by
scholars as a particularly salient space for counterpublics to cohere. Through the hashtag
function, topics can be debated by the platform’s whole user base, not just by those people who identify as “friends” or “followers” as on Facebook (see Papacharrissi, 2015, p.
27) and because of this, Marwick and boyd (2011) argue that we should conceptualize
audience on Twitter not as we have thought of mass media audiences in the past, but
rather as networked audiences (p. 129). Twitter’s functionality also allows for amplification of otherwise marginalized voices via networked connections, as has been the case in
the United States with the debate over racism following the police shooting of an unarmed black teenager in Ferguson, Missouri (see Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015;
Bonilla and Rosa, 2015), and debates around feminism and sexism (see Latina & Docher-
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ty, 2014; Clark, 2014; Williams, 2015). Scholars have also studied how Twitter has
helped to connect networks of activists around the world around issues such as the conflict in Gaza (see Siapera et al. 2015), and the protests after the 2009 Iranian election (see
Mottahedeh, 2015). Perhaps the best exemplar of how networked counterpublics thrive
on Twitter is what has come to be dubbed “Black Twitter.” Black Twitter has proven so
influential to contemporary political culture that The Los Angeles Times hired beat reporter Dexter Thomas to cover it (Greenberg, 2015). This Twitter-based counterpublic
has piqued the interest of journalists and academics alike because it demonstrates how the
platform can be used by a network of loosely affiliated people to change public conversation and effect the real world (see Chatman, 2015; Florini, 2014; Clark, 2014; Brock,
2012; Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015). Black Twitter may also be thought of as an
affective public (see Papacharissi, 2015) in which personal, emotional engagement with
issues translates into political engagement, such as with the hashtag #IfTheyGunnedMeDown (Jackson, 2016) and other “blacktags” (Sharma, 2013) that hail those users that
make up Black Twitter and allow for a space for affective connection to take place
through the medium.
The theory of affective publics outlined by Papacharissi (2015) is especially
useful to consider in this context. One scholar of affect theory, Lauren Berlant, has written that “Affect’s saturation of form can communicate the condition under which a historical moment appeals as a visceral moment” (Berlant, 2011, p. 16). The affective, physical,
or visceral reaction a person may have to any given situation, for Berlant is not only per-
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sonal, but collective. It is a reaction to a historical, collective present. Papacharissi brings
affect theory into the digital realm and she concludes that what is created from network
publics on Twitter are “soft structures of feeling” following Williams, or “affect worlds”
following Berlin and these theorizations provide the basis for her term “affective publics”
(2015, p. 116-117). For Papacharissi Twitter discourses see people engaging on a personal level with large-scale political ideas, and they open a space in which storytelling can
take place. By employing hashtags, users can connect their personal stories, ideas, opinions to others, and be hailed by “connective networks.” Users begin to feel part of something larger, even when that thing is amorphous and mediated and in turn they perform a
version of themselves within these connective networks and “these personal declarations
of the self also contain collectivist or civic aspirations” (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 105). Affective publics, then, in Papacharissi’s sense of the term, with their rhythm and movement, with their emotionality, urgency, and senses of play and irony are complex spaces
of engagement that require attuned attention. Thus affective publics on Twitter are particularly suited to ethnographic study.
In this chapter, I employ the method of hashtag ethnography that follows from
the understanding laid out by Bonilla and Rosa in their study of the hashtag #Ferguson
(2015). The authors note that the functionality of the hashtag proves useful for anthropological study as it resembles the note taking and indexing that ethnographic researchers
engage in. Beyond that, a hashtag can be a “mediatized place” where people gather to
discuss and participate in protest movements and other forms of activism. Bonilla and
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Rosa acknowledge that when approaching Twitter ethnographically, a researcher should
not stop at the hashtag, but should “stay with those who tweet and follow them after
hashtags have fallen out of ‘trend.’ Only then can we better understand what brings them
to this virtual place and what they take away from their engagement” (2015). Thus a
hashtag ethnography goes beyond a close reading of Twitter search results. It is a longterm participant-observation project that requires daily engagement. By following several
networked accounts for an extended period of time a researcher may begin to glean the
affective valences and frames of the hashtag and this is especially significant when it
comes to how counterpublics imagine themselves and their collective identities on social
media because as Bonilla and Rosa write, “Whereas in most mainstream media contexts
the experiences of racialized populations are overdetermined, stereotyped, or tokenized,
social media platforms such as Twitter offer sites for collectively constructing counternarratives and reimagining group identities” (2015). It is through social media discourse that
the complex boundaries of identity and belonging can be negotiated.
This method fits well with my understanding of the digital unconscious in
evangelical culture. It is through participation and observation from within the paths of
this unconscious that a researcher may begin to understand the tropes, and the stakes of
the digital realm. Furthermore, the #AmplifyWomen controversy is particularly suited to
hashtag ethnography because unlike the many protest movements that have had a social
media presence, this discourse is endemic to social media; it was a mediated event from
the moment that Christianity Today posted the article online and thus has only existed in
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the digital unconscious. It has never had a real-world, conscious presence. On Twitter,
prolific Tweeters “signal boosted” other writers using the retweet function and producing
Tweets telling others who else they should be following, thereby strengthening the network. Similarly many Twitter users responded with long manifesto-like threads on the
platform, and again, these threads sparked related debates. The Twitter conversation also
burst out into the blogosphere with people taking to Medium and other platforms to express their opinions on the original article. In turn those articles were sometimes Tweeted
out and entered back into the conversation on social media and they often enjoyed large
numbers of commenters.
Many of the women who Tweeted mentioned how emotionally taxing it was for
them to participate. One person wrote about the debate: “I’m tired. I laugh at the hilarious
comebacks to the subjugation of women because my own wounds are so far from healing” (EB_FindingMercy, 2017). Overwhelmingly, the women who participated in the
hashtag conversation did not see themselves as impartial observers commenting academically about evangelical gender roles, but rather saw themselves and their life choices as
implicated by the discourse. Because of this they shared words of encouragement with
each other just as much as they engaged in heated debate with those that disagreed with
them and many shared their personal stories through Twitter threads. Jory Micah, for example, wrote of experiencing gender discrimination in Bible School and being told that
she could not be a pastor because she was a woman. She writes, “I was devastated. I
thought I wasted my life. I questioned my calling/my faith, until God told me to start a
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blog/ministry” (jorymicah, 2017). For Micah and others, when Warren spoke of ordaining
female bloggers, it connoted a history of silencing female voices. And this points to why
the discourse maintained an emotional tenor and became a space for collective storytelling, and mutual encouragement.
Responding to the robust and diffuse discussion that followed the article’s release, editors at Christianity Today added a note to the original article that stated in part,
“the conversation continues to spread and split into what scientists call a dendritic—a series of branching pathways that resemble a tree or a nervous system.” (Warren, 2017). In
my analysis, I take the hashtag #AmplifyWomen as an entry point into this nervous system. I became aware of the controversy because I have followed prominent Christians on
Twitter, including many female bloggers, since I began using the platform in 2014. As the
discourse unfolded I followed as many of the active accounts as I could, checking in daily
and sometimes participating by liking or commenting on the Tweets of prolific posters. I
collected notes and screenshots as a means to keep track of the discursive shifts, commonly used memes, and recurring characters. And I continued to follow these account for
six months after the hashtag fell out of use. As such, my analysis is based not only on the
hashtag #AmplifyWomen, but also on the mediated social world from which its public
springs.
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Evangelicalism and feminism
From the beginnings of evangelicalism in America, as it took on the populist, revivalist themes that would come to define it, the role of women as public figures has been
uneasily debated. As Marilyn Westerkamp explains, Puritan women who publicly expressed their views created a paradoxical situation Puritan culture, especially in the seventeenth century when its traditionally hierarchical social structure began to be swept up
in revivalism. During this time, Puritan “celebrity” Anne Hutchinson became a problematic figure for church leaders because “her spiritual gifts were recognized and admired,
leading people, women and men, to grant her speech authority” (Westerkamp, 2007 p.
54). Like the female bloggers causing today’s “crisis,” women like Hutchinson, because
of their popularity, troubled religious leaders especially when they espoused views at
odds with Puritan orthodoxy–– in the case of Hutchinson Puritan leaders decided the only
recourse was to exile her from their community.
Much has changed in evangelical culture and theology since the seventeenth century, but evangelicals today are still split on the how women should occupy spaces of
power and authority in evangelical ecclesiastical structures and in culture. Though the
landscape is complicated, the evangelical position on gender relations has typically been
characterized by scholars with regard to the schism between egalitarians and complementarians. Egalitarians believe that women and men are equal, and though they are gifted
with different abilities, they should have equal access to power and authority within
churches and families. Complementarians, by contrast, believe women and men are
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meant to fulfill distinct roles in culture and in families; that men are meant to lead and
women to support, for example. Further muddying the waters, this split does not fall neatly along denominational lines, can vary from church to church, and can even shift
throughout a single church’s history. Nonetheless, complementarianism tends to be the
accepted position in most traditional American evangelical churches.
Complementarianism in some ways rigidly fixes gender roles, but in her ethnographic account of two fundamentalist Christian congregations Brenda Brasher (1998)
theorizes that the complementarian church is a “sacred canopy with a sacred partition,”
meaning that women occupy enclaved spaces and exercise their authority from within
these strictures. According to Brasher this has the effect of “Establishing parallel religious
worlds: a general symbolic world led by men that encompasses overall congregational
life and a second, female symbolic world composed of and led solely by women” (Brasher, 1998, p. 5). Thus, though men are in positions of nominal authority, women find ways
to manipulate the structure in which they find themselves in order to create space for their
own voices. Ethnographic and qualitative studies focusing on evangelical women like
Brashers’ then, paint a more complex picture than the simple split between complementarian and egalitarian theology allows.
And though complementarians tend to reject feminism qua feminism, it would
be a mistake to assume that they are cut off from the vagaries of popular and academic
feminist discourse. Manning (1999) found in her qualitative research with conservative
women from Catholic, evangelical and Orthodox Jewish faiths that although they claim
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to be against feminism, most conservative religious women agree with many, if not all, of
the values of feminism; they tend to enjoy working outside of the home, expect fairness
in their workplace, and hold positions of authority in their families. And as Griffith’s
(1997) ethnographic account of Aglow, a prayer organization for charismatic Christian
women reveals, evangelical women have developed various tactics and narratives of empowerment that borrow from discourses found in popular culture and in feminism. For
Griffith, it is a mistake for feminists to write off conservative Christian women and their
experiences as the complexity of their engagement with authority in their churches and in
society is in fact much more complex than the Culture War paradigm allows.
The variegated landscape of evangelical gender relations has become even more
complex in the postfeminist moment. “Postfeminism” is a contested term with sometimes
conflicting referents (see Gill, 2007, p. 249-272). Here, I am using it as Rosalind Gill has
theorized–– as a sensibility marked by certain predilections present in media and popular
culture that is “organized around notions of choice, empowerment, self-surveillance, and
sexual difference and articulated in an ironic and knowing register in which feminism is
simultaneously taken for granted and repudiated” (Gill, 2007, p. 271). This sensibility
relies on an understanding that many of the struggles of second-wave feminism have
been overcome and thus feminism is no longer needed. This sensibility takes as proof
positive the many individual women who have succeeded in their careers and in governments. As Sarah Banet-Weiser puts it “The individual entrepreneur becomes the signature
of a postfeminist women” (2012, p. 61). Thus it is a sensibility that relies on a neoliberal
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understanding of the economic and political world and regards with irony any attempt to
critique the culture of late capitalism. For another theorist of postfeminism, Angela
McRobbie (2009), this is the result of an insidious process that has in effect neutered potentially radical female critique. She writes of the expectations for women in a postfeminist culture: “The new female subject is, despite her freedom, called upon to be silent, to
withhold critique in order to count as a modern, sophisticated girl. Indeed this withholding of critique is a condition of her freedom” (McRobbie, 2009, p. 18). McRobbie looks
to popular culture and explores the ubiquitous idea that women can now “have it all”–– a
well-paying job and a successful family life--without relying on female solidarity or calling for social change.
For McRobbie and others, media is central to the construction of a postfeminist
sensibility. Susan J. Douglas (2010) explored the media landscape in the 1990s and
aughts in order to chart the rise of “enlightened sexism,” the ironic register in which popular culture recognizes and repudiates feminism. Douglas is particularly concerned with
the simultaneous girlification and sexualization of women in media which she believes
has had the effect of setting up overly sexualized bodies and girlish, submissive personalities as normative femininity. With the rise of social media and social media celebrity this
has become increasingly the case. And those women with popular blogs, or “Instafame”
on social media (see Marwick, 2015) are central in shaping what the ideal woman looks
like at any given moment. As Anita Harris writes about the figure of the “future girl” who
creates a mediatized persona for herself, it is in and through media that the promises of
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postfeminist rhetoric can be both displayed and policed (2004). In other words, social
media shapes a certain female habitus that has implications for how women perform
themselves on and through these platforms.
In some ways then, it makes sense that traditional, conservative women would
fit well in a media milieu that prizes traditional femininity. But this is just half of the picture. Though in the 1970s and 80s evangelical women became vanguards of a traditional
femininity constructed in opposition to the burgeoning feminist movement and are often
seen as the reason for many of feminism’s failures in the public sphere (see Stacey,
1983), as Susan Faludi’s research illuminates, the picture within evangelical culture was
always more complex. Faludi writes that the “backlash politics” of the New Right in the
1980s was largely predicated on the fact that Christian men had lost authority in their
own churches and families. These men, Jerry Fallwell and Paul Weyrich, chief among
them, advocated a return to a fabled 1950s vision of womanhood that would have kept
evangelical women in what they believed was their rightful, Biblical place. In order to
roll back the clock on women’s rights, they developed a rhetorical strategy that relied on
a positive sounding message.They were “pro-family” and thus, nominally pro-women,
and they strategically deployed evangelical female spokespeople to help spread their antifeminist vision. Connaught Marshner and Beverly LaHaye epitomized the women of the
New Right who as Faludi writes, “were voicing antifeminist views––while internalizing
the message of the women’s movement and quietly incorporating its tenets of self-determination, equality, and freedom of choice into their private behavior” (256). In many
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ways, the backlash politics fueled by the reactionary fervor of evangelical men won out
and neutralized feminist critique, but feminism within evangelical culture was never
completely squashed.
Since the 1980s, the debate about feminism and women’s proper role in the
church and in culture has raged. Evangelical parachurch organizations have arisen promoting egalitarianism and an evangelical version of feminism that borrows from secondwave and academic feminist discourses. Thus, perhaps as a backlash to the New Right’s
vitriol towards feminism, a reawakening of feminism within evangelical circles has occurred, especially among those who consider themselves egalitarians. The organization
CBE International (Christians for Biblical Equality) established in 1988 is one example
of this trend. Though CBE does not claim to be feminist per se, it advances an agenda
through conferences and media products defined by feminist understandings of female
authority, power, and choice. Their third value in their “Core Principles,” for example,
states: “Patriarchy is an abuse of power, taking from females what God has given them:
their dignity, and freedom, their leadership, and often their very lives” (CBE International, 2017). That a Christian organization rails against “patriarchy” in their mission
statement is an indication that the evangelical rejection of feminism is an overdetermined
narrative. Sarah Bessey’s book Jesus Feminist (2013) is another example of this trend
toward evangelical versions of feminism. In it, Bessey recalls her own familial and personal history in both complementarian and egalitarian churches, refutes many of the
commonly used Biblical justifications for the submission of women to male authority,
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and calls for a new “redemptive movement––for both men and women––toward equality
and freedom” (2013, p. 14). Bessey emphasizes the importance of collective storytelling
and of solidarity among women from all over the world and these themes echo in the
public that engaged with Warren’s article on the hashtag #AmpilfyWomen.
The discourse that followed the Christianity Today article is another indication
that feminism is not dead in evangelical culture, and in fact may be facing a renaissance
due to the affordances of social media. The (mostly) women and (some) men with that
engaged with the debate that flurried around the Christianity Today article and that centered around the #AmplifyWomen hashtag deployed various cultural touchstones, often
displayed a fluency with the argot of academic feminism, and contemporary pop-culture
postfeminism as well as with theological justifications for their understanding of their
own role and the role of women in evangelical culture and society. What erupted through
the #AmplifyWomen hashtag was an affective public that has been many years in the
making, one uneasily defined by feminism, postfeminism, neoliberalism, and evangelical
theology. Importantly, what was expressed shared little in common with the “Pitbull feminism” embodied most famously by Sarah Palin and that saw evangelical anti-feminist
women hope to attain positions of power in order to dismantle any feminist gains (see
Butler, 2012; Douglas, 2010, pp. 267-297; McCarver, 2012; Rodino-Colocino, 2012). It
is rather a real feminist movement, inspired and fueled by female Christian writers, to
promote a diverse array women’s voices in a patriarchal subculture.
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The Crisis
New Charismatic Authorities: Social media habitus and postfeminist performance in the
Christian blogosphere
“The crisis” identified by Tish Harrison Warren was predicated on the popularity
that female Christian celebrities have gained on social media, because of this popularity,
Warren warned that bloggers were gaining outsized influence in evangelical culture–– in
other words they were becoming authorities. Because of this, Warren suggested that
bloggers should be held accountable by formal bureaucratic authorities such as pastors.
Max Weber (1968) divided authority into three types: Rational or legal authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority. Defining charismatic authority he writes that it
relies on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by
him” (Weber, 1968, p. 215). The female bloggers at the center of “the crisis” and of the
affective public it called into being share many things in common, but most importantly,
they have all created self-brands on social media and in so doing they employ an understanding of what it means to be an “authentic” Christian woman, thereby displaying and
policing the boundaries of modern Christian womanhood in and through social media,
and, in so doing, bolstering their charismatic authority. Their feminine performance is in
some ways a result of the normative vision of femininity endemic to the evangelical social imaginary, but it is also a product of the habitus that social media engenders.
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On social media people are encouraged to develop a “self-brand,” a notion that
follows from a ubiquitous understanding of the power of the brand. And Sarah BanetWeiser connects this to postfeminism noting “Postfeminism and interactivity create what
I would call a neoliberal moral framework, where each of us has a duty to ourselves to
cultivate a self-brand” (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p. 56). Yet, self-branding to be successful,
must be somewhat invisible. That is, if it is clear that a social media celebrity is trying to
promote themselves, they lose that crucial air of authenticity–– and “authenticity” is currency on social media. As Alice Marwick has written, authenticity, though a slippery
term, is one of the guiding principles of social media presentation. In her study of the culture of Silicon Valley entrepreneurship, Marwick discusses how the cultivation of “authenticity” in social media is a type of emotional labor and is central for the maintenance
of a self-brand, the most powerful commodity in the social media world-- a commodity
that she notes also has real economic value (see Marwick, 2013, p. 167). Self-branding is
central to the working of social media and it encourages a specific type of performance
that is ongoing, and indeed fits into daily life by design. Successful social media celebrities post photographs and selfies daily, and thus constantly reinforce their brand through a
performative habitus demanded by the medium.
Though I will argue that these women at the center of a new evangelical feminist movement, they all brand themselves within a narrow understanding of the meaning
of femininity that relies on reified notions of the role of women as homemakers, and as
caregivers and in this way they perform their identities within the norms of a social media
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landscape dominated by postfeminist sensibilities. Jen Hatmaker, for example, on the
“about me” section of her website first emphasizes her role as a mother and a wife and
then says, “I love Jesus. I am absolutely that girl. I feel so tender toward Him that sometimes I think I'll die” (Hatmaker, 2017). Hatmaker’s emotional, indeed girly characterization of her spirituality is part and parcel of her authenticity. She does not portray herself
as a theologian or even as a woman, but rather as a down-home girl, whose love of Jesus
and her family guides everything she does. Beth Moore provides another example of how
self-branding functions along a narrow path for evangelical women bloggers. Like Hatmaker she presents herself as a mother and wife first and her role as a Christian is characterized as an abiding passion, “At the age of 18, Beth sensed God calling her to work for
Him. Although she couldn’t imagine what that would mean, she made it her goal to say
yes to whatever He asked” (Moore, 2017). Again, her theological understandings is characterized as coming from a place of girlish passion and her pursuits, though deeply-felt,
as generally submissive. These women also style themselves and their photos in a similar
way. They wear conservative but fashionable clothing, they often photograph themselves
lit in golden-hour light, they have fun, goofy pictures of themselves on social media and
their personalities seem to match their style. They come across as approachable mom
types. This type of self-branding is common in the postfeminist media landscape where
girliness, beauty, and traditional femininity are prized. These Christian women are “having it all” in their own way––they are mothers and wives, but they also hope to “spread
the gospel,” preach, teach, and speak out in evangelical culture.
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And because of this, despite their folky femininity, these women pose a threat to
evangelical authority and are at the root of what Tish Harrison Warren calls “the crisis.”
Postfeminist tropes of femininity have helped some evangelical bloggers become
celebrities and thus, they are seen as dangerous figures. Their digital habitus on display
also adds to their authority. Banet-Weiser notes that “Self-branding, in the postfeminist
context, becomes the selective hallmark of how to insert oneself into the future, as savvy,
technologically astute, and invested in visibility” (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p. 86). Evangelical women writers and bloggers want to stake a claim on being modern, and to achieve
this they turn to digital habitus and the mores of the social media milieu.
Yet, though savvy self-branding techniques have helped these women gain the
followers that they have, they have expressed uneasiness with the practice. In a Tweet
that has since been deleted Moore said she was “sick to death” of personal branding, and
noted that “It'll be a grievous mistake to cater to culture with a selfie gospel. All we'll lose
are numbers that weren't real anyway. Preach the cross.” She was a strange figure to be
voicing this critique as she has made her name in evangelical culture through her video
ministries, all plastered with her name and face, and marketed to Christian women’s
groups. Later clarifying her position on her blog Moore wrote:
Selling our souls doesn’t always involve money. I could sell my soul just for
the power of having a blog that attracts hundreds of thousands of readers. It’s
about notoriety, an understandable and legitimate goal out in the world market.
But we are Jesus followers. We’re attempting to sell ourselves in the name of

!186
Jesus. We’re being tutored in the post-Christian modern art of self-glory for
God’s glory. (2017).
Moore struggles with social media’s seeming insistence on this specific perfomative habitus, the maintenance of a self-brand. And though she states succinctly, “There is no godly
way to self-promote” (Moore, 2017), she also notes that she falls victim to this imperative
of social media. Here, Moore voices the bind in which evangelical female bloggers find
themselves. To self-promote self-consciously would be inauthentic, and further, would be
a type of selling out that Moore characterizes as “post-Christian,” however, it is through
self-promotion that her platform has thrived. Moore herself, despite her protestations
against it, is a master of the self-brand and because of this she has nearly 800 thousand
followers on Twitter. But as Moore’s polemic against self-branding reveals some selfawareness of the fact that self-branding is ultimately a neoliberal exercise. Nonetheless,
Moore has continued to post selfies on Twitter, she has continued to cultivate her brand in
the months that followed this article. And it is because the bloggers at the center of the
#AmplifyWomen controversy have mastered the postfeminist art of the self-brand that
they have the audience that they have. These women have become authorities in Christian
culture by creating a self-brand that relies on an understanding of what it means to be an
authentic Christian woman. Interestingly, that charismatic authority achieved by deploying their authentic, normative, Christian femininity has been leveraged against the traditional authoritative structures of evangelical gender relations––again, this is why it was
dubbed a “crisis” by Christianity Today. And that the perceived attack on these new au-
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thority figures that the Christianity Today article seemed to levy, opened up a space for
individual women to come forward, form connective bonds with others, and create a new
feminist affective public.

A populist religion meets a democratic medium
Women drew upon two social imaginaries in their response to the article, that of
evangelicalism as a particularly democratic religious tradition and that of the internet as a
democratic space for expression. Arguing against Warren’s thesis, the idea that the Christian blogosphere should be accountable to a more formal authority, Twitter users deployed
both of these ideas on the hashtag #AmplifyWomen as a way to defend the practice of
blogging, which they characterized as e a space for female expression in evangelical culture.
Responding on her own blog, Christian writer, Keri Wyatt Kent explained why
she disagreed with Warren and echoed a sentiment that was often repeated in the #AmplifyWomen conversation. She wrote: “To ask why women don’t serve within the authority
and structure of the church is a bit tone deaf. The people ‘in charge’ of many Christian
women have told them to sit down, be quiet, or go change some diapers in the
nursery” (Kent, 2017). For Kent and others the blogosphere has become a place of refuge
for Christian women, much like the ministries from which women have traditionally exercised their authority. But unlike those ministries, the internet has provided women with
platforms from which they can preach to large audiences, albeit unofficially. Digital habi-
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tus has liberated many female voices, and because of this, to corral blogging under the
authority of church culture, as Warren seems to suggest is the purpose of her article,
would be akin to telling women to go back, sit down, or to change diapers in the nursery.
The blogosphere provides a corrective to the entrenched patriarchal authority of
the church world and as such, many argued, it should not answer to any authoritative
structures. A Twitter user calling herself “April Persisting” wrote, “If I thought the broader church was completely right about everything (especially women in ministry), I
WOULDN'T HAVE A BLOG,” (Revolfaith, 2017; Emphasis in the original), and “Hey,
institution that could be leading ppl astray. Would you ensure I don't say anything you
think would lead ppl astray?" (Revolfaith, 2017). Here, the blogosphere is cast as a workaround, a way for women to speak without having to submit themselves to the authority
of a church that, as another user pointed out, “has almost exclusively been shaped by
straight white men” (Carly_Hanney, 2017). As a corrective to a culture seemingly controlled by white men, then, women have taken to the internet, to their own blogs. Not unlike the women Brenda Brasher studied who occupied their side of a “sacred partition,”
women flocked to blogging as a means of expressing themselves. But unlike those
women who have always taught and preached to their communities in their own way,
they found on the new medium a way to connect to thousands, even millions of people.
They were truly amplified, and not only that they were also able to create connections
with people who thought like them given the affordances of digital media. As Jory Micah
Tweeted, “The blogosphere gave me the female leaders I was looking for, but couldn't
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find in the Church - women standing up for justice” (Jorymicah, 2017b). The internet allowed women like Micah access to a community they might not have otherwise found––
a community of like-minded women thinkers. Thus, Warren’s piece threatened a space
that seemed tailored to women and the women on the hashtag fought to keep social media
as a protected space for women’s voices.
People commonly Tweeted about the Biblical justifications for lay authority and
used irony as a means of pointing out the hypocrisy implicit in the idea that female bloggers should be subject to institutional authority. They focused on the person of Jesus, who
as many people noted, was not an ordained minister or part of a church establishment.
One user wrote, “The funniest thing about last week's #AmplifyWomen convo & needing
to be ordained to have a platform is that I serve the son of a carpenter” and included in
her Tweet a Gif of pop star Rihanna winking (LysandraJanee, 2017). And another, again
deploying irony: “Would a carpenter/stonemason from a tiny town have the correct authority to write a blog? Asking for a friend” (Kimincrete, 2017).
Many women also brought up the figure of Mary Magdalene, the woman who
was said to have travelled with Jesus and who, in two of the gospels revealed his resurrection. Megan Westra joked about Mary’s role as an authority saying: “Mary: ‘Jesus is
risen!’Disciples: ‘Who gave you permission to say such a thing?’”(Mwestramke, 2017).
A popular female writer, Ann Voskamp wrote a response on her blog in a litany style that
emphasized her humility as an unordained woman and worked to connect that humility to
other Biblical figures, “Yeah, I don’t know much of anything, except that we all need
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each other, that we all belong to each other, but seems like maybe God has always chosen
women who felt less than, women that no one thought were enough: Tamar was harlot,
Ruth was an outsider, the wife of Uriah , who became the wife of David, was an adulteress, and Rahab was a woman of the night” (Voskamp, 2017). This defense and the style in
which it is voiced speaks to evangelicalism as a populist, democratic, folk religion where
humility and humble beginnings are often prized over institutional authority. Evangelicalism is littered with figures, who, just as these women did, used their own Biblical exegeses as a means to establish their authority. The lay preachers that spread Christianity
throughout America during the Second Great Awakening were similarly unordained. And
like the female bloggers at the center of this “crisis” their charismatic reach threatened
established religious order (see Fitzgerald, 2017, pp. 13-48).
Evangelicalism, even when it is not the religion of the lower classes, tends to believe itself to be a folk religion. Since the Second Great Awakening anti-authoritarian and
anti-clerical sentiments have been prevalent and charisma and popularity have been prerequisites for leadership (see Fitzgerald, 2017). Mark A. Noll in exploring the anti-intellectual “desires” of evangelicalism notes that “the evangelical ethos is activistic, populist,
pragmatic, and utilitarian” (Noll, 1994, p. 4). Because of this, the idea of evangelicalism
as a populist religion marries well with the idea of the internet as a democratic space.
Blogging is an inherently democratic medium–– a common understanding that many
users pointed out. For example, one wrote, “‘Some of these bloggers aren't accountable to
formal church authority!’ That's not a bug, it's a feature” (Violet_Sakinacy, 2017). And
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another: “The fact that churches can't police... diverse voices on the internet is... what
makes the internet great” (JacksonDame, 2017). These Tweets portray Warren and evangelical authorities who might police the internet as behind the times, clinging to a structure that the internet has blown up. They seem to suggest that evangelicals are struggling
with the democratization of information itself. Austin Channing addressed this with recourse to the history of media use in evangelical culture and the moral panics that have
accompanied technological change, “We survived the printing press, radio,
televangelists... I think we will survive the blogosphere, and whatever is next. I'm not
worried” (AustinChanning, 2017).
The women who called upon the social imaginary of the internet as a place where
anyone might be able to participate and the social imaginary of evangelicalism as a horizontal culture, then, presented an alternate view of the evangelical church in the twentyfirst century. Their vision was a church in which all people might have the authority to
preach or teach through the medium of the internet and in this way, many argued, they
might break the patriarchal hold on evangelical culture that they have found to be a silencing force in their individual lives. In other words, these women fought for a new version of evangelicalism in which women can finally have an equal voice.

Voicing a new intersectionality
The conversation on the #AmplifyWomen hashtag had an antecedent, the discourse surrounding the two hashtags #ThingsOnlyChristianWomenHear and #Things-
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OnlyBlackChristianWomenHear. The former hashtag was started by a Christian female
writer Sarah Bessey who wrote Jesus Feminist, and saw women sharing stories of being
shamed and in some cases abused in and around church culture. A typical Tweet that used
this hashtag referenced the subtle sexism implicit in Christian culture as women recalled
being told things like “‘You better cover up or you'll make boys sin’” (LydLikeJar, 2017).
Other users shared stories of abuse and oppression, like the woman who wrote “My pastor told me to be a good wife and my husband wouldn't beat, rape and try to kill
me” (RadicallySaved7, 2017). This hashtag also became a discursive space in which
women shared stories and pushed back against people who tried to discredit their experiences.
The latter hashtag #ThingsOnlyBlackChristiansHear was started in response to
the first by Ekemini Uwan (@sista_theology) as a way to indicate that the initial hashtag
hailed a public that was defined by an a priori whiteness. This hashtag dealt not only with
gender discrimination but also with racism in evangelical culture and with the intersectional subjectivity of black Christian women. For example, one user recalled hearing in
church: “‘It wasn't wrong for Christians to have slaves. They had slaves in the
Bible.’” (Pinklady404, 2017). As the online magazine Faithfully, a publication that focuses on the concerns of Christian women of color explained, however, the hashtag
#ThingsOnlyBlackChristianWomenHear did not garner the same amount of public attention outside of the Twitter discussion as the initial hashtag which was covered by several
Christian media outlets (see Menzie, 2017). These dueling hashtags reveal another parti-
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tion in evangelical culture between white Christians and black Christians. Though many
churches have explicitly attempted to create multicultural faith spaces as the research on
Los Angeles church Mosaic by Gerardo Marti explores (2005), American churches remain largely segregated spaces. One ethnographic study argues that white evangelical
churches systematically exclude people of color by applying “race tests” in white spaces
as a form of boundary maintenance (Bracey & Moore, 2017).
On the hashtag #AmplifyWomen, many brought up the question of intersectionality and asked where women of color stood in this debate. Austin Channing, a black
Christian writer who focuses on racial reconciliation in the evangelical church, noted of
the article that “The Problem goes beyond we need more woc writers. The Problem is
how often whiteness shapes, defines, is the beginning of the conversation”(Austinchanning, 2017b). And Nish Weiseth, herself a white Christian writer agreed with Channing.
Weiseth posted a thread that began “1. CT made a huge mistake by not leading & centering the conversation from the perspective of women of color. Full stop” (NishWeiseth,
2017a). In the conversation that followed, the women that participated referenced feminism and intersectionality explicitly and discussed ways in which they felt that church
culture was complicit in excluding people of color. Weiseth also referenced the fact that
women of color are not represented on editorial boards at magazines or as writers. Selfconsciously, she noted what she felt was her place in this conversation as a white women
standing up for the concerns of women of color: “That's why I'll keep swinging. It's not
your responsibility. It's ours” (NishWeiseth, 2017b) and another account chimed in saying
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“I'll keep swinging too. What the point of privilege if we don't use it to go to
bat?” (ShannonDingle, 2017). This conversation was a striking moment that saw white
evangelical women using anti-racism discourse along with anti-sexism discourse in an
attempt to build a coalition.
This is particularly significant given that many theorists have argued that postfeminism is an ethos that prizes individualism and individual achievement above all. It is
a neoliberal understanding of the world that does not allow for collective engagement to
take place. Angela McRobbie has called theorized this with regard to the cultural politics
of disarticulation (2009, p. 24-53). McRobbie draws on Stuart Hall’s understanding of
“articulation” in politics--the idea that in a deliberative democracy political power comes
from the ability to draw connections among multiple subjectivities–– in order to make the
case that feminism has been disarticulated. She writes, “In social and cultural life there is
instead a process of unpicking the seams of connection, forcing apart and dispersing subordinate social groups who might have possibly found some common cause (2009, p. 26).
For McRobbie, feminism has been disarticulated from anti-racism and thus it is significant to see evangelical feminists attempting to reclaim these connections.
That anti-racism discourse did not stand out and was not criticized or silenced
in this public is also interesting given the fact that most evangelical Christians identify as
Republicans and 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump in the 2016
election. The public that sprang forth around the #AmplifyWomen hashtag countered
these statistics rhetorically borrowing from liberal politics and criticizing Trump. Rachel
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Held Evans, for example, pointed out the irony of evangelicals calling for accountability
in the blogosphere after the election of Trump: “Evangelicals: We put a racist, lying, sexual predator in the oval office. Let's do a series on why Jen Hatmaker's shouldn't
blog” (Rachelheldevans, 2017b). In many ways this public, then, runs counter to the larger evangelical voting public. Yet the fact that it is comprised of popular figures perhaps
indicates why, again, these voices may be precipitating a crisis in evangelical culture.
Through social media a new coalition of evangelical feminists is being called into being.
Like Hatmaker, these women do not always accept evangelical cultural or political orthodoxy, but both the popularity of female Christian bloggers and the affective nature of the
public that defends them indicate that people are listening to these new shepherds of the
flock.
Conclusion
Social media has provided a new means for evangelical women to gain a voice
in evangelical culture and it is a space that women have shown they will passionately
protect. The article in Christianity Today written by Tish Harrison Warren sparked a debate that revealed the ways in which this affective public has come into being and been
defined in and through social media. As such it wrestles with typical social media bugaboos, the anxiety that surrounds the performative habitus of social media; the democratization of information and speech; questions of authority and celebrity––but it filters this
through the lens of evangelical culture and theology.
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The discourse presented here can also been seen, I argue, as establishing the
boundaries of a new evangelical feminism. This version of feminism promotes the idea
that women should have equal authority to men, they should be able to voice their opinions in public in any way that they see fit, and that their theological and cultural opinions
should be taken seriously. Their version of feminism does not include sexual liberation
and only scratches the surface of gender as a construct, and in these ways, they do not
resemble second-wave, third-wave, or postfeminist feminists. And yet, their understanding of female liberation should be taken seriously as it indicates that there is a grassroots
movement of women from a conservative subculture who identify or are beginning to
identify as feminists. This is no small thing given the historical opposition that evangelicals have put up to feminism for the last forty years and if, following McRobbie, the only
course forward for feminism is to re-articulate the bonds that women from diverse backgrounds share, then dismantling the narrative that claims evangelicals are anti-feminist
this public may indicate that a stepping stone toward that goal exists.
The crisis is also about the encroachment of progressive politics into the arena of
authority. Women are speaking using the language of progressive feminism. These unordained, unsanctioned voices are all the more dangerous because the platforms available to
them offer them a stage on which to create their personal brand and cultivate their
charismatic authority. These women, many of whom have been left out of the ecclesiastical structures of their denominations, or having been siloed into traditional female roles,
approach the medium of the internet with the intent to disrupt structures that have bound
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their voices in the past. Because of this, the Christianity Today article struck a nerve.
Women writers responded emotionally to the perceived threat of oppression. The democratization of information has in some ways liberated female voices in evangelicalism. Yet
many, like Tish Harrison Warren, fear that this liberation has gone too far and that these
women have too much authority, just as they did in the days of Anne Hutchinson.
In contrast to the previous case studies, which all focused on men whose goal was
to harness the digital habitus in evangelicalism as a means to bring people closer to the
church or to the gospel, this chapter has shown that digital habitus may also have unintended consequences for evangelical culture. It is through digital habitus, through reading
blogs, posting on Twitter, uploading selfies that a large network of women are questioning the roles that they have historically played in evangelical culture. And it is through
the performative habitus of social media that new authorities are springing up. While
many evangelicals hope that by modernizing their strategies and using technology as a
means of outreach and community building they may remain a relevant force in contemporary American culture, they also run the risk of modernizing evangelical culture. In
other words of being “in and of the world.”

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
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The anti-technological option

Against all odds, Rod Dreher’s The Benedict Option (2017), an appeal to transform American Christianity so that it might more closely resemble the ascetic practices of
Benedictine monks, made the New York Times Bestseller list in 2017. Dreher writes that
Christians need to retreat from politics and the public sphere and to create their own
counter-cultural communities and he explains that these communities should build
schools, follow strict guidelines, rules, and rituals and in many cases might require Christians to sacrifice their careers and middle-class comforts. In this way Christians in America would become a network of orthodox communities of believers not unlike the many
orthodox Jewish communities who live in the modern world, but also strictly set their
cultural practices and daily habitus apart from it. Ultimately, Dreher urges American
Christians to “build a Christian way of life that stands as an island of sanctity and stability amid the high tide of liquid modernity” (2017, p. 54).
Central to his understanding and critique of modernity is his antipathy for consumer technologies and for digital habitus. Dreher writes, “Our barbarians have exchanged the animal pelts and spears of the past for designer suits and
smartphones” (2017, p. 17) and he refutes the discourse that technology is a morally neutral tool, as many, including Bobby Gruenewald of Life.Church, have argued.14 Instead
14

See Grenewald’s TEDx talk from 2012, available on YouTube, in which he explains how technology is a
neutral tool that can be used for good or evil ends.
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Dreher implores Christians to see how the technological worldview that their interactions
with ubiquitous media is harming their faith. He believes that the impulse in Christian
culture to use technological tools is wrong-headed. In his view, “Technology itself is a
kind of liturgy that teaches us to frame our experiences in the world in certain ways and
that, if we aren’t careful, profoundly distorts our relationship to God, to other people, and
to the material world–– and even our own self-understanding” (Dreher, 2017, p. 220). He
prescribes strict media diets for Christians and Christian families and unequivocally condemns tech-saturated worship spaces. For Dreher, technology has encroached on culture
and though many claim that it can be used for positive, even Godly ends, Dreher dissents.
It follows from Dreher’s argument, in other words, then, not only that the medium is the
message but that the message of smartphones and other consumer technologies is ultimately an un-Christian one.
Interestingly, Dreher seems to read the trajectory of modernity in the same way
as many technologically-minded evangelicals in that he believes that Christians are losing
their place in the public sphere, however, he draws radically different conclusions and
indeed refutes many of the discourses about technology that have come to the fore in
Christian culture in the last decade. Dreher represents the backlash to the American evangelical embrace of new media technologies and his popularity proves that there is an audience who is receptive to hearing these ideas. Yet less than a year after the release of
Dreher’s book, Wired magazine reported on a megachurch pastor in Pennsylvania who
had left his church in order to start a virtual reality (VR) church (French, 2018), smart-
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phone apps geared toward evangelical audiences have continued to proliferate, and networks of Christians on social media have only grown, in fact Dreher himself has become
a popular figure on what might be considered “Christian Twitter.” Despite Dreher’s warnings, then, it seems that digital habitus is continuing to shape evangelical culture and the
digital unconscious of evangelicalism is continuing to grow.
As I have shown with the case studies in this project, the prevailing winds in
evangelical culture have been blowing against Dreher’s understanding of technology in
the last ten years. Relative to other religious traditions, evangelicals have embraced new
media technologies and have integrated them into nearly every aspect of evangelical culture–– which, as I argue is consistent with their historical attitudes toward new media
technologies such as radio and television. Just as evangelicals have historically used media technologies to spread their message, evangelicals today take to digital media enthusiastically. And in their use of the internet, evangelicals have begun to conceptualize their
place in the world in a different way. From the digital church leaders that hope to reach a
global population, to those entrepreneurs coding for a deeper purpose, to those missionaries who imagine the globe as a connected network of mobile phones, to those bloggers
and Tweeters seeking new forms of community engagement, evangelicalism has changed
as it has eagerly adopted the norms of the digital age. I have argued that this is the result
of American evangelicalism, as a populist religion, a continuation of their history of using
and remixing popular media technologies in order to remain relevant in the modern
world. A continuation, then, of the tradition of pouring old wine in new wineskins. But,
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my case studies also assert that their shift to the digital is different in qualitative and fundamental ways from other shifts throughout their history as it has shifted and shaped the
social imaginary of evangelicalism, and changed and upended the norms, discourses, and
practices of it.
Central to my understanding of how evangelicalism is being shaped by digital
habitus is my assertion that that the people who comprise this study share a digital unconscious, which functions in a similar manner to Walter Benjamin’s “optical unconscious,”
that is, as a display of collective beliefs and practices. To mine this digio-cultural assemblage for data, I have used various real-world and virtual methods. In attending churches
all over the country, interviewing Christians working in tech, as missionaries, and as
church leaders, and engaging in a “hashtag ethnography” of Christian Twitter users, I
have found that American evangelicals have adopted the argot, idioms and habitus of
digital culture and in so doing have created new meanings and narratives, new networks,
spaces, and hybrid forms, and new questions within evangelicalism about who counts as
a proper authority.
My study has shown that American Christians have transformed their churches
in order to appeal to a suburban culture that increasingly expects and is impressed by innovative technological tools and tech businesses and I take Life.Church, the “startup
church” in Edmond, Oklahoma is the prime example of this trend and a leader in this
movement toward a teched-up church culture. Though Life.Church is innovative in its
approach, this “startup church” can also be seen as the culmination of evangelical church
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growth strategies which have relied on demographic data to tailor the experience and
style of church to the preferences of American suburbanites. Because Americans today
engage in digital habitus, churches are now redefining themselves based on these technologies and practices, hence the startup church.
In Silicon Valley and beyond, Christians have entered the tech industry and
have created new apps. For some this is a way to tap a seemingly lucrative and ignored
niche market, but for others, tech business is a place in which evangelicals might imagine
how to redeem the business world, the tech industry, and even American culture more
broadly conceived. Though Christian business people believe in the redemptive potential
of technology and business, they also struggle to define their place in a corporate culture
whose ultimate and sometimes only goal is money-making. I argue that these entrepreneurs also fail to reckon with the biases of the technology industry and instead often reproduce them in their own businesses.
In contrast to the corporate worlds of church and startup culture, Christian missionaries have employed the rhetoric of the FOSS movement in the creation of new lower-tech technologies that they hope will be a new key to evangelizing to unreached people
groups. Those in the “mobile ministry” movement, inspired by free culture advocates
have tried to imagine ways to spark indigenous media production, much as the tech industry often purports to do––though their efforts have not proven fruitful and have often
laid bare the biases endemic to Western-based technologies and the ideologies they carry
with them.
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And lastly, women, whose voices have historically been pushed to the margins
of evangelical culture, have begun to make connections and find new authorities through
social media, even, I argue to the point of strengthening the bonds of a new connective
evangelical feminism. Interestingly, this movement has centered around a few female
bloggers who deploy a performative habitus on and through social media that follows the
logic of the medium and especially its reliance on self-branding as a central practice. Yet,
though these bloggers perform their feminine evangelical identity within the strictures of
evangelical understandings of womanhood, they have become charismatic authorities and
have carved out new spaces for women form networks and communities on social media
platforms like Twitter and these women have begun to question some of the central shibboleths of evangelical culture including its racially exclusionary past.
At stake in the transforming social imaginary this study charts, then, are the
recurring tropes of evangelicalism: modernity, authority, gender, and race. At stake too
are the myths exported from Silicon Valley culture: the myth of the meritocracy, and the
myth of “disruption.” Each of the case studies sketched out here illustrates a way that
Christian culture in the United States has fundamentally changed in response to what is
seen as “the digital age” and ways in which evangelicals have attempted to exert their
own influence on digital culture. And, if history is any teacher, evangelicals will not retreat, as Dreher hopes but will continue to change and adapt in response to the next innovations that capture the popular imagination.
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In offices, church basements, and homes across the country I have spoken with
evangelicals who see their role as technological vanguards as central to the future of
Christianity. Many believe that technological tools can and will hasten the return of
Christ, and because of this, to ignore these tools would be wrong, even sinful. I have spoken to others who see a clear market for their products and do not imagine their role in
Christian culture going far beyond that. But in all cases I have found an evangelical culture that is interpenetrated with the habitus of digital culture. Yet as Dreher indicates,
these changes, for some may have gone too far. Like Tish Harrison Warren, the priest
who challenges the role of female bloggers and their charismatic authority, Dreher sees
the technological world encroaching on traditional Christian values.
It may be that technology is a type of spiritual kryptonite as Rod Dreher wants
to assert, or it may be that it is the path that leads to a more robust Christian presence in
the public sphere as most of the subjects of this study would hope. In either case it seems
impossible to imagine an American evangelicalism that completely divorces itself from
the technological tools that have been thoroughly embedded into the ecosystem of this
culture. Unlike other faith traditions, evangelicals have proven themselves ready to jump
in and try out new media. And as my case studies have shown, these experiments have
changed what it means to worship, to proselytize, and to form communities in evangelical
culture today. Digital culture has changed how evangelicals think and operate, and how
they see themselves as inhabitants in the modern world and as passengers in Christian
history.
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Perhaps not coincidentally, along with Dreher’s critique of the technological
trajectory of American evangelicalism, there has been a concurrent backlash in American
culture against the sloganeering of the tech industry. Platforms like Facebook, which once
promised a more connected world, are now coming under scrutiny for empowering hate
groups and enabling the mass dissemination of false and misleading information. 15 The
academic discourse that had seen the future of technology as empowering to activism and
democratic norms, 16 has been challenged by prominent scholars who show that the reali ty on the ground is vastly more complicated (see Tufekci, 2017). The popularity of
Dreher’s book and his vision for the future of Christians as a counterculture in the United
States seems to point to the continued interest that evangelicals have of keeping up with
non only the flows, but the ebbs of the popular cultural tide.
If it is difficult to imagine an American evangelicalism that is not infused with
techiness, it also may be because it is increasingly difficult to imagine being an American
without access to consumer technologies. Americans are increasingly living lives in some
digital realm or another, whether or not they are conscious of it. It is getting harder and
harder to opt out of digital databases that store identity-defining metadata. We have been
conditioned to understand that our photos, files, and stored “in a cloud” somewhere. My
study has shown that a subset of American evangelicalism is preoccupied by the possibilities that digital media technologies might hold for their movement. But I also hope to
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Myriad news articles have been published exploring how social media, and especially Facebook has enabled the spread of dangerous and misleading stories. See for example, Carey, 2017 in The New York Times.
16

See for example Benkler, 2006.
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have made the case that the ideals and visions of the technology industry have come to
occupy a particular place in the American social imaginary. Ultimately, if American
evangelicals are changing as they respond to an increasingly ubiquitous digital culture, it
may be because we all are.

APPENDIX A
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A glossary of evangelical terms
Altar call
Typically occurring at the end of a sermon or other Christian event, this is the
time when the pastor or orator urges anyone in the crowd to come to the front and
“be saved.”
The Body of Christ sometimes abbreviated to The Body
The conceptualization of the global aggregate of all Christian believers in the
world.
Capital C Church
As in “The Body of Christ” this refers to all Christian believers in an ecumenical
sense.
The Early Church
The Christian church described in the Book of Acts.
Fruit
This term comes from The Book of Matthew (7:15-20) that quotes Jesus as saying
of false prophets “You will know them by their fruits” and it refers to the idea that
Christians should prove themselves based on their actions rather than their words.
It is often used in reference to people’s behavior.
Fundamentalism
This is a term that was inaugurated by a series of pamphlets called The
Fundamentals in the early twentieth century. Fundamentalists advocated for a
strict, literal understanding of the Bible and for Christians to retreat from worldly
affairs. After the Scopes trial of 1925, fundamentalism fell out of favor. Most
American evangelicals do not consider themselves fundamentalists today.
Gifts
This refers to an individual’s spiritual strengths conceived of as springing from
the Holy Spirit. Though it is meant to connote spiritual gifts this term is also used
more broadly as when a person is said to have “the gift of organization” for
example.
The Gospel
Specifically denotes the first four books of the New Testament, but connotes what
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Christians see as the “good news” of the story of Jesus Christ and his significance
as a savior of all people.
The Great Commission
This term refers to the goal set by Jesus in the Book of Matthew (Matthew
28:16-20) that his followers go forth and make disciples of all people.
Harvest
In the missionary context, this refers to the idea that there are souls in the world
that need to be spiritually harvested, or saved, as in a successful mission would
reap a bountiful harvest.
Kingdom
Refers to the Biblical idea of the Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Heaven and
is used to connote a spiritual world that is under the authority of God and Jesus.
-work
Work done in service to the Kingdom. Typically missions work and church
work fall into this category.
-tools
Any technology that can be conceived of as helping with or doing
“Kingdom work.”
Least of these
From the Book of Matthew (25:40), this refers to those who are poor,
downtrodden or in any way seen as lesser than.
Missional
A way of being, or doing things that is meant to attract people to Christianity.
Parachurch
A Christian organization that is not a church, usually a non-profit organization.
Pentecost
A Biblical event that was said to have occurred after Jesus’ ascension from death.
At this moment the Holy Spirit was said to have descended on 120 of Jesus’
disciples. This is seen as the spiritual beginning of the Christian church. It is often
referenced as a theological shorthand meant to signify that all Christian believers
have the authority of the Holy Spirit.

!209
Revival
Usually meant to refer to a period in a church’s history with a heightened spiritual
significance. Revivals have been important events in American Christianity and
their emotional, affective dimensions have been been shaping forces in
evangelicalism.
Saved
The moment when a person commits to being a Christian by “accepting Jesus as a
personal savior.”
Spiritual formation
A person’s spiritual growth path, or how a person grows in spirituality as a
Christian, as in how a child in the church may grow up to become a faithful adult.
Testimony
The way that a Christian may “witness” their faith usually told as a personal
conversion story.
The Unchurched
Refers to all of those people who chose not to attend church. Usually does not
refer to people in places where Christianity is not prevalent but rather references
secular people in the United States.
Unreached people groups
Coming from the missionary tradition this refers to the theory that there are
ethnolinguistic groups of people that cannot neatly be divided by nation that
have not been reached by Christianity.
Walk, Walks, Walk with God
Often shortened to simply “walk,” this refers to the proverbial “walk with God,”
that is every individual person’s life path as a Christian. The idea of “different
walks” signifies diverse life experiences.
Witness, Witnessing
To bear witness as a Christian is to share one’s faith with others.
Word of God
Typically used to refer to the Bible.
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